The effects of inter- and intra-cultural variations on managerial discretion and the implications for national competitiveness by Haj Youssef, M. & Haj Youssef, M.
WestminsterResearch
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/westminsterresearch
 
The effects of inter- and intra-cultural variations on managerial 
discretion and the implications for national competitiveness
Haj Youssef, M.
 
This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of Westminster. 
© Mr Moustafa Haj Youssef, 2017.
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
  
 
UNIVERSITY OF WESTMINSTER 
 
 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF INTER- AND INTRA-CULTURAL 
VARIATIONS ON MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 
 
 
Moustafa Haj Youssef 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of 
Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 2017
  
 
ii 
Abstract 
This thesis examines cross-cultural differences in managerial discretion and the extent to which 
variations in inter- and intra-cultural practices affect the degree of freedom in decision-making 
that is afforded to executives. Research into the degree of discretion, or ‘latitude’ of executive 
action, has primarily focused on individual-, firm-, and industry-level factors which, either 
enable or otherwise constrain the freedom of executive action. However, research into its 
national-level antecedents and consequences remains limited. This thesis further develops and 
extends the extant literature into the topic of managerial discretion by seeking to adopt a 
broader interpretation of national culture in relation to its effect on executive discretion across 
18 countries from 6 different regional clusters.  
The research entails a quantitative assessment to examine the relationship between 
cultural practices, managerial discretion and national competitiveness. The investigation into 
the national-level antecedents, consequences and the role of managerial discretion is studied 
using a mixture of primary and secondary data. Primary data consists of measurements of the 
degree of managerial discretion that is derived from survey responses of a panel of senior 
management consultants, who provided 792 discretion scores for the sampled countries. 
Secondary data consists of cultural practices derived from GLOBE cross-cultural project and 
national competitiveness scores operationalized using the Global Competitiveness Index 
(GCI). 
The thesis presents three empirical analyses of socio-cultural dynamics. The research 
first addresses how cross-national variations in cultural practices impact managerial discretion. 
The findings reveal that institutional collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, 
future-, humane-, and performance orientations, together with gender egalitarianism, 
assertiveness and cultural looseness, all influence the degree of discretion. In the second 
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iii 
dimension, the notion that intra-cultural variation plays a crucial role in shaping managerial 
discretion is critically discussed. An empirical analysis supports such a proposition and 
demonstrates a strong and positive association between these two constructs. For the third 
aspect, the relationship between managerial discretion and national performance is measured 
and evaluated by determining the impact upon national competitiveness. The data demonstrate 
that the degree of discretion directly influences national competitiveness and effectively 
mediates the relationship between cultural practices and national competitiveness.  
Overall, this PhD contributes to the field of strategic management, by discovering for 
the first time new national-level antecedents and consequences of managerial discretion, 
offering new theoretical insights and practical implications.  
  
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
iv 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... ii 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... viii 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ x 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. xi 
Dedication .............................................................................................................................. xiv 
Declaration.............................................................................................................................. xv 
List of Acronyms ................................................................................................................... xvi 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 17 
1.1. Rationale Behind the Study ......................................................................................... 21 
1.2. Research Framework ................................................................................................... 24 
1.3. Research Questions ...................................................................................................... 25 
1.4. Thesis Overview .......................................................................................................... 26 
1.5. The Context of the Study ............................................................................................. 27 
1.6. Research Contribution ................................................................................................. 28 
2. Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: A Review of Relevant 
Literature ................................................................................................................................ 30 
2.1. Historical Synopsis on Managerial Discretion ............................................................ 32 
2.2. Antecedents of Managerial Discretion......................................................................... 33 
2.2.1. Managerial Characteristics........................................................................................... 33 
2.2.2. Internal Organisation ................................................................................................... 39 
2.2.2.1. Managerial Characteristics and Internal Organisation ...................................... 48 
2.2.3. Task Environment ........................................................................................................ 49 
2.2.3.1. Task Environment and Managerial Characteristics ............................................ 66 
2.2.3.2. Task Environment and Internal Organisation ..................................................... 69 
  
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
v 
2.2.4. National Institutional Environment: The Research Gap .............................................. 73 
2.3. Consequences of Managerial Discretion ..................................................................... 89 
2.3.1. Individual-level Consequences .................................................................................... 91 
2.3.2. Organisation-level Consequences ................................................................................ 93 
2.3.3. Industry-level Consequences ....................................................................................... 95 
2.3.4. National-level Consequences: The Research Gap ....................................................... 98 
3. Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: Research Theories and 
Hypotheses Development..................................................................................................... 102 
3.1. Inter-Cultural Variations: Heterogeneity Across Countries ...................................... 107 
3.1.1. Inter-Cultural Variations: Cultural Practices as Antecedents of Managerial Discretion
 110 
3.1.1.1. Cultural Practices Vis-à-vis Institutional Collectivism ..................................... 113 
3.1.1.2. Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Uncertainty Avoidance ......................................... 115 
3.1.1.3. Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Power Distance ..................................................... 117 
3.1.1.4. Cultural Practices Vis-à-vis Future Orientation ............................................... 119 
3.1.1.5. Cultural Practices Vis-à-vis Humane Orientation ............................................ 121 
3.1.1.6. Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Performance Orientation ...................................... 123 
3.1.1.7. Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Gender Egalitarianism ......................................... 125 
3.1.1.8. Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Assertiveness ......................................................... 129 
3.1.1.9. Cultural Practices Vis-à-vis Cultural Looseness ............................................... 133 
3.2. Intra-Cultural Variations: Heterogeneity within countries ........................................ 134 
3.2.1. Intra-cultural variation as antecedent of managerial discretion ................................. 137 
3.3. National Competitiveness as Consequence of Managerial Discretion ...................... 147 
3.4. Managerial discretion as a Mediator Between Culture and National Competitiveness
 152 
4. Research Design and Methodology ........................................................................ 154 
4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 154 
  
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
vi 
4.2. Philosophical Underpinnings to Business Research .................................................. 155 
4.2.1. Issues on Philosophical Approaches .......................................................................... 158 
4.2.2. Theory and Theory Development .............................................................................. 161 
4.2.3. Research Paradigms for Theory Building .................................................................. 163 
4.2.4. Constructs and Variables ........................................................................................... 165 
4.3. Research Design......................................................................................................... 168 
4.3.1. Approaches to Research Design ................................................................................ 171 
4.3.1.1. Research Design Approach based on Aims and Objectives .............................. 171 
4.3.1.2. Research Design Approach Based on Time Frame Employed .......................... 172 
4.3.2. Primary Vs. Secondary Sources of Data .................................................................... 173 
4.3.3. Objective Vs. Subjective Measures of Data .............................................................. 174 
4.3.4. Scales of Measure ...................................................................................................... 175 
4.4. Survey Design ............................................................................................................ 176 
4.4.1. Email Invitation(s) to the Survey ............................................................................... 178 
4.4.1.1. Pre-notification and Email Content ................................................................... 178 
4.4.1.2. Personalisation .................................................................................................. 181 
4.4.2. Measuring Instrument ................................................................................................ 182 
4.4.2.1. Length and Structure of the Questionnaire ........................................................ 182 
4.4.2.2. Measurements Used in this Study on Managerial Discretion ........................... 183 
4.4.2.3. Measurements Used in this Study on Inter-Cultural Variation ......................... 186 
4.4.2.4. Measurements Used in this Study on Intra-Cultural Variation ......................... 199 
4.4.2.5. Measurements Used in this Study on National Competitiveness ....................... 202 
4.5. Sampling .................................................................................................................... 209 
4.5.1. Respondents Population and Sample Selection ......................................................... 209 
4.5.1.1. Sample Size Obtained with Email contacts ........................................................ 211 
4.5.1.2. Increasing Sample Size Using Social Media Platforms ..................................... 211 
  
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
vii 
4.5.2. Reminders and Response Rates ................................................................................. 212 
4.5.3. Pre-testing Procedures ............................................................................................... 213 
4.5.4. Non-Respondents ....................................................................................................... 218 
4.5.5. Summary .................................................................................................................... 218 
4.6. Methodology Adopted for Data Analysis .................................................................. 219 
4.6.1. Descriptive and Correlation Analysis ........................................................................ 219 
4.6.2. Hypotheses Testing .................................................................................................... 238 
4.6.2.1. Fixed-Effect Regression Analysis ...................................................................... 238 
4.6.2.2. Hierarchical Linear Modelling .......................................................................... 241 
4.6.2.3. Hierarchical Mediation Analysis ....................................................................... 243 
4.7. Summary .................................................................................................................... 244 
5. Research Findings .................................................................................................... 245 
5.1. Inter-Cultural Variations Findings ............................................................................. 245 
5.2. Intra-Cultural Variations Findings ............................................................................. 249 
5.3. National Competitiveness Findings ........................................................................... 252 
5.4. Mediation Analysis Findings ..................................................................................... 255 
6. Discussion and Conclusions .................................................................................... 257 
6.1. Research Implications and Contributions .................................................................. 268 
6.2. Research Limitations ................................................................................................. 276 
6.3. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 279 
References ............................................................................................................................. 281 
 
  
  
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
viii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Theoretical Model ................................................................................................... 21 
Figure 2: Research Framework ............................................................................................... 25 
Figure 3: Summary of Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion ................. 32 
Figure 4: The subjective/objective dimension of Burrell and Morgan (1979) ..................... 158 
Figure 5: Research Paradigms according to Burrell and Morgan (1979) ............................. 163 
Figure 6: Global Competitiveness Index Framework: Explanation on the Twelve Pillars .. 167 
Figure 7: The Deduction Research Process .......................................................................... 171 
Figure 8: Invitation Letter ..................................................................................................... 179 
Figure 9: Online Consent Form ............................................................................................ 180 
Figure 10: Managerial Discretion Questionnaire .................................................................. 182 
Figure 11: Studentised Residuals for Managerial Discretion Scores .................................... 215 
Figure 12: Studentised Residuals for Managerial Discretion Scores with Fitted Values ..... 216 
Figure 13: Heterogeneity of Managerial Discretion Across Countries................................. 218 
Figure 14: Country-level Relationship between Institutional Collectivism and Managerial 
Discretion ............................................................................................................................... 221 
Figure 15: Country-level Relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and Managerial 
Discretion ............................................................................................................................... 222 
Figure 16: Country-level Relationship between Power Distance and Managerial Discretion
................................................................................................................................................ 223 
Figure 17: Country-level Relationship between Future Orientation and Managerial 
Discretion ............................................................................................................................... 224 
Figure 18: Country-level Relationship between Humane Orientation and Managerial 
Discretion ............................................................................................................................... 225 
  
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
ix 
Figure 19: Country-level Relationship between Performance Orientation and Managerial 
Discretion ............................................................................................................................... 226 
Figure 20: Country-level Relationship between Gender Egalitarianism and Managerial 
Discretion ............................................................................................................................... 227 
Figure 21: Country-level Relationship between Assertiveness and Managerial Discretion . 228 
Figure 22: Country-level Relationship between Cultural Looseness and Managerial 
Discretion ............................................................................................................................... 229 
Figure 23: Country-level Relationship between intra-cultural variation across all dimensions 
and managerial discretion ...................................................................................................... 231 
Figure 24: Relationship between managerial discretion and GCI across all years ............... 236 
Figure 25: Relationship between managerial discretion and GCI per year .......................... 237 
  
 
x 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Summary of Research Hypotheses ......................................................................... 153 
Table 2: Positivism vs. Interpretivism................................................................................... 160 
Table 3: Summary of Constructs and Variables.................................................................... 166 
Table 4: Country-level scores for all variables: Managerial discretion, cultural practices and 
control variables ..................................................................................................................... 198 
Table 5: National-level variables: Independent and control variables .................................. 208 
Table 6: Mean discretion scores and frequencies for all countries ....................................... 212 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations (all variables) ............................... 220 
Table 8: Bivariate correlations: Intra-cultural variation and managerial discretion ............. 230 
Table 9: Bivariate correlations: Intra-cultural variation (each dimension) and managerial 
discretion ................................................................................................................................ 233 
Table 10: Bivariate correlations: Managerial Discretion and National Competitiveness ..... 235 
Table 11: Fixed-effect regression: The effect of inter-cultural variation (each cultural 
dimension) on managerial discretion ..................................................................................... 246 
Table 12: Fixed-effect regression: The effect of intra-cultural variation on managerial 
discretion ................................................................................................................................ 250 
Table 13: Fixed-effect regression: The effect of intra-cultural variation (each cultural 
dimension) on managerial discretion ..................................................................................... 251 
Table 14: HLM: The effect of managerial discretion on national-level competitiveness ..... 253 
Table 15: Results for the mediation test ................................................................................ 256 
 
  
 
xi 
Acknowledgements 
It may be cliché but I cannot quite believe that I am now sitting writing the last section of my 
PhD thesis. When I first started my doctoral studies, and started reading published thesis, I said 
to myself, “why do all doctoral researchers have the same wording in their acknowledgments 
section?”. Now I know why: no doctoral researcher, myself included, can ever believe that they 
are finishing their thesis and are due to submit. It is an incredible feeling that I have never felt 
before. It is the end of a long period of hard work, spending many nuits blanches and reading 
lots of papers. After several years working in the Arabian Gulf and traveling from one country 
to another, it was a wise decision to start my doctoral programme and I have never regretted it. 
I owe my heartfelt thanks to my wife, father-in-law and father for convincing me to carry on 
with this research. I know that I haven’t reached this stage because of my manly physique, 
good looks, green eyes or my own intelligence – which are of course core competences that 
have helped me to secure a certain competitive advantage. However, I don’t want to talk 
strategy in this section; the list of people that have helped and supported me during this 
endeavour is long and I need to thank all of them sincerely for getting me to this stage.  
 
First and foremost, I must start by thanking the wonderful Abu Pascal (as we say in Lebanon), 
my Director of Studies, Dr. Ioannis P. Christodoulou. As well as being a great academic, an 
excellent lecturer and loved by all students, especially women, I must admit that Ioannis is an 
amazing person with a great personality. He is generous with his time and advice, very 
supportive, particularly in times when I felt so down, and always encouraging and helpful. 
Ioannis, I couldn’t have done it without your support and without you being by my side. 
Thanks, must also go to my supervisor Dr. Thoralf Dassler and to Dr. Stephan Ludwig for 
helping with the analysis. Thank you for all your comments and suggestions. Special thanks 
  
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
xii 
must go to Prof. Alison Rieple for her constant support and for always giving me valuable 
feedback on my work. Another special thanks must go to Dr. Jaafar El-Murad for his support 
as well and for his trust. And to Dr. Franz Buscha, I would like to say thank you very much for 
your support and for understanding my personal situation. 
 
I am extremely grateful for the people who matter the most to me and whom I owe the most – 
my family. I will start by thanking my father-in-law, Dr. Maher Hussein, who is proud of me 
and happy that I am striving for the highest educational qualification available; thanks also to 
my mother-in-law Mrs. Hanadi Ballout – and sorry for not spending time with you when you 
came to visit us in London because of my PhD thesis. Thank you also to Dr. Lama Hussein and 
Mr. Khalil Hussein for their love and support, and a big fat thank you to my amazing sister 
Mrs. Carol Haj Youssef for her endless love and support and for considering me like her third 
child; I must also thank her for helping me with the data collection, particularly in the Middle 
East sample. Thanks also to my brother Eng. Samer Haj Youssef for his constant help and 
support.  
 
My biggest thank you must go to my adorable mother, Mrs. Hala Souk, who has been a constant 
source of support, help and encouragement. Thank you for all your prayers and for always 
protecting me with your love and kindness. Whatever I do, I cannot compensate you for all that 
you have done and continue to do for me. I am truly blessed to have such a wonderful mother. 
I must also acknowledge my profound gratitude to my king and my idol – my father General 
Salman Haj Youssef. I write this thank you with tears covering my face and with deep sadness 
covering my heart; I know how proud you would be to see me graduating and finally becoming 
a doctor. I know that you are watching me from heaven now, and I hope that you are proud of 
me and that I have fulfilled your dreams by completing this thesis. I miss you more than 
  
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
xiii 
anything in this world and love you so much. I promise to continue my life as you told me and 
will stick to your advice and wisdom. As I promised you at the end, this PhD is dedicated to 
your soul.  
 
Finally, my greatest appreciation and gratitude goes to my soulmate and partner – my amazing 
wife Dr. (soon to be) Hiba Hussein. I thank you from the bottom of my heart for all your love, 
support, help, endurance and for your ability to understand me during my research and during 
hard times. You’ve been the source of my inspiration and always will be. I can’t thank you 
enough for what you have done; I couldn’t have done it without you. I love you so much. 
  
  
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
xiv 
Dedication 
My father, Salman Haj Youssef, was immensely proud that his youngest son was working 
towards his PhD. Despite not speaking English, he promised to review my thesis once I had 
translated it into Arabic as he had a great interest in strategy, having been a military general in 
the Lebanese National Army – a CEO, one could say, leading 10,000 soldiers.  
 
Unfortunately, he was diagnosed with lung cancer in September 2015 and later in March was 
diagnosed with Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis. As soon as I knew my father’s condition, I was 
set about trying to finish my thesis as soon as possible so that he might see it in its final form. 
Unfortunately, God’s will went against my efforts and my father’s will, who passed away just 
a couple of months before I completed my PhD in October 2016.  
 
I could not have imagined my life without him; he has been my biggest supporter since I was 
a child; the idol in my teenager years; the king in my adulthood. I cannot forget his smile, his 
beautiful green eyes, his white hair and moustache, his smell, his wise words and the way he 
spoke to me. He was so proud of me. I can hardly bare the massive loss of him not being here 
with me while completing this thesis. I promised him that I would do whatever it took to get 
this PhD and pledged to devote it to him while he was alive.  
 
It is with my utmost pride and affection that I devote and dedicate this PhD thesis to my father: 
General Salman Haj Youssef 
(1951-2016) 
May your soul rest in peace 
  
  
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
xv 
Declaration 
I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work. 
 
Moustafa Haj Youssef 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
xvi 
List of Acronyms 
IC_P: Institutional Collectivism Practices 
IC_V: Institutional Collectivism Values 
UA_P: Uncertainty Avoidance Practices 
UA_V: Uncertainty Avoidance Values 
PD_P: Power Distance Practices 
PD_V: Power Distance Values 
FO_P: Future Orientation Practices 
FO_V: Future Orientation Values 
HO_P: Humane Orientation Practices 
HO_V: Humane Orientation Values 
PO_P: Performance Orientation Practices 
PO_V: Performance Orientation Values 
GE_P: Gender Egalitarianism Practices 
GE_V: Gender Egalitarianism Values 
AA_P: Assertiveness Practices 
AA_V: Assertiveness Values 
OD: Ownership Dispersion 
LO: Legal Origin 
EF: Employer Flexibility Index 
CL: Cultural Looseness 
GCI: Global Competitiveness Index 
IT: Information Technology 
CSQ: Commitment to the Status Quo 
  
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
17 
1. Introduction 
CEO influence on firm performance has increased from 8.6% over the period of observation 
1950-1969 to 26.4% over 1990-2009 (Quigley and Hambrick, 2015). Managerial discretion or 
the latitude of executive action (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) is the primary conduit 
enabling CEOs to place their own distinctive marks on firms’ outcomes (Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011). Accordingly, executives or CEOs matter only to the extent to which they 
possess discretion. 
Managerial discretion is limited to the ‘zone of acceptance of powerful stakeholders’ 
(Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) in the sense that executives’ actions should fall within this 
zone of acceptance and should be considered acceptable by those stakeholders. Recent research 
uncovers individual, organisation and industry-level antecedents of managerial discretion (e.g. 
McClelland et al., 2010; Peteraf and Reed, 2007; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012). However, as 
Crossland and Hambrick (2011) and Wangrow et al. (2015) suggest, beyond the micro-level 
aspects, at the broader national-level, culture may have further significant influence on the 
degree of executive leeway. At a national level, culture shapes people’s practices and 
behaviours (Javidan et al., 2006; Mantzavinos et al., 2001). As such, these culturally embedded 
practices also directly impact organisational and leaders’ behaviour within countries 
(Geletkanycz, 1997; House et al., 2004). Yet, the influence of culture on managerial discretion 
has been given scant attention in the literature. Although Crossland and Hambrick (2011) were 
the first to empirically demonstrate the link between culture and managerial discretion, they 
fell short in interpreting the multi-dimensional aspect of national culture. Culture includes a 
multitude of different dimensions (Taras et al., 2009) that are all important when assessing 
cultural influences. Studies that ignore this multitude are therefore limited in their scope and 
only address part of a more comprehensive construct (Richter et al., 2016).  
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It is important to note that the management field in general focuses solely on the one 
aspect of culture, which relates to cultural values, while neglecting other aspects of culture (e.g. 
practices and intra-cultural variations) (Aktas et al., 2016). This orientation has led to a 
shortcoming in our understanding of various management constructs (including managerial 
discretion) and has led tier-one scholars to call for an expansion of the “conceptual toolkit” to 
broaden the scope of cross-cultural research (Earley and Mosakowski, 2002; Gelfand et al., 
2006). Therefore, this PhD thesis moves beyond the value aspect of culture by examining the 
impact of an array of cultural practices – institutional collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, 
power distance, future-, humane-, and performance orientations along with gender 
egalitarianism, assertiveness and cultural looseness – on the degree of managerial discretion 
available to CEOs of public firms headquartered in 18 countries from six different regional 
clusters (Anglo, Nordic Europe, Germanic Europe, Latin Europe, Middle East and Confucian 
Asia). 
Beyond the need to uncover the influence of the practices aspect of culture, recent 
research emphasises the importance of considering the implications of the varying degrees to 
which these practices are adhered (e.g. Gelfand et al., 2011). Intra-cultural variation reflects 
the degree of homogeneity/heterogeneity in views innate to a society (Carpenter, 2000; Uz, 
2015). It is reasonable to assess cultural dimensions from an aggregate level by assuming 
spatial homogeneity within a country; however, drawing upon the idea that culture is a multi-
dimensional construct, there should be a balance between cross-national and intra-national 
diversity in culture (Tung, 2008a). Despite the recent evidence that shows that intra-cultural 
variation could be as salient as or sometimes even more than cross-country variation (Tung and 
Verbeke, 2010), its association with managerial discretion has not yet been explored. Thus, a 
more nuanced understanding of the implications of intra-cultural variation in general and the 
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variation surrounding cultural practices may aid in further understanding the national 
drivers/hindrances of managerial discretion. 
Furthermore, research that focuses on the consequences of managerial discretion has 
almost exclusively focused on few factors, notably: CEO effect on firm performance, firm 
strategic behaviour, level and nature of CEO compensation (Wangrow et al., 2015). Apart from 
other outcomes (e.g. industry attention patterns (Abrahamson and Hambrick, 1997)), this 
stream of work discarded the possibility that managerial discretion could have a national-level 
outcome. Although these micro-level studies have contributed to the construct of managerial 
discretion, there exists a stark controversy whether greater degrees of managerial discretion are 
always desirable (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). Therefore, this study adds a new line of 
enquiry on the consequences of managerial discretion by investigating its influence on the 
performance of countries measured by national competitiveness. 
Accordingly, this thesis builds on the initial work in the national domain of managerial 
discretion (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011) and draws upon cross-cultural (House et al., 2004) 
and institutional theory (North, 1990). In their study, Crossland and Hambrick (2011) 
examined the association between one aspect of culture (values) and managerial discretion. In 
this PhD, the author builds on their work and further extends the strategic management, 
particularly the upper echelon theory, by presenting an in-depth examination of other cultural 
aspects (practices) and their relative effect on the degree of CEO discretion. 
Second, this work integrates the advancement in cross-cultural research with the 
strategic management realm by exploring the interaction between intra-cultural variation and 
managerial discretion. Although there have been some initial attempts to highlight the 
importance of cultural heterogeneity/homogeneity within a given country in affecting various 
micro and macro-level variables in the broader management literature (e.g. Beugelsdijk et al., 
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2014), this is largely lacking in the strategic management and discretion literatures. Moreover, 
despite the explicit acceptance of stakeholders that exist in the original conceptualization of 
managerial discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987: 374), the effect of various 
stakeholders’ groups and their zones of acceptance on managerial discretion seems not to have 
been the subject of previous scholarly attention. This thesis draws on the stakeholder theory 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995) to show that the latitude of executive actions is not solely 
related to the aggregate acceptance of most stakeholders but is also subject to the acceptance 
of individual stakeholders’ groups. This study therefore introduces new antecedents of 
managerial discretion. 
Third, this research contributes to the managerial discretion literature through the 
assessment of the national-level implications of managerial discretion. Very few academics 
(e.g. Crossland and Chen, 2013) have examined the impact of managerial discretion on a 
macro-level construct. Even some scholars (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011) have discarded 
the idea that managerial discretion may be a desirable construct to drive country performance. 
In contrast, this study develops a theoretical framework that relates managerial discretion to 
national-level outcomes and empirically assesses its association with country competitiveness. 
Also, a paucity of work in the discretion literature has attempted to use discretion as a mediator 
(Wangrow et al., 2015), thus the understanding of how relationships between antecedents and 
outcomes at the national level are affected by managerial discretion and the role of discretion 
in enhancing certain outcomes in given environments is very limited. As such, this thesis sheds 
light on the mediating role that managerial discretion plays between national culture and 
competitiveness. 
This thesis’ orienting theoretical model is shown in Figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1: Theoretical Model 
 
1.1. Rationale Behind the Study 
The focus of this PhD thesis is a theme that has developed throughout the PhD program that 
the author has undertaken at the University of Westminster. While generally a PhD candidate 
starts with a general feel or sense of a specific enquiry or area of interest within the broader 
management discipline, it is essential to answer primary questions before converging to a focal 
point. One of such questions focuses on understanding the way in which individualities and 
practices of business leaders affect organisational outcomes. Built into this enquiry is the 
implicit assumption that business executives do shape their organisational fate and form. There 
are plenty of evidence to support this view, which resides in the strategic choice theory (Child, 
1972). But, there are other views which indeed argues the opposite. Population ecology 
theorists argue that environmental selection, and not business executives or managers, are the 
primary factors that shape organisational outcomes (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Such a 
dichotomy between these two schools of thoughts was bridged by the concept of managerial 
discretion, which was introduced by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987). The introduction of the 
discretion construct, which mediates the effect of competing forces (environmental, normative 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
22 
inertial, etc.); it was this insight that eventually demonstrated to be an essential point in the 
research. 
Managerial discretion is conceptualized as the latitude in executives’ decision-making 
(Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). It explicitly emerges as a conceptual link between theories 
that are predominantly deterministic ((e.g. population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977), 
or neoinstitutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)) and those that are mostly managerial (e.g. 
upper echelons (Hambrick and Mason, 1984)). Discretion exists to the extent that constraints 
to decision-making are relatively absent and when multiple plausible alternatives are available 
for executives to choose from. As such, it is a function of the individual executive (e.g. locus 
of control), the organisation (e.g. resource availability) and the task environment (e.g. industry 
regulations) characteristics or any combination of these. Together, these internal and external 
factors comprise a powerful range of possible limitations or catalysts for executive actions. 
At the individual level, research shows that executives operating within the same 
domain can foresee a distinct set of actions depending on their individualities and 
psychological characteristics (Wangrow et al., 2015). Some can envision a wider range of 
alternatives and create multiple courses of actions that would affect organisation outcomes. 
These psychological micro-foundations are unique features that determine executives’ 
discretion. For instance, executives with greater locus of control (Carpenter and Golden, 1997), 
ambiguity tolerance (Dollinger et al., 1997), networking relations (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 
1997), risk-taking behaviour (Roth, 1992) and lower commitment to the status quo 
(McClelland et al., 2010) possess more discretion. 
At the organisational level, firms with abundant resources that are easily transferable 
allow executives to foresee change and choose from a wider variety of alternatives (Hambrick 
and Finkelstein, 1987). Similarly, the lack of ingrained organisational culture and the existence 
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of a passive board accord executives with more discretion (Boyd and Salamin, 2001). 
Relatedly, CEO duality increases the likelihood of strategic change, which in turn enhances 
managerial discretion (e.g. Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; Kim, 2013). In contrast, 
organisations with an entrenched, rigid culture resulting from standardised routines and control 
place strict constraints on executives’ actions and make it difficult for them to initiate any 
strategic change (e.g. Key, 2002; Wangrow et al., 2015). 
Also, the task environment, in which firms operate, could drastically alter executive 
actions. Some industries can afford a greater variety of choices/actions than others. Hambrick 
and Abrahamson (1995) argue that advertising and R&D intensity along with market growth 
have a positive impact on managerial discretion. However, industry regulation constrains 
executives’ latitude of actions (Peteraf and Reed, 2007). Similarly, Finkelstein (2009) finds 
demand variability along with industry concentration to negatively affect CEO discretion.  
Although Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987: 379) argue that discretion is closely related 
to “the degree to which the environment allows variety and change”, much of the previous 
research, as will be discussed in the sections below, conceptualizes the task environment in 
terms of industry characteristics. Very little work has considered the impact of the macro-
environment, more precisely the national institutions, on executive discretion. Only recently, 
managerial discretion has been examined on a national-level (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). 
However, there still exists a dearth of research into the national level of discretion. National 
culture is comprised of a broader array of dimensions (Javidan et al., 2006), and as such further 
research is needed into the remaining cultural dimensions and their implications on managerial 
discretion. The dearth of studies into the national-level framework of managerial discretion is 
surprising given the evident support that organisational phenomena are widely different across 
countries. Additionally, work focusing on business executives, role of government, corporate 
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governance, cross-country differences, and the effect of globalization (e.g. Griffiths and 
Zammuto, 2005; Makino et al., 2004; Spencer et al., 2005) have all suggested that the 
uniformity of the freedom in decision making for business executives is subject to 
characteristics of the national-level. 
The pivotal point of this PhD thesis follows from the above identified issues and aims 
to fill in the gap in the existing literature on studies that only focuses on the individual, 
organisation, and industry and ignores the macro-level factors. The aim is not only to highlight 
the importance of the national-level, but also to explore the various antecedents, consequences 
and understand the role that discretion plays at such macro-level. By doing this, the author 
presents an iterative approach to theory building that is mainly lacking in this stream of research 
(Lawrence, 1997).  
1.2. Research Framework 
One of the most important criterion for any research is the ability to establish a direct and clear 
relationship between the theory and the empirical analysis (data) that is employed to test a 
theory (Rose, 1982). Hughes (1976) argues that theory and the evidence (data) are sometimes 
considered as distinct languages, and as such one should face some challenges to translate. 
Therefore, the framework adopted in this research is of a central importance as it illustrates 
how the core components are theoretically and systematically related to each other and to one 
another in the aim to establish an evident link to theory. This framework is described in figure 
2 below. 
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Figure 2: Research Framework 
Theory 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Exploration of the extant literature 
and the identification of the 
research opportunities. Showing the 
gap in the existing literature 
particularly at the national level. 
 Theoretical Propositions 
Chapter 3: Developing the research model 
Development of the research mode and specific 
hypotheses that relates to the antecedents (inter- 
and intra- cultural variation), implications (country 
competitiveness) of managerial discretion and the 
role that discretion plays at the national level. 
   
Results & Implications 
Chapter 5 for presentation of 
findings and 6 for research 
implications and contributions 
Descriptive statistics, presentation 
and interpretation of the results 
 Operationalisation and Field-Work 
Chapter 4: Methodology and research design along 
with empirical testing of the research design 
Translation of theoretical concepts to empirically 
measurable indicators. Econometric and statistical 
assessment of the variables. 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Rose (1982) 
1.3. Research Questions 
This PhD thesis seeks to answer the following research questions: 
1. What are the inter-, and intra-country antecedents and manifestations of managerial 
discretion? 
2. What is the national-level implication of managerial discretion? 
3. What role does managerial discretion play between the national-level antecedents and 
consequences? 
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1.4. Thesis Overview 
The core strength of this study is the ability to provide a holistic understanding of national 
culture and its implication on managerial discretion. Such a complete approach is provided via 
the examination of the inter (across countries) and intra (within) cultural variation of 18 
countries, along with the national-level implications of discretion. In the remainder of this 
chapter, the author provides an overview of the adopted structure.  
In chapter 2, the researcher offers a detailed and critical review of the relevant literature 
that examined the antecedents and consequences of managerial discretion. The author discusses 
the development of the construct of discretion, previous empirical attempts and relevant 
individual, organisational, industry and national-level correlates. A consideration of the 
multidisciplinary inputs to the field of managerial discretion, and a critical review of the 
development of such a construct enables the researcher to identify the opportunities and 
specific theory development directions. The researcher concludes that there exists an important 
drawback in the current literature, that is the failure to consider and draw attention to the 
importance of the national environment as an important predictor of discretion and to assess 
the national-level implication of managerial discretion. 
Having, in the preceding chapter, identified the gaps within the existing literature, the 
author in Chapter 3 builds in the institutional, stakeholder and economic development theories 
to develop the theoretical model and provides the substantial context within which the 
conceptual framework of this thesis is developed. With the research framework, as illustrated 
in figure 2, in place, specific hypotheses are generated to address the research questions 
formulated earlier in the preceding section. 
Chapter 4 introduced the methodological underpinning of this research and links the 
theory and evidence together. This is achieved via translating the theoretical model into 
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measurable indicators and then discussing the different techniques employed to operationalize 
the variables. The philosophical approach, research paradigm and constructs validity and 
reliability are also considered in this chapter. 
In Chapter 5 presents the findings of the empirical analysis conducted to test the 
proposed relationships between variables. While, the beginning of chapter 5 presents the 
findings that relate to the antecedents of managerial discretion, particularly effect of inter-, and 
intra-cultural variations on managerial discretion; the final sections of chapter 5 presents results 
relating to the implication of the managerial discretion and the mediating role it plays at the 
national-level. 
Lastly, Chapter 6 discusses the important implications and contributions of the results 
found in this thesis, suggests several avenues for future research and identifies several 
shortcomings or limitations.  
1.5. The Context of the Study 
The existing research in the upper echelons and the managerial discretion streams provided 
evidences supporting the view of the strategic choice theory but have abated calls (e.g. 
Hambrick in Cannella and Pettigrew, 2001) to move beyond explaining and investigating if 
executives matter, to a finer grained loom that demonstrate when they matter. Central to this 
research is the development of a model that specifically addresses when executives matter from 
a national-level perspective. The principle aim of this thesis is to contribute to the advancement 
of the discretion literature and the upper echelon theory by building on prior research in an 
iterative fashion to contribute to theory building. This is achieved by building on extant 
research and based on a thorough review of the existing literature. The literature review process 
resulted in identifying significant challenges or gaps in the macro-level theorization of 
managerial discretion, that is the ignorance of the national level. Also, other identified gaps are 
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related to the treatment of managerial discretion as a black box and by using perceived 
discretion as an alternative. On such basis, a theoretical framework is developed, specific 
research hypotheses are proposed and empirically tested in a rigorous process at the national-
level across 18 countries from 6 different cultural cluster. This concludes with the identification 
of the specific contributions of this research, and the implications for theory and practice. For 
clarity purposes, it is important to note, that in-line with the existing literature and mainstream 
research in the discretion field (Crossland and Chen, 2013; McClelland et al., 2010; Wangrow 
et al., 2015), the author uses the wording “managerial” to denote to executive particularly 
CEOs discretion. In most studies in the discretion literature, authors have used managerial 
discretion to refer to CEOs discretion, so the word managerial doesn’t refer to junior or middle 
managers but only refer to CEOs. 
1.6. Research Contribution 
This PhD thesis provides several contributions to the academic community in the form of 
contribution to theory in the field of strategic management particularly research into the topic 
of upper echelons and managerial discretion, and provides practical contribution to the 
professional community. Lawrence (1997: 18) stated that “theories are always in process”, yet 
despite the advancement in the strategic leadership and upper echelons in terms of bridging 
macro and micro approaches to organisational studies, the macro-level construct of managerial 
discretion, which solely focuses on the task environment, has been called into question 
(Wangrow et al., 2015). Although, Crossland and Hambrick (2011) have attempted to broaden 
the milieu in which discretion is studied, no further developments of the theory have taken 
place. Therefore, this thesis aims to address the gap that currently exists in the discretion 
literature to develop and test the theory that builds on the national-level in this stream of 
research. 
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In terms of theoretical contribution, the thesis develops a model which tests the different 
national dimensions of managerial discretion and provides an empirical assessment of the 
implications to national performance measure by competitiveness. This model contributes to 
the field of strategic management particularly studies examining the construct of managerial 
discretion by broadening the milieu in which executives’ matter, discovering new national-
level antecedents and consequences of such a construct. Also, the research adds to existing 
literature by demonstrating that managerial discretion mediates the relationship between 
culture and national competitiveness. Therefore, showing the positive role of managerial 
discretion in driving the competitiveness of countries. 
Of interest to professionals or practitioners will be the differential effect of culture on 
the latitude of actions for executives. This may be particularly interesting to multinational 
corporations or companies wishing to internationalize into new markets, as it will provide a 
better understanding of the institutional environment (particularly culture) of the host country 
and its effect on the freedom in decision making. Also, it will be of great interest to companies 
involved in cross-border mergers or acquisitions as it will aid in the development of selection 
criteria and the preparation for such transactions to assess its potential outcomes.
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2. Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: A Review of 
Relevant Literature 
The main aim of this review is to examine the articles that operationalized and studied the 
construct of managerial discretion in the broader strategic management and management 
disciplines. All articles included in this review are published in peer-reviewed top journals and 
are highly cited. The review included some theoretical papers, however mainly focused on 
empirical papers that examined the discretion construct. In-line with this thesis, majority of the 
articles reviewed in this chapter were specific to CEOs discretion, while using the wording as 
managerial discretion. Using the Social Science Citation Index, the author search particularly 
for terms that are either directly related to managerial discretion or are considered as synonyms 
of managerial discretion. As such, the researcher searched for the term “managerial discretion”; 
“industry discretion”; “organisation discretion”; “individual discretion”; “national discretion”; 
“CEO discretion”; “latitude of actions”; managerial objectives” in each of the top journals. The 
author followed a selective sampling to include articles that are more relevant to this research 
and that have followed or applied the main aspects of the discretion construct that was 
originally introduced by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987). Also, articles found were mainly 
published in the: Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of International Business Studies, Strategic 
Management Journal, Management Science, Journal of Management, Journal of Management 
Studies, Organization Science, to name a few. All articles were published between 1988 and 
2016. This resulted in over 150 articles, so to find the highly-cited ones, the author used google 
scholar to see which articles have been highly cited out of the initial sample. This filtering led 
to less than 100 articles, which were then reviewed to determine whether they all should be 
included in the literature review section of the thesis. Finally, the author used only the articles 
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that directly assessed the discretion constructs and examined either it's antecedents or 
consequences. The reason behind such selection is that some of the articles often used 
managerial discretion as a theoretical hook without testing or examining the antecedents 
(sources), consequences (implications) or the role that discretion plays between different 
constructs (mediator, moderator). Therefore, this has even filtered the number of articles that 
were included in the below review, which are around 55. Including all these articles, even if 
some of the variables presented in these papers are not included in the empirical analysis of 
this research, is essential for several reasons. First, to show that despite the growing body of 
research that studied the concept of managerial discretion, none and very few have a looked at 
the macro dimension, particularly the characteristics of the national environment (i.e. culture). 
Second, to highlight the main gap within the existing literature and to show that importance of 
studying the national-level to open new horizons and broaden the milieu in which discretion is 
studied, which is one of the aims of this thesis. Lastly, to highlight the main implications of 
managerial discretion and show that such stream of research is lacking important implication, 
that is the impact on national competitiveness. 
A critical review of the relevant literature is presented in the below sections by 
classifying and discussing the various constructs, or in more technical terms antecedents and 
consequences, of managerial discretion. At the beginning the author provides an overview of 
the discretion literature, then discusses the construct at different dimensions (individual, 
organisation and industry) then concentrates on the essence of this PhD, the national 
environment, and conducts an extensive critical review of all related published studies. Figure 
2 summarizes the literature review in terms of its antecedents and consequences by highlighting 
the research gap that is mainly present in the national dimension. 
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Figure 3: Summary of Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion 
 
2.1. Historical Synopsis on Managerial Discretion 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of managerial discretion refers to the latitude of options of 
actions that is afforded to senior executives and mainly CEOs. While Hambrick and Finkelstein 
(1987) took the credit to introduce such seminal construct in the management research, 
managerial discretion existed even earlier but in different forms. For instance, in sociology, 
Lieberson and O’Connor (1972) argued that business leaders are of a great importance for their 
organisations, as they account for changes in companies’ performance and more importantly 
their individualities (leader traits) are the primary factors that shape the success of their 
organisations over time. Also, similar argument is echoed in the upper echelon theory 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984), which argues that firms’ outcomes and actions reflect 
executives’ cognitions, often proxied by their demographic characteristics. In other words, if 
Chapter 2 – Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: A Review of 
Relevant Literature 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
33 
an executive is accorded greater latitude of options, then organisations’ actions are more related 
to the executive individualities.  
The discretion construct acts as a link between two opposing or conflicting view in 
organisational theories: strategic choice and population ecology (Crossland, 2008). Strategic 
choice theory (Child, 1972) argues that the chosen strategies by top managers are the main 
factors contributing to organisational outcomes (Andrews, 1971). Whereas, the theory of 
population ecology argues that organisational outcomes are subject and limited to internal and 
external constraints or pressures (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). The discretion model presented 
by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) reconciles these two opposing views by recognizing that 
internal and external forces shape organisations outcomes but this will be subject to the 
pressures imposed by these forces on executives’ actions. Executive discretion can be enabled 
or constrained subject to the existence of each of these forces (internal or external). Hambrick 
and Finkelstein (1987) in their development of the concept of managerial discretion focused 
on three primary forces that determine the level of executives’ discretion: managerial 
characteristics, internal organisational factors and industry factors. However, another macro-
force, national factors, also play a crucial role in the determination of the discretion levels, 
which is the core of this thesis. The author starts the below discussion by discussing the 
antecedents or factors that determine the degree of discretion from different dimensions, then 
discusses the main implications or consequences.  
2.2. Antecedents of Managerial Discretion 
2.2.1. Managerial Characteristics 
Studies of organisations have been mainly approached from two perspectives: sociological and 
psychological. The sociological perspective considers organisations as a function of structural 
factors and differences. But, from the psychological angle, organisations are a function of the 
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personalities and capacities of specific individuals that have an influence over organisations’ 
outcomes. In other words, executives’ psychological features and their association with an 
organisation have a crucial role in restricting or boosting the extent to which they can envisage 
and implement various actions (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Even within the same 
environment, top managers have a distinct set of choices based on the linkage between their 
own individualities and the environment (Child, 1997). Building on the upper echelon theory 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984), a company is an echo of its top executives’ psychological 
characteristics. These personal attributes strongly influence executives’ cognitive base and 
their interpretation of actions. Consequently, this will be reflected in their firms’ strategic 
choices. For instance, an executive locus of control, tolerance for ambiguity, commitment to 
the status quo, ability to deal with cognitive complexities and many other individualities 
constitute their psychology-based personality, which will in turn affect firms’ outcomes 
(Wangrow et al., 2015). In this vein, many scholars have investigated the impact of individual 
executives’ characteristics on managerial discretion. 
Miller et al. (1982) were among the first scholars to report a positive relationship 
between executives’ (mainly CEO) behaviour and firm performance. Their work was based on 
Rotter’s (1966) conceptualization of internal and external individuals (classification of locus 
of control), in which internal individuals possess a lower score in the locus of control 
measurement and are seen to believe that all events happening are under their control. This 
contrasts with externals, who believe that events and outcomes are not controllable and are 
beyond their reach (Rotter, 1966). Miller et al. (1982) found that internal CEOs tend to foresee 
more risk-taking and innovative strategies that deviate from industry competitors. Locus of 
control is one of the main managerial characteristics that have been used to assess discretion. 
Internals as opposed to externals are more energetic, have deeper involvement, possess 
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persuasive power and tend to produce innovative strategies. However, such characteristics 
should be accompanied with a flexible environment. Locus of control showed an indirect 
relationship to the environment and structure; sometimes the environment places constraints 
that push a personality in the external direction (Miller et al., 1982), which leads to a lower 
degree of discretion. However, it is important to emphasise that locus of control is a stable 
characteristic, which does not change over time (Kinicki and Vecchio, 1994). Locus of control 
is also individually dependent and context-independent compared to managerial discretion, 
which is context-dependent and may vary significantly over time (e.g. Hambrick et al., 1993; 
Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2013). Therefore, locus of control is a predictor and a factor 
affecting discretion level.  
Some argue that locus of control is inevitably associated with risk-taking behaviour 
(Boone and DeBrabander, 1993). Internal executives are thought to possess important reading 
skills that allow them to tweak their assessments of situations based on the changes in the 
external environment (Carpenter and Golden, 1997). To understand how managers, perceive 
managerial discretion, Carpenter and Golden (1997) found that locus of control has a direct 
link with the perception of managerial discretion. Individuals’ perception of managerial 
discretion is affected by the power that others attribute to them, particularly in situations where 
those individuals have little discretion (Carpenter and Golden, 1997). The idea here is that 
executives, due to their involvement in various strategic planning and proposing additional 
ideas, will give an impression to others as powerful individuals, even though in fact they have 
less latitude of actions. Additionally, locus of control plays an important role in selecting 
relevant business partners. In a study of the effect of reputation on the decision to collaborate 
with other businesses, Dollinger et al. (1997) discovered a mediating role for the locus of 
control construct. They argued that internals, due to their highly-perceived discretion, engage 
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in partnership with other firms even if those organisations show signs of negative reputation 
(Dollinger et al., 1997). Such thinking is related to the suppression function that internal 
executives possess. Internals can analyse and read information even if those data are negative 
for them; this provides a strong foundation for innovative, risky and bold actions. These 
arguments are backed up by the idea that internals, due to their belief that they are in control, 
perceive themselves as having greater managerial discretion than their external counterparts.  
Moving forward, some researchers have investigated other managerial characteristics 
and their role in influencing degrees of managerial discretion. In this domain, some studied 
whether risk-taking, openness and consensus decision-making characteristics have a relation 
with the strategic choices that firms adopt in their global operations (Roth, 1992). When 
executives tend to take risk in their actions, they would possess greater discretion and 
subsequently follow a global strategy that gives them more control over subsidiary activities. 
This is because multi-domestic strategies provide little discretion to executives based at the 
companies’ headquarters and higher discretion to the foreign subsidiary manager. Opening and 
consensus strategic decision-making characteristics limit the degree of managerial discretion, 
as in such cases executives will be more open to take on board others’ ideas; which might 
reduce their latitude of actions. Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) argued that intra-industry 
ties (within industry relationships) lead to strategic conformity compared to extra-industry 
(external industry relations) relationships that result in strategic deviation. Those networking 
characteristics for executives are associated with the interpretation and information gathering 
reserve that they collect from such linkages. Accordingly, when executives possess intra-
industry relations, they tend to conform to industry norms, which means that they tend to see 
themselves as having low discretion. In contrast, executives possessing external industry ties 
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will gather additional information that broadens their cognitive base. This enhances their array 
of actions, allowing them to foresee a broader range of distinct strategies. 
In another vein, Buchholtz et al. (1999) showed that managerial discretion plays an 
important mediating role in the consideration of corporate giving (philanthropy) activities. This 
is backed up by the findings of Hayley (1991), which emphasise level of managerial control 
(discretion) as an important factor in philanthropic activities, along with the idea that 
philanthropic activities reflect a good image of executives. They concluded that while 
corporate resources exist and executives possess high discretion with higher personal 
responsibility, they are more likely to implement philanthropic actions (Buchholtz et al., 1999). 
However, some might argue that in recent environments, corporate philanthropy has become a 
strategic choice, where it helps in enhancing corporate profile, reputation, customer loyalty, 
legitimization, social acceptance, etc. When executives follow such orientation, they are not 
giving away their own money but instead are giving away that of their shareholders. Thus, their 
own values are not considered important; it is only related to the discretion level they possess. 
In the upper echelon field, studies have identified several CEO characteristics that are 
fundamental antecedents of discretion. This includes executive age (Simons et al., 1999), 
education (Hambrick et al., 1996; Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996; Cho and Hambrick, 2006), 
functional background (Geletkanycz and Black, 2001), tenure and succession (Carpenter and 
Fredrickson, 2001). This research stream has focused on executive individualities and their 
relationship/influence on firms’ strategies and performance. Executives’ age may have a role 
in forming their interpretation of incidents and in turn will affect their understanding base that 
leads to certain strategic choices. But, how can such attributes be relevant to managerial 
discretion? Singer and Sewell (1989) claimed that there is a preference for older individuals to 
occupy high-status roles than their younger counterparts. Their argument is based on the 
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impression that individuals with white/grey hair, seriousness, sobriety in speech, etc. are 
symbolic of their seniority, which in turn will bring certain skills and experience to the table. 
Thus, when such executives are in place, they may be able to express or illustrate higher levels 
of power. Carpenter and Golden (1997) indirectly supported such a proposition by showing a 
positive relationship between these two constructs. They reported that “managers in part 
through impression management activities… increase their power and enlarge their latitude of 
actions” (Carpenter and Golden, 1997:187). Though such a relationship exists only to the 
extent to which the contextual framework or external environment allows it to happen. In 
contrast, it is argued that in high-discretion environments, which allow greater changes and 
diversification, the average TMT age tends to be lower (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Thus, it 
could be postulated that managerial discretion has a negative relationship with age. 
Furthermore, additional investigations discovered a link between a CEOs’ tenure and 
their aim to foresee strategic change. Some considered that CEOs with high organisation and 
position tenure are more likely to show low intention to foresee strategic change (Miller, 1991; 
Henderson et al., 2006), and such a feature will decrease firm innovation (Wu et al., 2005; 
Simsek, 2007). Accordingly, CEO commitment to the status quo (CSQ), which is the enduring 
belief that a firms’ current strategies are correct (Hambrick et al., 1993), will increase 
(Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). In relation to managerial discretion, increased CEO 
commitment to the status quo will lead to a limited range of action perceived by that CEO. 
However, from another standpoint, due to their increased confidence in the way in which their 
company has been operating, along with the rigidity of its strategic orientation, CEOs will be 
having a higher level of discretion. Yet, both arguments will vary significantly depending on 
the environmental stimuli. McClelland et al. (2010) argued that CEOs’ commitment to the 
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status quo in high-discretion environments (industries) has a negative impact on firm 
performance; however, this is not applicable in low-discretion contexts. 
Therefore, out of the seven initial individual antecedents proposed by Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1987), only CSQ and locus of control have been explicitly examined. Despite 
several attempts to theoretically link other individualities with managerial discretion, the 
literature fails to give additional attention to and directly assess the impact of executives’ 
psychological characteristics on discretion. To sum up, the author has discussed in the above 
section how executives’ characteristics – such as age, tenure, locus of control, CSQ, personal 
responsibility, and risk-taking behaviour – could affect the degree of their managerial 
discretion. The next discussion will centre on the second dimension of managerial discretion: 
the internal organisation. 
2.2.2. Internal Organisation 
Moving on from the individual psychological construct of discretion, this section discusses 
another important micro-construct: organisational characteristics. Organisation attributes such 
as inertial forces, resource availability, powerful inside stakeholders, board of directors’ 
structure and characteristics, and many other factors represent the second source influencing 
degrees of managerial discretion. A firm’s internal characteristics define the extent to which it 
is open to a range of possible actions. Such openness endows CEOs with greater latitude to 
implement actions. For instance, the existence of robust inertial forces places constraints on 
top executives’ calls for change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Such a force limits the 
amenability of the firm, making the CEO less able to execute a variety of actions (Hambrick 
and Finkelstein, 1987). Similarly, powerful internal stakeholders guide executives’ discretion. 
Powerful internal stakeholders with high CSQ restrain executives from adopting any strategic 
changes because their priority is to sustain the incumbent strategies, processes and structure of 
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the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Resource accessibility also plays a significant role: it 
provides additional leeway for top executives to implement actions corresponding to their 
determination (Wangrow et al., 2015). For that reason, companies that have experienced 
extensive financial or resource expenditures will not be able to provide additional leeway for 
executives’ actions. Hence, firms will be committed to their products and processes (Hambrick 
and Macmillan, 1985) along with sustaining their current courses of activities. 
Singh and Harianto (1989), in their work on the adoption of ‘golden parachutes’, which 
represent incentive packages for executives as insurance in the case of a takeover threat, found 
that concentrated ownership structure (non-management stock ownership) and higher board 
member tenure as opposed to CEO tenure lead to ignorance regarding golden parachutes. These 
results indicate that, in compliance with some board characteristics, CEOs will end up having 
various levels of influence. When top executives do not possess stock ownership and there 
exists concentrated ownership of stocks/shares, along with boards having a higher tenure, the 
CEO is not able to influence boards of directors, which results in lower discretion. In contrast, 
when the board of directors has a lower tenure and dispersed stock ownership, the CEO will 
have higher discretion. In the same research orientation, academics argued that CEO and TMT 
pay is related to the ownership structure of the firm. In dispersed ownership structures, firms 
are management-controlled, whereas in concentrated ownership, firms are owner-controlled 
(Werner and Tosi, 1995). Management-controlled organisation pay is related to growth, and 
executives can advocate their own pressures to establish a suitable pay structure compared to 
owner-controlled firms where pay is strongly associated with performance. Accordingly, 
managerial or executive discretion plays a core function in constructing firms’ pay structure, 
particularly for those executives. To empirically support such a view, Werner and Tosi (1995), 
in their study of the effect of ownership structure on compensation strategy, found that firms 
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providing higher managerial levels (management-controlled) tend to pay more premiums in 
terms of salaries, bonuses and long-term incentives as opposed to low-discretion organisations. 
This is due to the increased latitude of action that executives possess when ownership is 
dispersed allowing them to amend the compensation strategy in their favour.  
Furthermore, Campbell et al. (2012) investigated the impact of shareholder direct 
access or involvement in the nomination of new directors. They argued that granting owners 
greater influence regarding the nomination of new directors, having a classified board structure 
(Gompers et al., 2003) and a board composed of true outsiders (outside directors) will diminish 
executives’ latitude of actions (Campbell et al., 2012). Such shareholder involvement reduces 
agency costs but at the same time increases the power base of those shareholders and their 
control over executives’ actions. When a board of directors is comprised of a large proportion 
of outsiders, the independence of the board increases (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Accordingly, 
shareholder involvement in directors’ nominations and board composition act as internal 
organisation factors that impact the level of managerial discretion. 
Moving forward, some scholars have looked at a distinct factor that has a considerable 
effect on the design of executive incentive plans. Rajagopalan (1997) looked at the fit between 
firms’ strategic orientation and its top managers’ incentive plan based on Miles and Snow’s 
(1978) typology. He discovered a better performance fit for firms implementing an annual 
bonus, in which they use cash and accounting measure incentives, with defenders (firms with 
no or little engagement in market/product development) rather than prospectors (firms that 
endeavour to pioneer in market and product development). On the other hand, performance is 
healthier when prospectors use long-term, stock-based and market-measured incentive plans 
as opposed to defenders (Rajagopalan, 1997). In the same vein, Rajagopalan and Finkelstein 
(1992) presumed that prospectors have the highest degree of discretion and CEO pay, which is 
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based on firm performance, compared to defenders and reactors. This is because both the 
strategic orientation of defenders and the annual bonus scheme have similar time horizons 
(short). Managers can be evaluated in line with their performance without bearing any risk as 
opposed to prospectors where such orientation requires managers to foresee riskier behaviour 
and long-term goals. Also, it is related to the agency theory as variations in strategic orientation 
lead to changes in managerial motivation and control behaviour (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990). Therefore, managerial discretion is positively associated with firms’ 
strategic orientation. The higher the variations in firm strategic orientation, the higher the 
changes in the degree of ambiguity, availability of a diversified array of actions and the 
outcome uncertainty (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992). Hence, prospectors are thought to 
provide more discretion to executives and allow a greater tolerance for innovative and novel 
strategies to be implemented. Whereas, for defenders, due to the existence of stable and 
unchanging orientation, novel and innovative strategies would not be tolerated; accordingly, 
executives follow the previous pattern of their firms, which indeed lowers their level of 
discretion. Despite these interesting findings, it is unclear whether other types of firm strategic 
orientation influence the degree of discretion and consequently the pay system. Most former 
studies have argued that the strategic orientation most adopted by firms is analyzer (firms 
possessing an intermediate type with a unique combination of both prospector and defender 
characteristics) (e.g. Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Boyd and Reuning-Elliott, 1998). Thus, 
the association between strategic orientation and executive discretion is limited only to 
defenders and prospectors. 
The importance of understanding compensation systems comes from an agency 
perspective. From this standpoint, there are potential problems that might occur during the 
interaction process between the agent and the principal. These problems can be summarised 
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as: objectives incongruence (e.g. Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Nilakant and Rao, 1994) and 
information asymmetry (e.g. Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 
1992). The latter exists when agents possess better knowledge on task operations and 
implementation compared to principals and when those agents (managers) possess higher 
discretion. This creates multiple decision options, ambiguous causes and effects, and low task 
programmability (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992). Therefore, to avoid such agency 
problems, compensation strategies become increasingly important. Those problems basically 
expand as environmental differences and operation complexity increase, particularly when 
firms compete in global industries. To develop this notion further, academics have studied the 
international implications of organisational factors on compensation strategy for subsidiary 
firms. In the international context, firm headquarters delegate responsibilities and work to 
subsidiary units (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). Here, the information asymmetry comes mainly 
from two sources: cultural distance and the structure of operations or relationship between the 
headquarter and the subsidiary. In the first cause, cultural differences between the context of 
the headquarters and the subsidiaries make it difficult for principals to monitor the work of 
their agents, and as such the agency problem increases (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992). The 
second source ranges from lateral centralisation (decentralisation of decision making) and 
global rationalisation (centralisation of decision making) (Roth and Morrison, 1992). In this 
vein, when headquarters follow a global rationalisation relationship with their subsidiaries, the 
agency problem is low because the principals, which are mainly located at the headquarters, 
will be able to monitor closely the work of the subsidiary agent. This contrasts with a lateral 
centralisation structure where agents have greater autonomy in decision-making, which implies 
increased agency problems. However, goal incongruence occurs from the notion of parent 
commitment or the commitment of subsidiary managers to the headquarter; when there is high 
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commitment, there will be fewer agency problems. Thus, one can assume that companies 
following global strategies in international contexts tend to provide lower discretion to 
subsidiary executives, but that companies adopting multi-domestic international strategies will 
provide more discretion to their subsidiary managers. Again, to overcome such agency 
problems, principals tend to establish a compensation or incentive system that aligns both 
interests. 
To empirically test such assumptions, Roth and O’Donnell (1996) studied the design 
of compensation strategies in foreign subsidiaries based on agency theory from three 
perspectives: cultural distance, lateral centralisation and subsidiaries’ senior management 
commitment to the headquarters. They found that with lateral centralisation, the level of 
incentive compensation for subsidiaries’ senior executives’ increases; their compensation 
incentive is higher relative to the market (other competitors) (Roth and O’Donnell, 1996). 
These results are due to the presence of high managerial discretion for subsidiary executives 
when firms adopt lateral centralisation. To avoid and/or reduce the agency problem, principals 
tend to increase incentive compensation to keep subsidiary managers’ behaviour within the 
acceptable limits. Therefore, in a global context, the international structure of organisations 
(centralised vs. decentralised) plays an important role in shaping subsidiaries’ managerial 
discretion. Similarly, but in a new context, Boyd and Salamin (2001) replicated previous 
studies that were mostly conducted in the US on the Swiss financial industry. They confirmed 
the previous findings (e.g. Rajagopalan, 1997; Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992) in terms of 
the impact of firms’ strategic orientation on executives’ discretion and compensation system; 
however, they asserted that strategic orientation also affects the pay of all employees. The 
distinction is that executives will have higher bonus pay and incentive pay systems in firms 
adopting a change-orientation strategy. This is due to their organisational hierarchy, which has 
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been acknowledged to affect managerial discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). The 
discretion generated from organisational hierarchy is associated with the coercive and 
legitimate power gained from formal positioning within the firm. Thus, Boyd and Salamin 
(2001) provided another important organisational force, firm hierarchy, which influences 
managerial discretion. 
Apart from the focus on compensation and pay systems to identify the impact of 
organisational factors on managerial discretion, some authors have attempted to investigate 
and understand the importance of other executives’ decision-making authority, particularly 
Chief Information Officers (CIO). In this vein, Preston et al. (2008) argued that CIOs are 
important strategic decision makers within organisations if they are provided with the 
appropriate discretion or authority to produce strategic technological contributions. They found 
discretion to play a mediating role between organisational factors, including the firm’s climate, 
support for IT, CIO hierarchical power, CIO strategic effectiveness and CIO relationship with 
other TMT members (Preston et al., 2008). Therefore, if organisations encourage assertive 
behaviour for their executives (Morrison and Phelps, 1999), pro-activeness (Parker et al., 2006) 
and personal initiatives (Frese et al., 1996), the degree of managerial discretion provided to 
these executives will increase (Preston et al., 2008). Also, organisational support for certain 
firms’ activities or functions, like IT, shapes the latitude of the executives who are responsible 
for those functions. Such support might be associated with providing enough resources to 
implement certain functions; by doing so, organisations will be supporting these activities and 
providing greater latitude to those who are on top of these functions (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 
1987; Buchholtz et al., 1999). Finkelstein and Peteraf (2007) raised a similar argument in 
which they suggested that executives’ discretion is dependent on the complexity, uncertainty 
and observability of managerial activities. Additionally, the structural power gained from 
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formal positioning within the firm (Daily and Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992) is another 
function that influences the degree of discretion. Thus, organisational climate influences the 
discretionary boundaries of its members (Neal et al., 2005; Morrison and Phelps, 1999). 
Staying within the boundaries of boards of directors, one important event that has a 
major role in influencing discretion is the retention of a former CEO as board chair. This wave 
has been noticed widely in North American firms, as claimed by Booz & Co., along with 
previous research findings (e.g. Brickley et al., 1999). One can attribute the cause of such 
events to various factors, including the board perceiving the successor or new CEO as lacking 
the reasoning of the former incumbent, and the board trying to follow the trend elsewhere 
(Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). Another important factor can be the former CEO’s 
psychological unwillingness to depart and firms institutionalised practices (Goodstein and 
Boeker, 1991). Fitting within such a perspective, Brickley et al. (1999) found a significant 
relationship between pre-succession performance and the preservation of a former CEO on a 
board in which the highest performing CEOs will tend to remain on the board compared to 
their low-performing counterparts. However, such associations are controversial. In fact, some 
very successful CEOs have not remained on the boards of their former companies, such as 
Harvey Golub from American Express and Louis Gerstner from IBM (Quigley and Hambrick, 
2012). In discretion terms, such retention has considerable implications on the leeway of the 
actions of the successor CEO.  
However, regardless if the former CEO stays on board or not, successor CEOs based 
on his/her individual attributes would be able to enlarge the degree of discretion available to 
them. This has been illustrated in the concept of ‘narcissistic CEOs’ (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 
2007). In this vein, Quigley and Hambrick (2012) claimed that examining discretion from this 
standpoint would contribute to the field by adding a new source of discretion, which they 
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labelled as ‘powerful parties’. But, those powerful parties are in fact the board of directors who 
are indeed part of the internal organisation; therefore, looking at discretion from this angle 
would not add additional sources but would instead contribute to internal organisation factors, 
particularly board composition. Regardless of that, Quigley and Hambrick (2012) emphasised 
that former CEO retention significantly impacts new CEO discretion, including the range of 
possible options that act to influence corporate outcomes (Shen and Cho, 2005), particularly 
strategic change (Quigley and Hambrick, 2012). Executive turnover leads to surges in 
organisational change as new CEOs are under pressure to demonstrate their efficacy by 
spotting problems and introducing new initiatives; such events also provide an opportunity for 
firms to break out from their inertial bonds (e.g. Pfeffer, 1992). Executives in general are not 
open-minded (Henderson et al., 2006); in other words, they believe that their previous 
paradigms, strategies and actions are appropriate regardless of any changes (Hambrick et al., 
1993). Additionally, due to their existence as board chair to monitor the work of the successor 
executives, former CEOs are still committed to their visions and previous decisions they took 
during their time in office (Quigley and Hambrick, 2012). This means that predecessor CEOs 
will place explicit and implicit constraints on the actions of the new CEO. Thus, former CEO 
retention as board chair diminishes successors’ discretion and will accordingly limit his/her 
ability to make strategic changes. 
Recently, a study by Eun-Hee Kim (2013) looked at the impact of deregulation on the 
environmental and differentiation strategies that electric utility firms adopt along with the 
extent to which they are keen to enter the renewable green electricity market. Companies need 
to react appropriately to deregulation events to stay in the game. Thus, incumbents’ firms have 
focused on their own competencies gained from previous deregulated operations instead of 
pursuing a differentiation strategy. This is due to inertial organisational constraints, such as 
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internal firm resources, previous experience of doing things and learning gained from earlier 
operations (Kim, 2013). Proactive executives look at deregulation as an opportunity to provide 
additional innovative actions (Anderson and Bateman, 2000; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008) but do 
not get involved in renewable or green strategies if independent power producers exist. This is 
because power producers have long been established in the market and have a significant bank 
of electricity generated; hence, they are major suppliers for other firms. Thus, it can be posited 
that organisational integration and particularly vertical integration play an important role in 
affecting the degree of managerial discretion. However, weak empirical evidence has existed 
for such a proposition (Kim, 2013), which could be an interesting area for future research. 
2.2.2.1. Managerial Characteristics and Internal Organisation 
Apart from studying the dimensions of each type of discretion and looking at its impact on the 
level of leeway provided to firms’ executives, some scholars have looked at combining various 
dimensions together and have tried to predict how such combinations could shape managerial 
discretion. Some have looked at variables of the task environment along with managerial 
characteristics (e.g. Adams et al., 2005); others have gone on to study internal organisation and 
the task environment (e.g. Papadakis and Bourantas, 1998); and some have been interested in 
investigating the effect of combining internal organisation variables with managerial 
characteristics (e.g. Key, 2002). The first two combined sources will be explored in more detail 
in the sections below (3.3.1 and 3.3.2); here, the focus is on the latter dimension. In this vein, 
the only study found in the literature that incorporates both the organisation and managerial 
characteristics is Key’s (2002) work. He reinforced the importance of locus of control as a 
critical variable in perceiving managerial discretion (Carpenter and Golden, 1997); however, 
more importantly he found firm ethical culture to have a positive relationship with perceived 
managerial discretion. Also, he examined the effect of other individual (age, gender, tenure, 
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education) and organisational characteristics (size, type, industry, presence of ethical code) on 
perceived discretion. There was no support for the latter propositions. This contradicts earlier 
empirical results that emphasised the importance of the individual and organisational 
characteristics in shaping the level of managerial discretion (e.g. Hambrick and Finkelstein, 
1987; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). Despite the inability 
to articulate additional organisational and individual characteristics, Key’s (2002) work has 
introduced a new effect on managerial discretion – firm ethical culture. 
2.2.3. Task Environment 
In this section, the author reviews relevant studies that have investigated the antecedents of 
managerial discretion from an industry perspective. Task environment in the study of 
managerial discretion represents the organisation’s domain characteristics and its effect on the 
degree of discretion attributed to organisations’ executives who operate in such an atmosphere. 
The task environment might enhance/diminish discretion if, for example, there is a large variety 
in products and services between competitors (product differentiability), demand 
volatility/stability, industry concentration, structure, regulated/deregulated industry, powerful 
external forces, market growth and capital intensity (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). 
Correspondingly, some authors have categorised industry characteristics into the 
dimensions of munificence, complexity and dynamism (Dess and Beard, 1984). Based on that, 
much of the following work has concentrated on those dimensions and argued that each will 
have a distinct impact on managerial discretion. Lieberson and O’Connor (1972) were the first 
to examine the concept of leadership and the influence of leaders on organisational 
performance. They stated that “leader’s ability to implement goals reflect not only his/her 
distinctive qualities, but also social and environmental limits” (Lieberson and O’Connor, 1972: 
117). Thus, organisations are not only related to the individual characteristics of executives but 
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also their actions are associated with the social milieu in which they manoeuver. Lieberson and 
O’Connor (1972) found that management or leaders of large organisations have an influence 
on their firm performance, particularly sales, when the industry is characterised by high 
concentration. However, executives influence profit margins when their industry is low in 
labour intensity (labour pay constitutes a small proportion of total employment cost) or in a 
growing phase with consumers representing a significant part of its market. In other words, due 
to the existence of the abovementioned industry topographies, executives will show greater 
influence (either bad or good) on their organisations’ performance. Accordingly, it can be 
argued that industry concentration, labour intensity, industry growth and consumer demand 
differ in their constraints on executives’ discretion. However, Hambrick and Abrahamson 
(1995), in their aim to assess the degree of discretion within industries, have developed an 
innovative measure of industry discretion based on scores gathered from a panel of academics 
and security analysts. Those scores were also matched with archival industry data including 
product differentiability, capital intensity and market growth. They only found that advertising 
and R&D intensity along with market growth are positively related to industries characterised 
by high levels of discretion but that capital intensity was negatively related because it induces 
more strategic rigidity and an inability to change in the short term (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 
Ghemawat, 1991; Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995). 
From an information-processing perspective, the task environment provides various 
levels of information based on the task the firm faces. For example, turbulent environments 
provide a mass of information for firms’ executives to consider. The more turbulent the 
environment is, the more the managerial work is varied and fragmented, and the more 
information processing is necessary for executives (Daft et al., 1988). In contrast, in a steady 
or stable environment, the same bank of information and interpretation is not needed as stable 
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industries provide more routine work and standardised activities. Consequently, some 
researchers have studied the impact of the industry nature (turbulent versus stable) on TMT 
characteristics, specifically CEO dominance and TMT size. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) 
found that CEO dominance leads to poor performance in turbulent industries (excluding the 
computer industry) as opposed to stable ones, and that the larger the TMT size, the greater the 
information-processing capabilities it has, which leads to better performance in turbulent 
industries. Apart from their findings that mainly relate to the TMT features, they argued that 
turbulent industries or environments and discretion operate in a complementary manner to each 
other (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). In other words, volatile industries are characterised by 
being highly fluctuating in terms of advertising, R&D intensity, growth, demand, degree of 
regulations etc. (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Thus, such kinds of atmosphere give 
executives a wider array of actions to foresee, meaning higher discretion compared to stable 
environments in which actions are mainly restricted to a very limited range of activities. 
Additionally, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) noted that TMT attributes might not influence 
firms’ outcomes in low-discretion contexts. Therefore, turbulent and stable environments as 
industry dimensions provide different levels of managerial discretion. 
As previously discussed in an earlier sub-chapter (3.1), commitment to the status quo 
(CSQ) is one of the individual factors that executives possess that influence their discretion. 
CSQ has been found to have a negative relationship with managerial discretion. Particularly, 
scholars have focused on the organisational and individual determinants of the CSQ such as 
hierarchical position, long tenure and knowledge about alternatives etc. (e.g. Miller, 1991; 
Hambrick et al., 1993). Few have looked at the industry determinants that affect CSQ, which 
in turn shape managerial discretion. Industry norms have a greater role in influencing 
managerial practices and their psychological base (Hambrick et al., 1993). Spender (1989) 
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argued that there exists an increased similarity across companies operating in the same industry 
and labelled such homogeneity as ‘industry recipes’. Those recipes are generally the common 
frames of knowledge (Hambrick, 1989), which most firms possess within an industry and 
accordingly follow. In other words, industries are described by shared or interlocking 
metaphors of how things work or should work; therefore, such industry knowledge has a 
significant impact on the individuals who lead firms in such environments and affect their way 
of interpretation. Following the industry recipes would therefore lead to higher convincement 
of organisations correctness. Thus, the greater the occupancy in such an environment, the 
higher the CSQ will be. In other words, industry norms or recipes or knowledge lead to lower 
managerial discretion. Such propositions have been empirically justified by Hambrick et al. 
(1993); they found industry tenure to be positively related to CSQ more than organisational 
tenure and that this relationship is more pronounced in high-discretion industries compared to 
low-discretion ones. In simple terms, being involved with industry norms or the social 
construction of reality for a long time increases the tendency of executives to foresee industry 
recipes. Higher-discretion industries boost such associations as opposed to low-discretion ones 
in which executives’ effect on their organisation is muted. However, one might argue that 
Hambrick et al.’s (1993) methodology of a mail questionnaire might not provide relevant and 
objective responses, as they asked executives – mainly CEOs – about various measures 
including company performance, perceived change and industry discretion. Although their 
main objective was to understand respondents’ (executives) perspective, it can be debated that 
when researchers are looking for a subjective reality, they need to take into consideration the 
cognitive and psychological base of the individual. For instance, locus of control, as one of the 
highly discussed and researched executive characteristics, was not considered in Hambrick et 
al.’s (1993) work, and was not even included in the list of control variables. The idea here is 
Chapter 2 – Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: A Review of 
Relevant Literature 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
53 
that internal individuals might evaluate firms in a positive manner in line with their beliefs, 
while externals might underestimate firms’ performance, industry discretion and need for 
change. Therefore, within the field of managerial discretion, it is crucial to take on board 
various factors and employ the appropriate methodology to achieve relevant results.  
From a distinct angle, managerial discretion is influenced by other industrial 
characteristics such as industry regulatory characteristics. Magnan and St-Onge (1997), to 
understand the moderating effect of managerial discretion on CEO compensation within the 
US commercial banking industry, found that the strategic domain of banks (service: wholesale 
vs. retail; geography: international/super-regional vs. domestic) along with the regulatory 
characteristics of the task environment impact CEO compensation. In other words, executive 
compensation will be linked to performance in high-discretion contexts rather than in low-
discretion environments (Magnan and St-Onge, 1997). Similarly, Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) 
portrayed that the greater the level of managerial discretion, the more the CEO will be 
compensated, but this relationship will only be true when firm performance is high. Continuing 
in the same research vein, Finkelstein (2009) presented similar findings emphasising the 
importance of industry attributes in shaping managerial discretion. He used the same previous 
theoretical model and industry variables (advertising, R&D intensity, growth rate, demand 
instability, regulations, concentration and product differentiability) suggested by Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1987), but the distinction is in the use of multiple industries. The findings again 
reinforce that the level of discretion within an industry shapes CEO compensation and 
contingent-performance pay, in which high-discretionary environments lead to greater CEO 
pay and the adoption of performance-contingent systems (Finkelstein, 2009). However, the 
remarkable result in this study is that market growth has been the most significant variable 
affecting the degree of industry discretion followed by R&D intensity (Finkelstein, 2009). This 
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necessitates taking a closer look and identifying which industry factors mostly affect the level 
of discretion.  
Most arguments presented in these studies are based on Hambrick and Finkelstein’s 
(1987) industry determinants of discretion. The core concept is that industry regulations impose 
various constraints on organisations and thus executive (CEO) actions. Low-regulated 
environments provide executives with higher latitude of actions and therefore higher 
discretion; this in turn leads to greater CEO efficacy. Moreover, investment opportunities, 
which can be defined as the available opportunities within a certain industry, can also affect 
discretion. For instance, in industries with limited investment openings, executives will have a 
limited array of choices available to them to make a significant strategic contribution; this 
results in having lower uncertainty within the task environment. Hence, executives will be 
provided with low levels of discretion. On the other hand, industries with high investment 
opportunities are classified as having a higher growth rate and providing a wider range for 
market and product expansion (Hambrick and Lei, 1985). Frequent investment opportunities 
are classified as un-programmed decision-making (Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995), and will 
result in the creation of an ample variety of actions to be taken. Identically, product 
differentiation enhances the latitude of actions available to business executives as in such 
industries the means-end linkages are not clear and are poorly understood (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987; Rajagopalan and Prescott, 1990). The executive job therefore becomes more 
complex and poses higher risks (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992).  
Likewise, demand instability provides CEOs with an unpredictable atmosphere, which 
increases the information-processing demands and sophistication of CEOs’ tasks. CEOs then 
have a wider array of actions to implement and subsequently greater discretion. Also, industries 
characterised by high capital intensity make it difficult for firms to foresee change (Ghemawat, 
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1991) due to the high cost associated with business processes and the focus on efficient 
behaviour. In such environments, executives encounter higher restraints, limiting their 
discretion as opposed to a more flexible industry structure in which the change is easier to 
execute. In fact, some have argued that in an oligopolistic market (few competitors), firms have 
limited strategic choices as they constrain themselves (Scherer and Ross, 1990). More 
competitive industries allow greater room for differentiation and provide additional 
options/opportunities (Hubbard and Palia, 1995), thus there is greater discretion in competitive 
industry structures. However, in a concentrated structure, the external forces of suppliers, 
buyers, etc. are limited, which allow firms to be more independent; thus, executive discretion 
is ambiguous. To conclude, and apart from the positive or negative effect of industry structure 
on discretion, the task environment structure acts as a predecessor that influences the level of 
managerial discretion. 
Rajagopalan and Datta (1998) examined the impact of industry characteristics, 
particularly product differentiation, growth rate and capital intensity, on successor CEO 
attributes (age, tenure, functional background and education level), and assessed if such a fit is 
more pronounced in high-performance firms. This was carried out on a sample of US 
manufacturing non-diversified firms. They argued that in industries with greater product 
differentiation, there is clear evidence that CEO tenure is lower, their educational level is high, 
and that they mainly come from a non-throughput background; it was also found that the greater 
the industry growth, the lower the tenure and age of these executives (Rajagopalan and Datta, 
1998). However, they did not find any support for their fit argument (CEO characteristics and 
firm performance). These findings might raise several issues and counter-arguments. For 
instance, their sample industry (manufacturing) is characterised by having a greater number of 
throughput executives due to the nature of such an industry, where core attention is on costs 
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and having efficient business processes. Second, such industries are by default categorised as 
being capital-intensive due to the high fixed costs associated with establishing and running a 
manufacturing business. Third and most importantly, they have not adopted a managerial 
discretion framework, which is critical to understand the impact of CEOs on their companies’ 
performance. If CEOs possess higher discretion, their individual characteristics will play a core 
role in boosting/diminishing firm performance. Also, one might argue that in their sample, the 
manufacturing industry is characterised by being a low-discretion context; looking to establish 
a relationship between CEO attributes and firm performance will therefore not be applicable 
due to the overall environment condition. Therefore, presenting such a discussion enhances the 
importance of managerial discretion in understanding various organisational business 
phenomena.  
Datta et al. (2005) continued this research stream (industry impact) but took a different 
perspective – human resource management and work systems. Like Rajagopalan and Datta’s 
(1998) industry characteristics and sampling (US non-diversified manufacturing firms), Datta 
et al. (2005) employed the same industry features in addition to industry dynamism (stable vs. 
changing). Datta el al. (2005) found that industry growth, capital intensity and product 
differentiability all play a moderating role between high performance work systems (HPWS) 
and productivity. This is due to the role of discretionary factors associated with each industry 
type, so in high capital-intensity industries that provide strategic rigidity, employing HPWS 
does not in fact enhance labour productivity due to the high cost associated with deviations 
from the core of the business. On the other hand, industries with a high growth rate and product 
differentiability allow more innovative activities, information processing and task complexity; 
therefore, adopting HPWS enhances productivity. Despite the major focus of most strategic 
management researchers on the upper echelons and managerial discretion, the discretion 
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construct could be applied to employees or middle managers and would provide interesting 
insights. From this standpoint, high-discretion contexts (industries) provide greater task 
complexity, a wider range of actions, complex information processing, greater innovation and 
creativity. Therefore, one can argue that the adoption of HPWS, the focus of which is to 
enhance team information-sharing, lateral communication, skill building and broaden task 
roles (Datta et al., 2005), will boost employees’ or managers’ discretion but may reduce 
executive discretion. Such an argument has no empirical justification but could be of interest 
to future researchers to consider. Regardless of the domain of analysis, it has been reaffirmed 
that industry characteristics have a significant influence on managerial discretion.  
Moreover, within the vein of industry regulation but looking at a new industry (US 
airline industry), Peteraf and Reed (2007) studied the impact of industry changes – from a 
regulated industry to a deregulated task environment – on managerial discretion and internal 
fit. Their findings reconfirm the importance of industry regulations in shaping the level of 
managerial discretion. However, they used a sophisticated labour-economics technique to 
reaffirm the importance of fit and further support the contingency theory (Peteraf and Reed, 
2007). In relation to managerial discretion, Peteraf and Reed (2007) looked at two managerial 
choices: ‘operational’ which relates to route, pricing, entry and exit and ‘administrative’ 
choices, which are mainly the transformation processes that shape/govern operational choices. 
The empirical results demonstrate that industry regulations have a significant direct effect on 
managerial operations choices, thus reducing managerial discretion, whereas for administrative 
practices the effect is not significant and shows indirect constraints (Peteraf and Reed, 2007). 
Such arguments are backed up by the idea that operational variables or choices are easy to be 
controlled by industry constraints because they are observable, whereas administrative 
practices are internal procedures and choices related to a firm, tacit in nature, complex and 
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harder to imitate, which makes it harder for industry regulators to directly constrain such 
processes (Rivkin, 2000). Therefore, executives experiencing limited discretion in certain 
realms can still find a way to adapt and exercise their own latitude of actions in other less 
regulated arenas (Peteraf and Reed, 2007). This is consistent with Hambrick and Finkelstein’s 
(1987) indirect suggestion that executives in limited discretion environments but higher 
discretion firms may discover the means to break out of their contextual constraints.  
When deregulation took place, managers changed their practices; however, this was not 
due to the looseness of the constraints but was rather due to the emergence of new industry 
recipes that fit the new environmental condition (Peteraf and Reed, 2007). This again supports 
the contingency perspective. Likewise, another group of scholars (Goll et al., 2008) studied the 
impact of industry transitions (regulated to deregulated) within the US airline industry. Goll et 
al. (2008) studied the impact of TMT characteristics on business strategy and firm performance 
in the US airline industry during the transition period between 1972-1995 and the moderating 
role of managerial discretion. By using Porter’s (1980) strategy typology (differentiation, low 
cost and focus), they found that during the regulated period, TMT characteristics did not shape 
business strategies and consequently firm outcomes compared to the deregulated period (Goll 
et al., 2008). During deregulation, TMT characteristics played an important role in shaping 
business strategy, which led to better performance. However, the drawback of their work is the 
ignorance of firm features in terms of size, culture, and financial capabilities along with asset 
intensity. They did not control for firm individual variables; thus, a counter-argument may be 
raised. For instance, during the transition stage from a regulated to a deregulated task 
environment, firms with extensive assets, large size, etc. are not easily amenable and cannot 
change and adjust instantly to the new industry norms. This provides lower discretion for 
executives and limits their innovative ability to change strategy. In other words, performance 
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and business strategy will not be directly linked to TMT individualities. Overall, these findings 
re-emphasise the importance of the task environment in stimulating the degree of managerial 
discretion. Correspondingly, industry regulations play a core role in shaping executives 
discretion in which free-regulatory industries provide higher levels of discretion compared to 
highly regulated task environments. The idea of understanding industry characteristics is the 
core of the contingency theory. The internal arrangement (strategy and structure; strategy and 
organisation activities) and external alignment with the environment – the fit between 
organisational structure and environment along with matching strategy with the environmental 
(industry) needs (Donaldson, 2001) – are crucial for the success of a business and in 
accomplishing a sustainable competitive advantage (Rivkin, 2000).  
As an extension of the previously discussed literature but with the employment of new 
types of measures (lexical commonality and lexical density via computer-assisted text 
analysis), Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) studied the impact of industry characteristics, 
particularly ‘attentional homogeneity’ on executives’ discretion. However, before discussing 
their findings, it is important to understand what attentional homogeneity means. It is one of 
the three information-processing sequences (attention, interpretation and actions); it relates to 
the degree of similarity between the attention roots of executives across different firms 
(Abrahamson and Hambrick, 1997). Its relation to managerial discretion is seen from an 
attention angle. Managerial discretion itself is the latitude of action executives have and is the 
array of alternative options that a top manager can foresee (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). 
That is, discretion discusses options, thus reasonably it also confers diversity in the options that 
managers attend to (Nelson, 1991). In other words, assuming discretion is high, it means a 
wider array of options. However, executives, due to their bounded rationality, only choose 
some options to pay attention to and ignore others. This is the importance of homogeneity in 
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terms of which options are considered and which are discarded. As organisations within the 
same industry share similar norms and knowledge, the executives of these firms most probably 
share similar beliefs (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1994). Thus, when industry conditions are 
low, executives tend to have lower homogeneity because they have the leeway to pay attention 
to a broader set of options; by contrast, in industries where conditions are high, executives will 
have higher homogeneity as they share similar beliefs with their rivals, which forces them to 
pay attention to the same choices as others. As an empirical support for such argument, 
Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997), in a study of fourteen different industries, found that 
industry discretion has a negative link with attentional homogeneity, i.e. when industry 
discretion increases, executives’ attention will become less homogenous compared to their 
rivals within the same environment. This reinforces the above-conferred indication that 
industry norms, recipes, knowledge or interlocking metaphors all present significant pressure 
that shapes executives’ discretion.  
So far, the understanding of managerial discretion is based solely on Hambrick and 
Finkelstein’s (1987) model of discretion and its determinants. Most scholars in this stream of 
research have focused on such a model without investigating and exploring the model itself 
(Boyd and Gove, 2006). Thus, there is a need to grasp how the determinants of discretion merge 
together and see what will happen if managerial discretion is studied independently. 
Accordingly, Keegan and Kabanoff (2008) worked on improving the measurement of 
attentional homogeneity in managerial discretion by exploring its obverse – attentional 
heterogeneity – as a measure of industry degree of discretion. This has been implemented by 
employing Abrahamson and Hambrick’s (1997) lexical commonality and density measures in 
company letters of publicly listed firms as well as by adding a third improvement measure – 
the exploratory factor analysis – to produce one factor analysis (Keegan and Kabanoff, 2008). 
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They looked at new variables in industry debt usage and industry accounting standards and 
found that industry level of discretion is negatively linked to the former and that high discretion 
leads to adjustments in the latter (Keegan and Kabanoff, 2008). Based on the agency theory, 
unrestrained executives might expand the inappropriate usage of firms’ cash flow for their 
personal benefit. Also, in constrained environments, firms tend to make intensive use of debt 
financing. This gives lenders more power, which in turn lowers managerial discretion. 
Furthermore, Spender (1989) argued that in industries where debt is crucial, industry recipes 
specify a suitable variety of debt structure. Hence, the deviation from industry debt usage 
affects the level of managerial discretion. In other words, discretion increases when firms’ debt 
usage deviates from the industry mean (Keegan and Kabanoff, 2008). Then, it can be postulated 
that industry debt usage and variation in accounting standards contribute to changes in 
managerial discretion levels.  
In the impression management research spectrum, recent studies using industry 
variables (market growth rate, demand instability, differentiation, R&D and advertising 
intensity and capital intensity) have been conducted in a new context related to the adoption of 
strategic noise (leaders releasing of information to influence stakeholders’ reaction to manage 
their impression) during a material event such as CEO succession announcement (Graffin et 
al., 2011). The findings show that strategic noise is employed when long-tenured outgoing 
CEOs were paid higher than other TMT members and when working in a firm with a strong 
share-price performance. Also, such strategic implementation takes place when the incoming 
CEO has not been in a CEO position previously and comes from a low-reputation company 
(Graffin et al., 2011). In addition to that, previous analysis does not show any support for the 
firm level of managerial discretion as some can anticipate that high-discretion firms might 
employ strategic noise to lower the impact of CEO succession. This might not be attributed to 
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internal organisation dimensions of managerial discretion. However, it might be related to 
industry sources. For instance, in low-discretion industries in which CEOs possess little 
influence on organisational outcomes, firms’ outcomes are more predictable and stable, 
therefore announcing CEO succession will have a lesser impact on stakeholders and their 
reaction towards it, resulting in no adoption of strategic noise. However, there is no empirical 
evidence to support such a proposition; this may be an interesting area of investigation.  
Moreover, additional industry characteristics have been considered to influence 
managerial discretion but in an inductive manner. Sener et al. (2011) looked at the board of 
directors’ features and its impact on organisational performance for Turkish publicly traded 
companies. They found that industry characteristics – particularly munificence, dynamism and 
complexity (Dess and Beard, 1984) – play an important role in shaping board of director 
composition. In other words, in varying industries, mixed board compositions – especially 
outsiders and affiliated members as opposed to insiders – enhance organisational performance 
(Sener et al., 2011). Having a mixed composition in boards of directors with a higher rate of 
affiliated members and outsiders brings advantages because they enrich the strategic options 
available to firms, help in outsourcing external resources, and bring innovative and additional 
choices that can be taken into consideration for better execution. Accordingly, it is possible to 
argue that while insiders are thought to have a negative influence on organisation outcomes in 
munificent and dynamic industries, and that they possess higher commitment to the status quo 
(low discretion) (e.g. McClelland et al., 2010), munificent and dynamic industries interact in a 
way that limits discretion. Again, such a claim is subject to further empirical analysis to assess 
its relevance and applicability. 
One of the topics in managerial discretion that remains understudied is the international 
context, particularly how managerial discretion based on industry characteristics can influence 
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the international diversification of firms. International diversification is a complex and multi-
dimensional phenomenon; however, it has only been studied from two main perspectives: 
international trade (e.g. Mudambi and Zahra, 2007) or organisational strategy (e.g. Chi and 
McGuire, 1996). As international operations or geographical expansion involves numerous 
risks, then executives of firms foreseeing such growth should possess an enhanced latitude of 
actions to execute such a strategy (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). Thus, managerial discretion 
should also play an important role in the international context. Based on such a perspective, 
Sahaym et al. (2012) investigated how large and publicly traded US manufacturers implement 
export strategies through the lens of managerial discretion, industry innovations and 
uncertainty and the real options model. Real options are the source of investment opportunities 
that allow executives to respond in a contingent manner, in which they have the right but are 
not forced to take certain actions (Li and Rugman, 2007; McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). In other 
words, real options provide executives with flexibility in terms of strategy (Reuer and Tong, 
2005), which is seen in exports. Exporting – the basis of international expansion – benefits 
executives through generating rent on a lower investment scale. It also gives them the 
opportunity to increase their scale of actions and move to an incremental level such as 
international joint ventures or foreign direct investment, etc. without forcing them to make 
huge upfront commitments. From a task environment perspective, innovative industries 
motivate geographical expansion since companies are persuaded to enter countries/markets in 
which their innovative offering can lead them to achieve competitive and comparative 
advantages (Anand et al., 2010; Sahaym et al., 2012). Similarly, industry uncertainty drives 
executives to adopt strategies that distribute risk outside the domestic boundaries, seek external 
opportunities and share investment activities (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001; Sahaym et al., 
2012). Accordingly, by combining these three perspectives, Sahaym et al. (2012) found that 
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managerial discretion combined with high innovation and uncertainty motivate firms to pursue 
geographical expansion using export strategies. Managerial discretion has a moderating role in 
triggering export strategies when industries are characterised by innovation and uncertainty. 
Despite the absence of a causality relationship in Sahaym et al. (2012), one can anticipate that 
such industry characteristics provide greater leeway in terms of actions for executives, as most 
previous researchers have shown (e.g. Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Finkelstein and Boyd, 
1998; Datta et al., 2005; Finkelstein, 2009). Therefore, innovation and uncertainty lead to 
greater discretion, which in turn results in pursuing geographical expansion, particularly export 
strategies.  
Moving forward, Hambrick and Quigley (2014) introduced a new analytical method to 
study the overall effect of CEOs on firms’ performance along with understanding/examining 
the latitude of this effect in a sub-sample of high-, medium- and low-discretion industries based 
on Hambrick and Abrahamson’s (1995) industry classifications. They used industry variables 
(product differentiability, capital intensity, market growth, regulations and demand instability) 
but with a new method labelled ‘CEO in Context (CiC)’. This new methodology redefines 
previously adopted measures from two perspectives: industry and firm. For industry, the 
amendments relate to the exclusion of the focal firm and the inclusion of all industry firms – 
not only the one in the data sample when calculating for industry performance (Hambrick and 
Quigley, 2014). For firm measurement, the CiC replaces the previous firms’ dummies with 
controls for inherited profitability and health, as this has been shown to diminish successful 
individual CEO contribution e.g. IBM’s CEO (Hambrick and Quigley, 2014). Following this 
innovative methodology, the results show that the CEO effect has been represented in higher 
percentages (contribution) compared to previous studies (e.g. Mackey, 2008; Lieberson and 
O’Connor, 1972). The new overall percentage equates to 38.5% for ROA, 46.4% for MTB and 
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35.5% for ROS (Hambrick and Quigley, 2014). Interestingly, Hambrick and Quigley (2014) 
found that the CEO effect increased as industry discretion increased. This confirms the 
previous findings that industry characteristics shape industry discretion but additionally 
illustrate that such factors lead to a higher CEO effect – in other words higher discretion.  
As in the upper echelons and managerial discretion perspectives, the increased tenure 
of executives boosts their CSQ, leading to stable strategic moves, a lack of necessary 
innovative ideas, and an absence of innovation and change (e.g. Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990; Cohen and Bailey, 1997). With increased tenure, executives become seen as ‘stale in the 
saddle’, thus emphasising the importance of occasional executive turnover, which would 
amplify firms’ performance as they acquire new perspectives that enhance their innovative and 
changing actions (Miller, 1991). However, based on the human capital theory, increased and 
accumulated specific and valuable human capital in firms positively influences organisational 
effectiveness (Crook et al., 2011). In simple words, increased organisation tenure among 
executives enhances the possibility of firms achieving competitive advantage, as those 
resources are viewed as intangible endowed assets with increased capability, knowledge, 
relationships, embedded culture, greater awareness, experience etc. where all aspects positively 
contribute to firm performance (Collins and Clark, 2003). However, to empirically assess the 
effect of TMT turnover on firm performance, Messersmith et al. (2013) found contradicting 
results. They examined and evaluated the role of industry discretion based on three task 
environment dimensions: munificence, instability and complexity. They found increased TMT 
turnover to result in lower firm performance, and that such relationships are curvilinear due to 
the nature of turnover (Messersmith et al., 2013). Turnover is advantageous in the way that it 
provides better firm performance by promoting adaptability, flexibility and innovation 
(Hausknecht and Trevor, 2011). In contrast to the managerial discretion perspective, 
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Messersmith et al. (2013) argued that industry characteristics (munificence, instability and 
complexity) have no moderating impact between TMT turnover and firm performance; more 
precisely, they found that industry munificence (growth) decreases the effect of TMT turnover 
on performance. Such an argument is misleading for many reasons. First, they only controlled 
for firm size, performance, year, CEO departure and TMT organisational tenure diversity 
(Messersmith et al., 2013) without taking into consideration other crucial and very important 
factors like firm diversification, firm resources, firms’ investment intensity, ownership 
structure and executives’ individualities, which are very important enablers/restrictors of 
managerial discretion. Second and most importantly, they assured that TMT turnover has an 
impact on firm performance by proposing that they have proved, even if indirectly, that those 
TMTs had higher discretion levels because otherwise TMTs will have no impact on company 
performance (e.g. Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Additionally, industry munificence and 
other characteristics provide greater discretion, as empirically tested by many scholars (e.g. 
Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996), therefore, the effect of 
TMT turnover on performance will be more pronounced in high-discretion task environments.  
To summarise, this literature section has discussed and showed how industry 
characteristics significantly shape the degree of discretion provided to executives leading firms 
in these task environments. 
2.2.3.1. Task Environment and Managerial Characteristics 
As mentioned earlier, with the aim of broadening the scope of discretion research, some 
scholars have incorporated several sources of managerial discretion. Although this research 
stream has not provided any additional dimensions or sources of discretion, it has significantly 
contributed towards enhancing understanding of this phenomenon. In this section, the author 
discusses several studies’ outcomes that were based on integrating two dimensions of 
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discretion: task environment and executives’ individualities. In this vein, Adams et al. (2005) 
worked on identifying how CEO power impacts firm performance variability and examined 
the role of industry discretion. They adopted Finkelstein’s (1992) model of source of power 
(structural, ownership, expert and prestige power) and especially focused on structural power 
and, more precisely, CEO status of founder, CEO status as sole insider on the board, and CEO 
title concentration (Adams et al., 2005). The results indicate that CEO power significantly 
impacts performance variability for both stock return and other accounting measures (ROA 
and Tobin’s Q). However, it has been shown that not all three indicators of power possess the 
same effect; instead the most robust effect was the CEO status as firm founder (Adams et al., 
2005). Interestingly, when Adams et al. (2005) included industry characteristics based on 
Hambrick and Abrahamson’s (1995) classification, they found that the effect of CEO power 
on performance variability is stronger in high-discretion industries as opposed to low-
discretion task environments. Some might argue that high-discretion industries mechanically 
provide volatile performances; however, the findings emphasise that there is no significant 
relationship between performance variability and industry level of discretion (Adams et al., 
2005). This indicates that if the CEO possesses less power, then even in high-discretion 
industries he/she will not be able to influence firms’ outcomes. Accordingly, discretion derived 
from the task environment characteristics and executives’ characteristics has a stronger positive 
relationship between each other and both act to influence organisations’ outcomes.  
From a distinct angle, McClelland et al. (2010) investigated the impact of CEO CSQ 
on firm future performance. Despite reporting the findings of this study in one of the preceding 
sections (managerial characteristics and task environment), it is important to reintroduce it here 
in more depth as it integrates several dimensions that affect discretion. As noted earlier, older 
CEOs and CEOs with increased position tenure have a positive relationship with CSQ 
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(McClelland et al., 2010). In other words, as they get older, executives become more risk-
averse, inflexible, rigid and resistant to change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Also, when CEOs 
stay in their position for a long time, they become more embedded within the organisational 
culture and strongly believe in the accuracy of past strategies and recipes (Hambrick et al., 
1993), which will result in low innovation (Wu et al., 2005; Simsek, 2007) and decrease the 
propensity to strategic change (Henderson et al., 2006; Miller, 1991). However, based on the 
classification of Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995), McClelland et al. (2010) found more 
interesting results. They argued that CSQ is negatively related to future firm performance in 
high-discretion industries but that it is positively associated with future firm performance in 
low-discretion industries. In other words, in high-discretion industries, firms run by older and 
long-tenured CEOs that have a high degree of CSQ suffer from decreasing or deteriorating 
performance. Firms run by CEOs with the same characteristics but in low-discretion industries 
enjoy a better performance. This is simply because in low-discretion industries, where the 
environment is stable and the change margin is very limited, CEOs cannot alter their firms’ 
strategies and practices due to the high cost associated with such changes, which might lead to 
impaired performance (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Henderson et al., 2006). In contrast, in 
high-discretion industries where change can be rapid and products and services are developed 
continuously, CEOs who discard such events will miss the competitive wave and would 
struggle to recover easily, hence causing reduced performance. As a real-life illustration, 
Blackberry has failed to compete within the smartphone industry, which is considered a high 
discretionary type of task environment. After the launch of the first iPhone, Blackberry’s CEO 
said in a statement: “it’s kind of a new entrant into an already very busy space… but in terms 
of a sea-change for Blackberry, I would think that’s overstating it” (Balsillie, 2007). After that, 
the company did not implement any strategic actions to respond to the external industry 
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changes; hence from such standpoint, it clearly looks as if Blackberry’s CEO had a high level 
of belief in the company’s strategic correctness (high CSQ), which indeed resulted in ‘killing’ 
the company and removing it from the competition. Therefore, it can be concluded that having 
higher CSQ will stabilise/enhance firm performance based on the industry discretion levels. 
Overall, individual characteristics along with industry attributes shape the discretionary 
boundaries available to executives that lead to variations in organisations’ outcomes.  
2.2.3.2. Task Environment and Internal Organisation 
Another combination of discretion dimensions is the examination of the characteristics of both 
the task environment and the internal organisation. In this vein, Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1990) demonstrated the important moderating role of organisational and industry discretion 
levels on TMT individuality (tenure) and its influence on organisational outcomes. They 
focused on TMT tenure in the organisation, industry discretion as per Hambrick and 
Finkelstein’s (1987) measures, organisational discretion based on resource slack and firm size, 
in addition to firms’ outcomes as strategic persistence and conformity to industry average along 
with performance conformity (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). The results show that TMT 
tenure has a positive relationship with firms’ strategic persistence and conformity along with 
performance conformity with industry (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). In other words, firms 
led by long-tenure TMT follow a persistent strategy that conforms to industry mainline 
strategies (imitating competitors), which results in having a performance very close to the 
industry average. This is simply because long tenure increases TMT CSQ and limits 
information processing, which reduces the tendency to adopt novel and innovative strategies, 
along with making executives more risk-averse and resistant to change. However, these 
findings are not generalisable to every context, neither organisations nor industries, as 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) showed that TMT tenure has a significant impact on firms’ 
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outcomes in the computer industry (high discretion task environment) compared with gas 
distribution and chemical industries (more restricted/regulated industries). Also, TMT tenure 
has a larger effect on small-firms’ outcomes and firms that have high slack as opposed to a 
lower effect on large firms with low resource slack (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). 
Therefore, in high-discretion industries and organisations, TMT tenure has a larger influence 
on firms’ outcomes, showing the crucial moderating role of industry and organisational 
discretion between TMT tenure and organisations’ consequences. 
In a distinct vein, Rajagopalan and Finkelstein (1992) looked at executives’ – 
particularly CEOs’ – compensation system and its relationship with two dimensions of 
discretion: internal organisation based on Miles and Snow (1978), strategic orientation 
classification (Prospectors, Defenders, Analysers and Reactors) and task environment based 
on regulatory factors. Their study examined how US electric utility firms reacted to industry 
regulation events. The findings show that the task environment and strategic orientation of 
firms play a critical role in defining executives’ compensation system in terms of amount, type 
and proportion of cash compensation paid (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992). 
Correspondingly, organisations that adopt a more discretionary (prospector as opposed to 
defender; defender as opposed reactor) strategic orientation that operate in an uncertain 
changing environment offer higher compensation pay, which is mainly based on performance 
and in the form of incentives and option plans (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992). 
Accordingly, strategic orientation, as a characteristic of internal organisation, along with 
deregulated task environments (high multiple option, ambiguity of means-ends effect, outcome 
uncertainty and low behaviour programmability) create greater discretionary atmospheres that 
provide higher pay in CEO compensation plans that are more outcome-based and offer a larger 
proportion of cash.  
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Furthermore, in a study related to the impact of CEOs on technological innovation (TI) 
in Greek publicly listed companies, Papadakis and Bourantas (1998) found that CEO 
characteristics impact firms’ TI; however, the organisational and industry factors were more 
pronounced as opposed to those individualities in all the innovative strategies except for new 
product innovations. The results suggest that environmental dynamism (industry factor), firm 
structure, particularly organic structure (organisational factor), low formalisation and 
centralisation (organisational factor), professional knowledge or the use of external consultants 
(organisational factor), firms’ information-processing capabilities (organisational factor) and 
companies’ analytical/rational decision-making processes (organisational factor) all have a 
significant and positive impact on firms’ technological innovation (Papadakis and Bourantas, 
1998). In contrast, CEO characteristics are mainly personality factors, which include: CEO 
need for achievement and CEO tendency to support/enhance their organisation’s goals for 
reputation and power; these factors have a positive impact on firms’ adoption of innovative 
strategies (Papadakis and Bourantas, 1998). However, surprisingly there was no support for 
the demographic aspects of CEOs (tenure and formal education). This might be due to sampling 
issues where in their sample, CEOs worked in their organisations on average for around 17 
years, which is a long tenure. Leading to increased commitment to the status quo and a lower 
ability to change, the findings might be mixed. Apart from that, Papadakis and Bourantas’ 
(1998) study strengthens the importance of the internal organisational and industry in shaping 
the level of discretion provided to CEOs. 
Moreover, in organisations where slack is high and they do not suffer from increased 
debt structure, CEOs will have a greater impact on their firms’ outcomes (Wasserman et al., 
2010). Wasserman et al. (2010) debated that in industries with numerous opportunities, CEOs 
are not time-constrained in terms of selecting a relevant opportunity. That means that CEOs 
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can take advantage of another opportunity afterwards, as there exists an abundant set of 
choices. However, in industries where opportunities are scarce, CEOs are time-constrained and 
should select an opportunity instantly to avoid losing it to rivals. This argument is related to 
the industry growth rate, as Wasserman et al. (2010) suggested that growing industries provide 
a larger array of available opportunities, so missing an opportunity will have a lower impact 
on firm performance. Hence, scarcity of opportunities leads to a higher CEO effect, meaning 
higher discretion. However, the drawback of Wasserman et al.’s (2010) study may be related 
to the ignorance of other factors (e.g. CEO individualities), which could influence the CEO 
effect as well. Although these findings could be imperfect, it should be clarified that discretion 
is not only about the effect of executives on company performance but is also related to the 
range of actions available that are indeed considered acceptable by other stakeholders 
(Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Therefore, in industries with scarce opportunities or those 
labelled by Wasserman et al. (2010) as “Impact Industries”, CEOs will only have a limited 
number of actions to execute, which might not fall within the “zone of acceptance” of 
stakeholders. Such task environments provide CEOs with low discretion levels. 
In a distinct investigation of industry and organisational characteristics and their effect 
on managerial discretion, Hambrick et al. (2005) looked at the determinants of managerial 
discretion based on DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) isomorphic pressures. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) identified six dimensions (goal ambiguity, industry structure, role of the state, 
organisational resource dependency, legitimate models and managerial backgrounds) that 
increase isomorphism within an industry. Organisations operating in similar environments are 
subject to isomorphic pressures – either coercive (forced), mimetic (copying others) or 
normative (professionalism of decision makers) – that make them homogenous in their strategy 
and structure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). They viewed isomorphic pressures and the 
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homogenisation of operations as having similar positive directions. That means that when 
isomorphism increases, homogenisation across firms increases as well. Although, Hambrick et 
al. (2005) departed from the same perspective, they argued that isomorphism and 
homogenisation/heterogeneity do not share a similar direction. Instead, if isomorphic pressures 
diminish, then heterogeneity among firms operating in the same industry increases. This has 
been backed up by the observation of the changes that had happened in the American steel 
industry between 1980 and 2000. Hambrick et al. (2005) adopted the same dimensions and 
found that during this period the steel industry has seen: a decrease in goal ambiguity, the 
industry becoming less structured (more players), a decrease in the role of the state 
(deregulation), organisations broadening their resource dependence (engaging in international 
JVs), alternative legitimate models being created and managerial background becoming more 
diverse. These changes have contributed to an increased intra-industry variety and 
heterogeneity among firms operating in the steel industry. Also, to make things clearer, 
Hambrick et al. (2005) enlarged that sample of observations to an additional 18 industries and 
found a similar variety and heterogeneity. Therefore, increased industry heterogeneity and 
intra-industry variety result in greater discretion. Similarly, organisations facing low 
isomorphic pressures – those that are not dependent on a small number of entities as resources 
and with a more diverse structure – will provide greater discretion to their executives. Despite 
providing such theoretical opinions on isomorphism as a determinant of managerial discretion 
(Hambrick et al., 2005), those arguments still need to be empirically tested and proven to be 
sufficient. 
2.2.4. National Institutional Environment: The Research Gap 
As discussed in the preceding sections, most research into managerial discretion has focused 
on the three dimensions (individual, internal organisation and task environment or industry) 
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that were initially proposed by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), apart from several studies 
combining some of these dimensions. It has been almost four decades since the seminal work 
of Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) without any efforts to develop a new dimension or 
substantially develop the theory. No studies had looked at the institutional national factors that 
represent the macro level of the environment and its impact on managerial discretion until 
Crossland and Hambrick’s (2007) notable work on how the CEO effect differs across countries. 
Moreover, there are a few other studies that have incorporated the institutional environment 
within the discretion framework (e.g. Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Makhija and Stewart, 
2002) but that was not a straightforward investigation, as will be shown in the discussion 
below. In general, the core role of institutions within a certain environment is to establish a 
stable, consistent and accepted structure for human interactions (North, 1990; Williamson, 
2000). In doing so, depending on the degree of these institutions, some actions might be 
acceptable and others as not. Therefore, the latitude of executives’ actions along with their 
array of available choices might be weakened or strengthened based on the institutional 
environment characteristics.  
Earlier studies in relation to corporate governance have shown that countries differ 
significantly between each other in terms of their institutional contexts (e.g. Roe, 1993; 
Charkham, 1994; Rao and Lee-Sing, 1996). However, this literature has concentrated on 
specific contexts – mainly the US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Japan, etc. which fall under 
the developed countries umbrella. This has generated two divisions: Anglo American, which 
includes the US and the UK, and non-Anglo American clusters. The first division is 
characterised by: passive shareholders, active markets emphasising corporate control, and 
boards of directors that are not independent from management (some TMT members 
participate in corporate boards). The latter category, which includes Continental Europe and 
Chapter 2 – Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: A Review of 
Relevant Literature 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
75 
Japan, is more connected with shareholders that constantly interfere in major decision-making, 
independent boards of directors and limited markets for corporate control (Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro, 1998). The manifestation of managerial discretion is related to two agency problems 
that affect the effectiveness of corporate governance. Initially, executives may engage in short-
term cost-intensification activities to enhance their perk incomes or to provide other sources of 
compensation (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Another manifestation is associated with 
executives who pamper their needs for status, prestige and power. In such cases, executives 
will work in a long-term fashion to increase organisation size and growth but not to enhance 
shareholder profit, which is the core of corporate governance. These two managerial discretion 
appearances can be labelled as cost-augmentation and self-strategising (Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro, 1998). Therefore, when corporate governance limits corporate control as per its 
structure, emphasises shareholder profit maximization and works to accomplish such 
objectives, it exerts strong control over TMTs, which effectively reduces their latitude of 
action. Such reasoning is echoed in the work of Koufopoulos et al., (2010), where they 
demonstrated based on a sample of Greek shipping companies, that due to the corporate 
governance structure CEOs have greater/lower influence on most strategic decision-making 
processes. On the other hand, a diverse ownership structure provides more corporate control 
(less governance), which leads to augmented levels of discretion (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 
1998). However, some argue that even when ownership is diverged, executives are not able to 
pursue discretionary behaviour (Oviatt, 1988). There are other constraints that take place and 
act as a barrier to managers’ discretionary actions (Finkelstein, 1992). Accordingly, corporate 
governance is one of the key factors that have a crucial role in shaping managerial discretion. 
Its relation to the institutional environment is that it differs between countries, so in some 
countries corporate governance practices might enhance discretion whereas in other countries 
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the same practices might act in a contrary fashion. In this vein, Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) 
looked at the differences in corporate governance structure as a mediator between firms’ 
ownership concentration and companies’ profitability. They took such an angle because it has 
been believed that ownership concentration provides more control over executives’ actions, 
and due to the independence of board of directors, the agency problem does not exist. In such 
governance structures, a function of management is to maximise shareholder profit and not 
follow cost-augmentation or self-strategising goals. Thus, logically ownership concentration 
should provide better profit levels. Empirical findings suggest that even if shareholders are 
dominant, internal (originated from firms’ stakeholders) and external (originated from markets) 
constraints exert strong limitations on executives’ discretion (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998). 
Hence, institutional contexts do matter regarding the degree of discretion provided to 
executives. Hence, it is not only related to the task environment, internal organisational 
characteristics or the executive individualities. Despite Gedajlovic and Shapiro’s (1998) 
contribution, the results do not illustrate the micro-processes that cause institutional differences 
between national contexts.  
From another angle, Makhija and Stewart (2002) have investigated the impact of the 
institutional environment on managers’ risk-taking behaviour. The study has been conducted 
on two different institutional environments that differ particularly in their government 
economic orientation: a free-market economy (United States) versus a centrally planned 
economy (Czech Republic in 1992). The findings show that in free-market economies, 
managers are more suited to grasp ambiguous situations, absorb uncertainty in outcomes, have 
the capability to process information to establish appropriate actions and seek entrepreneurial 
behaviour (Reed, 2001). In contrast, in centrally planned economies, outcomes are predictable 
or programmable by the government, uncertainty is very low, ambiguous situations do not exist 
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and government bureaucracies are the only means of resource allocation (Kornai, 1992). 
Therefore, in such institutional environments, managers do not possess enough latitude of 
action to influence organisational outcomes. The only influence they have is procedural as 
opposed to their rivals in free-market economies where their accountability towards outcomes 
is more pronounced. In other words, the degree of managerial discretion decreases as decisions 
are pushed towards more formal levels, such as the state. Moreover, Makhija and Stewart 
(2002) found that executives in free-market economies have a greater sense of power towards 
decision outcomes, are more comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity and perceive more 
outcome accountability compared with their rivals in centrally planned economies. Such 
characteristics (except organisational accountability) lead to greater risk-taking behaviour. 
Accordingly, executives operating within national contexts that are featured by a free-market 
economy enjoy greater discretionary levels. 
Crossland (2007) developed a taxonomy based on three formal (legal tradition, 
ownership structure and labour flexibility) institutions and one informal (culture) based on the 
classifications presented by North (1990) to assess the level of discretion provided by the 
institutional environment. Such a taxonomy presented four groups: low-discretion (e.g. Japan, 
Sweden), rule-discretion (e.g. France, Germany), norm-constrained (e.g. Canada, Ireland) and 
high-discretion countries (e.g. the UK, the US and Australia) (Crossland, 2007). Obviously, 
low-discretion and high-discretion countries both represent the opposite extremes of 
institutional environmental constraints in which the low-discretion countries exert formal and 
informal constraints on executives, whereas the high-discretion environments enjoy more 
flexibility. Remarkably, rule-constrained countries have higher formal institutional constraints 
but lower informal barriers, which allows greater discretion on this part. This contrasts with 
norm-constrained countries, which possess higher informal institutional constraints but provide 
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weaker formal institutions, giving executives greater flexibility in terms of foreseeing their 
preferred actions. Such a classification clearly demonstrates that the institutional environment 
differs across nation-states. To reinforce such a perspective, Crossland and Hambrick (2007) 
studied how CEO effects (triggered by managerial discretion) vary across three countries – the 
US, Germany and Japan – using variance component analysis. Similarly, they adopted North’s 
(1990) classification of informal and formal institutions and investigated the impact of national 
values including individualism and uncertainty avoidance, which represent culture (informal 
institutions), along with corporate ownership structure and board governance, which represent 
the legal corporate system of public companies (formal institutions). Cultural values impose 
strong effects on individuals’ behaviour and perspectives (Huang and Van De Vliert, 2003). 
Thus, executives operating in national environments with different cultural values are subject 
to fluctuating influences (Davis et al., 1997). Here, there is a distinction between individualism 
(countries encouraging idiosyncratic behaviour) and collectivism (countries encouraging 
consensus behaviour). In an individualistic environment, stakeholders tolerate idiosyncratic 
behaviour from executives (Crossland and Hambrick, 2007). However, collective societies 
exert strong constraints on executives’ actions, and only allow for consensus-based behaviour 
or decisions (Smith et al., 1996; Hofstede, 2001). Based on Hofstede’s (1980) original data 
classification of cultural values, Crossland and Hambrick (2007) argued that the US is ranked 
first on the individualism scale and last on the uncertainty avoidance scale compared to 
Germany and Japan. Thus, executives operating in the US have more discretion compared to 
their rivals in Germany and Japan (Crossland and Hambrick, 2007).  
Moreover, when it comes to corporate ownership, most publicly owned US firms do 
not have a sole shareholder with a high stake in the company (Useem, 1993; Lee and O’Neill, 
2003). By contrast, firms in Germany have more concentrated ownership in which major banks 
Chapter 2 – Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: A Review of 
Relevant Literature 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
79 
hold much of companies’ stakes (Roe, 1993; Dore, 2005). In a similar fashion, Japanese firms’ 
ownership structure is heavily reliant on business groups (‘Keiretsu’) which exert significant 
constraints on executives’ actions, including choice of products, suppliers, customers, 
resources, market entry, etc. in addition to the existence of sole shareholders owning the largest 
stake in the organisation (La Porta et al., 1999; Kim et al., 2004). Hence, when ownership is 
dispersed, executives tend to have greater discretion and owners have a lower influence on 
them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), leading to a higher CEO effect (Crossland and Hambrick, 
2007).  
In terms of the board of governance, CEOs in the US enjoy a strong influence on board 
nomination (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). Majority of them have dual status (also being chair 
of the board), which means exerting more power on board decisions (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 
1994). In contrast, Japanese boards have a ceremonial role (Ahmadjian, 2003); however, due 
to the existence of strong business groups and a collectivistic orientation, which force 
executives to take consensus-based outcomes, executives have less leeway over organisational 
outcomes (Charkham, 1994). Conversely in Germany, board composition is very intense. 
There are two types of board in the country: managerial, including executives, and supervisory 
(Gorton and Schmid, 1996). The first has nothing to do with major decisions but the latter is 
comprised of bank agents, debt holders, shareholders and employee representatives possessing 
greater power and exercising stronger constraints, limiting executives’ actions (Dore, 2005). 
Accordingly, and based on the arguments mentioned above, Crossland and Hambrick (2007) 
found that executives’ discretion varies between the US, Germany and Japan whereby in the 
US executives enjoy more discretion than their peers in Germany and Japan. This argument 
has been shown through CEOs’ effects on performance variance using two accounting 
measures (ROA and ROS) and two market-based measures (sales growth and MTB).  
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Crossland (2009) empirically demonstrated the validity of the managerial discretion 
construct previously presented in Crossland and Hambrick (2007). He argued that country 
norms such as unpredictability and autonomous actions along with the flexibility of a country’s 
employer relationships and legal origins have a strong impact on shaping CEOs’ discretion 
(Crossland, 2009). When countries or societies promote individualistic values, and encourage 
unilateral behaviour, CEOs will be able and encouraged to use their idiosyncrasy to affect 
organisational outcomes. Similarly, norms that tolerate unpredictability in terms of uncertainty 
associated with certain actions provide executives with a wider array of accepted options, hence 
greater discretion (Crossland, 2009). The legal tradition (common vs. civil law tradition) has 
demonstrated itself as a major formal institution that affects executives’ discretion as well. 
More precisely, the civil law legal origin, which promotes collective behaviour, helps to reduce 
executives’ latitude of actions as opposed to the common law which emphasises ends-based 
orientation (Shen and Cho, 2005) (achieving shareholders’ objectives without focusing on the 
means implemented in doing so), which gives greater leeway to CEOs (Crossland, 2009; 
Crossland, 2007). In relation to employer flexibility, if non-economic factors (legislation, 
contracts etc.) dictate employee-employer relationships, then less employer flexibility results 
in low managerial discretion (Crossland, 2009). The findings re-emphasise the prominence of 
national institutions, which differs between countries in restraining or empowering CEOs’ 
discretion. Another illustration of 15 countries showed how the US provides a greater 
discretionary environment as opposed to South Korea and Japan (Crossland, 2009). 
Despite the influential attempt presented in Crossland and Hambrick (2007), the study 
has identified the influence of national institutions on CEO discretion through the lens of the 
antecedents of managerial discretion (CEO effect). However, they have not taken into 
consideration a direct assessment of the discretion levels, which meant that the findings were 
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not empirically valid. Accordingly, these authors in a recent and more developed study 
covering the same concept enlarged their sample of countries to 15 (European, North 
American, Australia, Asian countries), used a direct measure of discretion through international 
equity fund managers scores in which they have been validated using a panel of cross-cultural 
and international management scholars, and included additional national institutional 
(informal) factors (cultural looseness, power distance) (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). The 
findings reinforce the importance of national institutions in shaping executives’ discretion. In 
countries where there is more individualism, uncertainty tolerance, cultural looseness, 
dispersed firm ownership, common-law origin, and employer flexibility, CEOs enjoy higher 
levels of discretion, by which they strongly affect their firms’ performance (Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011). However, power distance, as an informal institution, did not exhibit a 
positive relation with discretion (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). This might be the case, since 
in some countries, even if they have low discretion, leaders might be given an elevated status, 
which widens the distance between members of society. Such a proposition is supported by 
Rose and Kavanagh’s (1976) example that in constitutional monarchies, people closely 
working with this class are given very little freedom in terms of their actions but are afforded 
great respect. Although the findings did not support power distance, the remaining national 
institutions were strongly evident (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). The remarkable 
contribution that Crossland and Hambrick (2011) made was departing from informal and 
formal institutional classifications to a broader societal orientation. Due to the high correlation 
between those national institutions along with the interconnectedness of institutions (Scott, 
2001) and their complementarity (Hall and Soskice, 2001), Crossland and Hambrick (2011) 
developed two categories: ‘risk orientation’, which includes uncertainty tolerance, legal origin, 
and ownership dispersion and employer flexibility; and ‘autonomy orientation’, which includes 
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individualism and cultural looseness. Therefore, the full array of institutions, which form a 
coherent whole, along with other organisational phenomena, influence executives’ discretion 
(Crossland and Hambrick, 2011; Peng et al., 2008). Therefore, risk and autonomy-oriented 
countries provide an appropriate field for executives to take idiosyncratic and bold actions 
(greater discretion).  
The national level of managerial discretion – an under-discovered field of research in 
strategic management in terms of its implications on firms’ outcomes and executives’ actions  
– continues to attract researchers to investigate various organisational phenomena in depth. In 
their attempt to do so, some researchers have looked at the impact of national discretion levels 
on CEO dismissal in several countries (15 countries based on Crossland and Hambrick’s (2011) 
sample) (Crossland and Chen, 2013). Although previous research has found a negative 
relationship between poor firm performance (stock price decrease) and CEO dismissal (e.g. 
Martin and McConnell, 1991; Brickley, 2003), no researchers have yet looked at 
comprehensive, cross-cultural or multi-country CEO dismissal (Crossland and Chen, 2013). 
By combining agency theory, which views weak or poor company performance as being 
respectively associated with poor executive (CEOs) performance (Dahya et al., 2002), and the 
corporate governance perspective, which sees poor firm performance as related to ownership 
structure – particularly concentrated structures and the existence of outside directors – 
Crossland and Chen (2013) argue that CEO dismissal is more related to the national level of 
managerial discretion provided by each country. Additionally, they found that CEO-board 
power asymmetry, differences in countries in terms of firm performance measures (the 
information implications of those measures) and the availability of a developed executive 
labour market also have a strong relationship with CEO dismissal. The executive labour market 
is a distinct type of market compared to the normal labour force. It is less globalised and 
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consists of national talent pools. In a strongly selective executive labour market, the number of 
available qualified and skilled executives is an important element to take into consideration 
when boards decide to dismiss an incumbent CEO. This provides a restricted range of 
replacements available to the board, thus it is crucial that the board is aware of the existence of 
equivalently skilled alternative executives (DiNardo et al., 1996). Hence, poor firm 
performance would be less negatively related to CEO dismissal in countries where the 
executive labour market is under-developed (Crossland and Chen, 2013). In terms of firm 
performance measures and its fluctuation from one country to another, Crossland and Chen 
(2013) divided the focus into two different types of measures: market-based and accounting-
based. Market-based measures, mainly stock returns, function in line with new market 
information (external) and new firm information (internal) (Morck et al., 2000). When a group 
of stock movements changes in the same direction, such market-based measures are less a 
function of firm-specific information and more so reflect the market information. Therefore, 
when such phenomena occur, the changes in stock return are not informative indicators of 
companies’ internal performance (Lel and Miller, 2008). In this case, a board would be 
reluctant to dismiss the incumbent CEO; therefore, the association between market-based 
performance and CEO dismissal will be more negatively related in countries where the stock 
price information is high (Crossland and Chen, 2013). On the other hand, in terms of 
accounting-based measures, CEOs can alter financial reports (Dechow et al., 1995; Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999), particularly in countries where standardised financial reporting policies are 
absent. This is what Crossland and Chen (2013) labelled as ‘earnings management’; they found 
that when earnings management is exercised in some national contexts, CEO dismissal would 
be less negatively related to poor firm performance.  
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Furthermore, ownership structure, based on agency theory, is a crucial prediction of 
power distribution among corporate decision-makers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As claimed 
by Crossland and Hambrick (2007), they expect dispersed ownership to provide CEOs with 
greater power over the board and concentrated ownership to act oppositely. Recalling previous 
studies’ findings that countries differ in their formal institutions – particularly ownership 
structure whereby some are concentrated like Germany and Japan and others are more 
dispersed like the UK and the US (La Porta et al., 1999; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Crossland and Hambrick, 2007) – CEOs in a dispersed ownership 
structure possess greater power over boards, which leads to lower CEO dismissal. However, 
Crossland and Chen’s (2013) findings suggest the opposite. CEO dismissal is not negatively 
related to poor firm performance in countries where ownership is dispersed. This might be 
explained by the greater discretion available to CEOs in such contexts, which gives them more 
accountability and responsibility over their actions and consequently their firm performance. 
In that case, stakeholders observe CEOs as being personally responsible for good or bad firm 
performance. The interaction between those two discretion mechanisms – ‘power-enhancing’ 
and ‘non-power enhancing’, demand volatility and national culture (Finkelstein and Boyd, 
1998; Crossland and Hambrick, 2011) – have reduced the relationship between CEO dismissal 
and poor firm performance. Apart from that, an important result shown in Crossland and Chen 
(2013) is that different countries, due to changes in the level of discretion provided to CEOs, 
will behave differently when it comes to CEO dismissal in relation to poor firm performance. 
In other words, CEO dismissal would be more pronounced and negatively related to poor firm 
performance in countries where managerial discretion is high (Crossland and Chen, 2013). 
Again, these findings show the importance of managerial discretion, particularly at the national 
level, in explaining various strategic management and organisational phenomena. 
Chapter 2 – Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: A Review of 
Relevant Literature 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
85 
Apart from the effect of national culture and managerial discretion on firms’ outcomes 
in the strategic management field, researchers have used national culture along with managerial 
discretion to explain other management phenomena such as strategic humane resources. Rabl 
et al. (2014) investigated the relationship between High Performance Work Systems (HPWS) 
and business performance through the lens of national culture and managerial discretion. 
Before discussing their findings, it is important to understand the concept of HPWS in strategic 
HR. High performance work systems are mainly HR practices that are designed to enhance 
business performance through the use of motivation, employees’ contribution to and 
engagement in business processes, enhancing employees’ abilities, performance pay, selective 
staffing, investing in training and development programmes and employee participation in 
decisions (e.g. Boxall and Purcell, 2003; Combs et al., 2006). The importance of HPWS is that 
it enhances firms’ performance (e.g. Datta et al., 2005; Combs et al., 2006; Jiang et al., 2012). 
However, these findings were uncovered using single-country analysis without taking into 
consideration the differences between national cultures across countries, which might 
otherwise lead to different results as the fit of such HR strategies is not common to all national 
contexts (e.g. Aycan et al., 2000; Stavrou et al., 2010). 
An unanswered question that remains the key focus of scholars in the field of 
management is whether national culture moderates the effectiveness of management practices 
(Kirkman et al., 2006), in this case the HPWS. As noted by Hofstede (1993), management 
practices and theories do not work internationally and stop at national borders. He reinforces 
his view as a response to the debate around standardised and localised practices by saying that 
“for best results, a multinational’s management practices should fit the local culture” 
(Hofstede, 2001: 441-442). Keeping this argument in mind, Rabl et al. (2014) adopted the 
national culture difference framework based on House et al. (2004) along with two aspects of 
Chapter 2 – Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: A Review of 
Relevant Literature 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
86 
managerial discretion: cultural looseness-tightness (Gelfand et al., 2006) and institutional 
flexibility in terms of legal origin and labour market flexibility, based on Crossland and 
Hambrick (2011). They found a positive relationship between HPWS and business 
performance regardless of the constraints associated with national cultures, and a more positive 
association when countries are characterised by tight culture (Rabl et al., 2014). These findings 
can be related to the lower impact of informal institutions compared to formal ones, which are 
crucial for firm legitimacy. Therefore, companies can sometimes deviate from informal 
institutions, particularly in HR practices, because if they conform to the formal constraints then 
their behaviour will continue to be legal and legitimate. Interestingly, Rabl et al. (2014) argue 
that in tight cultures, the link between HPWS and business performance is positive. Such a link 
is more positive in countries with low power distance, low collectivism and high performance 
orientation. This is reasonably true as high performance orientation will lead to the employment 
of practices that enhance performance. In low power distance nations, hierarchy and seniority 
are not regarded as important and selection is based on skills and performance (Aycan, 2005). 
However, such societies do not tolerate differentiation between individuals as the HPWS does 
when it comes to performing selective staffing. In terms of low collectivism countries, as stated 
in Crossland and Hambrick (2007, 2011), countries with low collective behaviour (high 
individualism) provide higher discretion to executives, therefore implementing idiosyncratic 
strategies. Hence, the adoption and implementation of HPWS is not seen as objectionable and 
in this sense, there are no constraints exerted by the institutional environment. To conclude, 
managerial discretion is not only effective, and moderate organisational outcomes in the pure 
strategic management field but also in terms of HR practices and other business-related 
activities as well. 
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From the above review, several important shortcomings exist in relation to the literature 
on discretion. These gaps are not only found in one area (dimension) but are dispersed 
throughout this field. Very little research has focused on individual characteristics as 
antecedents of discretion. Out of the seven individual-level predecessors proposed by 
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), only locus of control (Carpenter and Golden, 1997) has 
received considerable attention in the literature. Other psychological micro-foundations of 
executives could play an important role in enhancing or constraining executives’ latitude of 
actions. For instance, self-efficacy, which indicates executives’ confidence in carrying out 
different tasks within their leadership roles, could also affect managerial discretion. Increased 
self-efficacy has been linked to improved and sustained firm performance (Gist and Mitchell, 
1992; Judge et al., 2002). Also, increased firm performance leads to enhanced executive self-
efficacy (Lindsley et al., 1995). Therefore, such a construct could play a crucial role in 
enhancing executives perceived discretion. Other individual-level antecedents are anticipated 
to have a significant effect on discretion, such as CEO confidence. Confident executives tend 
to venture into a greater variety of projects (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), hence such 
individuality will likely increase executives’ awareness of a greater array of actions, leading to 
enhanced discretion. Accordingly, this failure to address other important individual-level 
antecedents has resulted in development and understanding of managerial discretion being 
constrained.  
Second, the organisational-level antecedents of discretion lack new discoveries. In this 
vein, several internal composites were operationalised as having an important effect on 
discretion such as: resources, slack, organisational culture and powerful inside forces. 
However, the extensive application of firm performance as an outcome of discretion has 
dominated the organisational dimension. However, an alternative causal relationship would 
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also be applicable. For instance, poor firm performance might increase shareholders’ or boards’ 
monitoring and control, which will constrain CEO actions. Thus, such an inverse relationship 
could also lead to lower levels of discretion. It is important for researchers to reconsider the 
organisational dimension and to try to establish causal relationships between various 
organisational factors that may play an important role in shaping executives’ latitude of actions. 
Third and most importantly, task environment, which constitutes the most extensive 
enquiry within the discretion literature, has only been covered from the industry paradigm. 
Industrial factors (e.g. market growth, regulations, demand instability, etc.) are not the sole 
antecedents present in the task environment. The environment in which firms operate also 
covers the institutional or national sphere. Despite Crossland and Hambrick’s (2007, 2011) 
attempts, which added an important new line of enquiry, considerable opportunities still exist 
to investigate the country-level characters that could affect executives’ discretion. As 
previously mentioned, this specific gap in the research is the core focus of this thesis and the 
area most relevant to it. National environments possess various factors that could play a 
significant role in shaping executives’ discretion. Very little work has studied the relationship 
between a confined domain of leadership (e.g. CEO discretion) and other national-level factors. 
This study incorporates such considerations by empirically integrating the effect of broader 
informal institutions and cultural practices on CEO discretion. Such an attempt helps to 
compensate for the dearth of research and would likely broaden our understanding in relation 
to the national environment of discretion. It is also important to note that discretion research 
has strongly focused on US and Western contexts; however, following the cross-cultural logic, 
culturally distant countries/collectives might not recognise, appreciate or validate the effect of 
national institutions on executives’ discretion. Thus, by studying an extended set of countries, 
the researcher is enhancing the development of the field of discretion by assessing its 
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applicability and validity in other countries and more essentially discovering new insights. The 
following chapter offers answers to the questions related to why and how managerial discretion 
differ across countries (inter-cultural variations) by incorporating the other aspect of culture – 
its practices. 
2.3. Consequences of Managerial Discretion 
If executives do indeed matter, then their latitude of actions would significantly affect several 
organisational and national level outcomes. The core concept of the discretion model argues 
that if executives, particularly CEOs, have a greater array of alternatives and their influence on 
decision making is high, their effect on organisational outcomes (strategy and performance) 
becomes greater (Wangrow et al., 2015). Using an innovative technique to capture individual 
CEO effects on firm performance, Hambrick and Quigley (2014) find that CEOs in high-
discretion industries possess a greater effect on firm performance compared to their 
counterparts in moderate- and low-discretion industries. Similarly, Quigley and Hambrick 
(2015) assert an increased effect of CEOs on firm performance in the US – a high-discretion 
context (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). However, a recent study by Fitza (2014) shows that 
the actual CEO effect is smaller than previous studies’ estimates and that such effects are 
conflated with events that are outside the CEO’s control, mainly related to random chance. The 
difference is seen in the methodology employed by scholars to estimate the CEO effect. Despite 
this variance, Quigley and Graffin (2016) reaffirm the significant importance of CEOs and 
their greater effect on firm performance. This is consistent with earlier studies that link 
managerial discretion to CEO power and performance variability, in which greater discretion 
is positively related to greater performance variability (e.g. Adams et al., 2005). CEO effect 
has not only been examined in a single context but also across countries. Crossland and 
Hambrick (2007) using institutional theory find that greater CEO effect is experienced in 
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countries where national-level constraints are absent or low. In the same vein, countries with 
more managerial discretion allow CEOs to have a greater effect on firm performance 
(Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). As such, these earlier studies provide considerable support 
for the notion that managerial discretion is positively related to greater CEO effect on firm 
performance and that discretion is the main driver for this increased effect.  
Another important outcome of managerial discretion is executive compensation. Using 
a variety of external (task environment) and internal proxies, several studies demonstrate that 
more managerial discretion is positively associated with greater CEO compensation (e.g. Boyd 
and Salamin, 2001; Finkelstein, 2009; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Rajagopalan and 
Finkelstein, 1992). Equally important is the discretion outcome related to firm strategic 
behaviour. For instance, Kim (2013) finds that discretion, derived from CEO duality, is an 
important driver for the likelihood of market entry. Also, discretion has been directly correlated 
with the degree of commitment to the status quo, in the sense that greater discretion weakens 
such commitment and increases the likelihood of strategic change (McClelland et al., 2010). 
Staying in the stream of strategic change, Quigley and Hambrick (2012) empirically find that 
internal constraints (e.g. retention of a prior CEO on the board) reduce the degree of managerial 
discretion, which in turn limits the scale of strategic change. From a broader perspective, 
executives operating in a free-market economy, which drives higher degree of managerial 
discretion, engage in more risk-taking behaviour (Makhija and Stewart, 2002). Despite, these 
previous attempts to understand the consequences of managerial discretion, few other studies 
have considered and examined alternative outcomes (Wangrow et al., 2015). 
The author discussed in the preceding sections of the literature the various antecedents 
of managerial discretion, which are the factors that shape the degree of executives’ latitude of 
actions. In this section, using the same dimensions, the author reports on studies that looked at 
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managerial discretion’s impact on various individual, firm, industry and national level 
outcomes. These studies used managerial discretion as an independent variable, and utilised 
different external and internal characteristics to assess its impact. While managerial discretion 
is theoretically conceptualised to directly affect several outcomes, the literature includes 
studies that focused on discretion as an important mediator or moderator between various 
independent and dependent variables. These studies will also be reported in the discussion 
below. 
2.3.1. Individual-level Consequences 
As previously stated, locus of control was found to be an important driver/hindrance of 
managerial discretion, with more internal executives possessing more managerial discretion as 
opposed to their external counterparts (Wangrow et al., 2015). Such discretion antecedent leads 
to considerable changes in firms’ strategy, environment and structure. From early work on 
locus of control (e.g. Shapero, 1975) to more recent conceptualisations (e.g. Dollinger et al., 
1997), firms led by internal executives have been found to show a greater tendency towards 
adopting entrepreneurial qualities and engaging in greater innovation, which makes it more 
likely for a firm to implement an organic organisational climate. This results in more frequent 
introduction of new products and services along with increased product development. The 
environmental and structural links with internal locus of control lies in the premises that 
innovative and organic firms are more likely to be attracted to and be in dynamic and 
heterogeneous environments (Miller et al., 1982).  
Miller et al. (1982), in a sample of Canadian firms, find that executives with internal 
locus of control (an important discretion driver) are more innovative and proactive. Also, 
internal executives, due to their perception of high discretion, engage and proceed with 
alliances even in mixed or negative reputation scenarios (Dollinger et al., 1997). As such, 
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discretion moderates the relationship between reputation and establishing an alliance with a 
less reputable partner by suppressing the negative information related to the partner’s 
reputation. Equally important is the decision-making characteristic and propensity of 
executives to be open and take risky actions. Roth (1992) argues that the fit between greater 
risk-taking and openness in the decision making, which enhances executives’ discretion, would 
enable firms implementing an international strategy to perform better in the global context. 
On another crucial perspective, strategic conformity is an important outcome of 
executive ability to influence firm strategy to adhere to or deviate from the central tendency of 
the task environment. If executives develop a narrow repertoire of strategic alternatives, they 
become embedded in a strategic approach, which significantly limits their latitude of strategic 
actions (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). Similarly, Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) find 
that executives have more intra-industry ties (within the same industry) and possess a lower 
degree of managerial discretion, which in turn leads to greater strategic conformity and better 
performance in uncertain industries. In contrast, executives with more extra-industry ties (ties 
outside the main organisational domain) are associated with more discretion, which results in 
the adoption of deviant strategies.  
In a separate vein, studies show that greater levels of managerial discretion force CEOs, 
to a certain extent, to become more personally responsible for philanthropic activities (Wood, 
1991). These philanthropic actions provide executives with the opportunity to influence their 
image and advance their own interests to core stakeholders (Haley, 1991). However, if firms’ 
resources are limited, executives are not able to engage in philanthropic activities. Following 
such reasoning, Buchholtz et al. (1999) show that managerial discretion related to charitable 
or philanthropic contribution is an important mediator between firm resources and corporate 
philanthropy.  
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Lastly, CEO commitment to the status quo plays an important role in defining the 
latitude of executives’ actions and its consequent outcomes. Despite being a predictor of the 
level of strategic change in an organisation (Hambrick et al., 1993), commitment to the status 
quo is also suggestive of other organisational outcomes. McClelland et al. (2010) examined 
CEOs’ commitment to the status quo in several industries (high, moderate and low) and found 
that such a cognitive construct is particularly important in high-discretion task environments 
(e.g. computer equipment). The relationship between commitment to the status quo and firm 
performance is more pronounced in high-discretion industries (McClelland et al., 2010). 
Therefore, in high-discretion contexts, firms led by CEOs who are committed to the status quo 
suffer from weak future firm performance as opposed to firms operating in low-discretion 
domains. 
2.3.2. Organisation-level Consequences 
CEO compensation is another frequently studied outcome of managerial discretion. Werner 
and Tosi (1995) studied the effect of managerial discretion on the incentive plans and the 
compensation packages of managers, and found that companies with higher managerial 
discretion pay premium compensation packages through greater bonuses, higher salaries and 
long-term incentives compared to low-discretion firms. However, high-discretion companies 
that paid such premiums did not perform better than their counterparts, which may be related 
to less monitoring of the compensation process (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1994). Other studies 
(e.g. Rajagopalan, 1996) show that to benefit from a better economic performance, firms need 
to align the compensation packages provided to top executives with their strategic orientation. 
Rajagopalan (1996) argues that firms with a prospector strategy, which provide a greater level 
of discretion, would perform better if the incentive plans adopted were stock-based as opposed 
to defender firms, which perform better when implementing cash-based incentives. This is in 
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line with Rajagopalan and Finkelstein’s (1992) findings, which assert that a company’s 
strategic orientation has a considerable influence on executives, particularly in terms of CEO 
compensation. Additional support for the impact of firm strategic orientation comes from the 
findings of Boyd and Salamin (2001), who identify that strategic orientation affects the pay of 
all employees but most importantly top executives whose base pay is higher if their firms 
implement a change-orientation strategy, which afford greater discretion.  
Also, hierarchical positions have a significant impact on tailoring reward systems for 
the upper echelons, where executives leading firms with greater change-orientation strategies 
are rewarded with higher bonuses (Boyd and Salamin, 2001). Likewise, companies with a 
concentrated ownership structure in non-management hands, which constrains discretion, 
significantly reduces the likelihood of boards adopting a golden parachute (Singh and Harianto, 
1989). However, the ability of firms to make strategic change based on greater discretion is 
also related to the organisational structure, particularly predecessor-retention on the board. 
Retaining a former CEO on the board of directors is found to significantly dampen the 
successor CEO’s discretion, which makes it harder for them to initiate more strategic change 
and deliver a better performance (Quigley and Hambrick, 2012). 
Even in the international context, subsidiaries differ in their compensation packages for 
executives to the parent company. In a study of 100 subsidiaries in five countries, Roth and 
O’Donnell (1996) demonstrate that the lateral decentralisation of subsidiaries, which allows 
greater discretion, provides higher levels of incentive-based compensation plans to its 
executives. 
Moreover, Preston and Chen (2008), by studying the discretion of important top 
executives in contemporary firms, found the discretion afforded to chief information officers 
(CIOs) to be strongly and positively related to greater IT contribution to firm performance. 
Chapter 2 – Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: A Review of 
Relevant Literature 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
95 
Similarly, Smaltz et al. (2006) argue that the latitude of actions provided to executives, 
particularly those responsible for the IT department within an organisation, adds value to the 
organisation and improves its performance. From a resource-based view, the CIO is an 
important asset, which can be used to create business values (Karahanna and Chen, 2006). 
Providing more latitude of actions for such executives will therefore lead to positive 
performance outcomes. From the same standpoint of the resource-based view, firms with 
abundant resources would provide greater levels of managerial discretion, which helps to 
enhance firm performance (Wasserman et al., 2010). Also, resources – specifically those which 
are intangible, such as free cash flow – would allow for greater latitude of actions and result in 
greater shareholder control (Campbell et al., 2012). This is due to the greater information 
asymmetry (Harris and Raviv, 1991) and the greater challenges from a governance perspective 
to control and monitor these assets (Durnev and Kim, 2005), which increases the agency cost. 
As such, this will have an important implication on the director nomination and may signal 
negative market reaction (Campbell et al., 2012).  
Several other studies have looked at different sets of outcomes of managerial discretion. 
For instance, Kim (2013), in a study of US firms in the electric utilities industry, shows how 
managerial discretion could be an important predictor of market penetration and development. 
CEO duality, as an organisational proxy of managerial discretion, has a core role in increasing 
the likelihood of firms entering the green renewable market (Kim, 2013). This likelihood of 
investing in green technologies or entering the green energy market is directly associated with 
managerial discretion, because discretion allows executives to deal with the uncertainties and 
risks that result from the use of unfamiliar green technology (Murillo-Luna et al., 2008). 
2.3.3. Industry-level Consequences 
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The industry antecedent of discretion has led to several important consequences as well, which 
has attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention. Like the organisational antecedent 
of managerial discretion, the task environment is an important determinant of executive 
compensation. In a sample of companies from the Fortune 1,000 list, Finkelstein and Boyd 
(1998) examined the main effect of industry managerial discretion on CEO pay. They find that 
managerial discretion – triggered by higher market growth, advertising intensity, and less 
regulation – has a strong positive relationship with CEO compensation. This relationship is 
more significant for high performers (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998). However, due to the high 
industry discretion, boards of firms operating in such domains tend to construct compensation 
plans that reflect the possible ability of CEOs to impact firm performance; as such, the 
proportion of performance-contingent CEO compensation will be greater (Finkelstein, 2009). 
Also, the association between performance and executive compensation is stronger when 
discretion mediates this relationship (Magnan and St. Onge, 1997). 
Another studied consequence of industry discretion is its direct effect on company 
performance. Hambrick and Quigley (2014) found that CEO effect on firm performance is 
much larger in high-discretion industries as opposed to low-discretion ones. Further support is 
derived from Adams et al. (2005) and Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993), who also empirically 
show that the CEO effect on firm performance is much larger in high-discretion industries. 
However, not all industry characteristics that drive discretion have the same positive effect on 
firm performance. In a study of the impact of TMT turnover on firm performance, Messersmith 
et al. (2013) argue that environmental munificence weakened the negative effect of TMT 
turnover on firm performance and that industry complexity and instability were found to have 
no relationship with performance. Contrary to the discretion literature, these findings may 
indicate that such high-discretionary task environments may soften the association between 
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TMT turnover and firm performance. Additionally, Wasserman et al. (2010) show that industry 
concentration provides companies with fewer opportunities to act, which leads to CEOs having 
a greater effect on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Likewise, CEOs operating in 
industries with low growth, which limits the range of opportunities available, would have a 
greater impact on firm performance. Despite these equivocal results, it should be taken into 
consideration that discretion is context-dependent (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987), and that 
this research stream focused mainly on the direct effect of the industry discretion and neglected 
the impact of other intervening factors or variables. 
Furthermore, industry discretion has played an important signalling role for top executives, 
whereby executives of firms with poor performance that operate in high-discretion task 
environments interpret such a performance as a signal for change, which results in departing 
from the status quo (Hambrick et al., 1993). However, this is dependent on the executive 
tenure, as high-tenured executives were found to be more inclined towards strategic conformity 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). In contrast, Goll et al. (2008) show that less tenured and 
young executives were more lenient towards differentiation strategies which involve a greater 
latitude of actions. This is due to the increased innovation in firms’ offerings (Papadakis and 
Bourantas, 1998). These findings are observed in high-discretion industries. Therefore, 
industry discretion was found to mediate the relationship between executive and TMT 
characteristics and organisations’ business-level strategies.  
Only a small number of studies have examined alternative industry discretion consequences. 
For instance, Datta et al. (2005) argue that industry capital intensity, product differentiation 
and industry growth, all of which provide more discretion, positively affect labour productivity 
and mediate the relationship between high-performance work systems and labour productivity. 
Other studies such as Datta and Rajagopalan (1998) examined the impact of industry discretion 
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on the individualities of CEO successors and find that greater industry product differentiation 
leads to a higher educational level, lower organisation tenure, and greater likelihood of a non-
throughput background of the successor. Greater industry growth also increases the likely age 
of the successor. In contrast to the normative perspective, these findings indicate that matching 
successor characteristics would not realise better performance.  
Other industry discretion outcome that is related to executive individualities is attentional 
homogeneity. Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) demonstrate that industries with greater 
discretion negatively affect executives’ attentional homogeneity. As such, the greater the 
industry discretion, the higher the heterogeneity in executives’ cognitions. This helps 
executives to pay attention to external challenges and broadens their array of actions. Also, 
industry discretion has important implications on executive behaviour. For instance, when 
industry regulations are lifted, allowing more discretion, executives become more efficient in 
their selection of appropriate strategies, which helps them to acquire more dynamic capabilities 
to achieve better adaptation to organisational change (Peteraf and Reed, 2007). Furthermore, 
industry level discretion was associated with less debt usage and greater accounting 
adjustments by firms operating in such domains (Keegan and Kabanoff, 2008). Also, the 
influence of industry discretion driven by innovation and uncertainty plays a crucial role in 
shaping the geographical diversification of sales. In this vein, Sahaym et al. (2012) find that 
industry discretion is positively related to export-driven internationalisation, which means that 
executives in industries that provide them with a greater latitude of actions can pursue 
geographic diversification via export strategies. As such, along with firm resources (e.g. 
innovative products) the internationalisation process is significantly influenced by managerial 
discretion.  
2.3.4. National-level Consequences: The Research Gap 
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As mentioned earlier, there is a dearth of research in managerial discretion at the national level 
(e.g. Wangrow et al., 2015). From the national-level antecedents to the consequences, studies 
have failed to provide deep insights into this important but under-researched dimension. This 
dearth of research is a surprising void giving abundant indications that the national-level 
framework has important implications on various business phenomena. For instance, CEO 
compensation, which is an important outcome of discretion (as stated in the preceding 
discussion), is clearly evidenced as varying across countries based on the cultural profile of a 
country, where some CEOs receive higher compensation packages (e.g. in the US) as opposed 
to others that receive less (e.g. in Japan) (Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004). Also, executive 
departure rates (Lucier et al., 2005), board composition (Li and Harrison, 2008), stock market 
responses to executive actions (Lee, 1997) and CEO strategic rationales (Witt and Redding, 
2009) all suggest that the national-level framework is an important dimension that can shed 
light not only on heterogeneity in managerial practices but also on the transferability of such 
practices. 
As previously stated, the only consideration given to the national context in the 
discretion literature was Crossland and Hambrick’s (2011) work on CEO discretion across 
countries. In addition to the national-level antecedents, managerial discretion at the national 
level showed important implications. Crossland and Hambrick (2011) argue that CEOs of 
public firms headquartered in countries with greater discretion have a greater effect on 
company performance compared to their counterparts in low-discretion countries. Also, 
discretion plays an important mediating role between national-level antecedents (cultural 
values) and the effect of CEOs on firm performance (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). As such, 
the greater the discretion at the national level, the higher the effect of CEOs on firm 
performance. 
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Another study by Crossland and Chen (2013) presents new insights into the national 
level framework of managerial discretion. The findings suggest that CEO accountability is 
dependent on the national level of managerial discretion, in which CEOs in high-discretion 
countries are more accountable for poor firm performance than those in low-discretion 
countries (Crossland and Chen, 2013). Therefore, CEO accountability, or dismissal-
performance sensitivity, is another outcome of national-level managerial discretion.  
So far, these are the only studied outcomes (CEO accountability for poor firm 
performance and CEO effect on firm performance) of managerial discretion at the national 
level. The national-level framework provides a great opportunity for researchers to discover 
new insights and develop the theory further. Furthermore, while managerial discretion has long 
been related to performance, there seems to be stark controversy regarding whether greater 
degrees of managerial discretion are always desirable (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). In 
other words, is more managerial discretion beneficial? Some theoretical propositions suggest 
that greater discretion may lead executives to develop managerial objectives, which is 
executives foreseeing actions that provide self-returns (Shen and Cho, 2005). However, that 
would be dependent on the individualities of each executive and their own values, which may 
not be generalisable across all contexts.  
One of the most notable inferences of managerial discretion is its ability to determine 
whether executives have much leeway in terms of their organisations’ outcomes. As such, 
discretion has long been related to explaining variance in firm performance attributable to 
individual CEOs (Quigley and Hambrick, 2015; Quigley and Graffin, 2016). Yet. Earlier 
research failed to show whether the discretion construct has a positive or negative effect on 
performance in general (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). Crossland and Hambrick (2011: 815) 
argued that “it is important to emphasise that managerial discretion is not per se, necessarily 
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good or bad, but simply refers to the latitude of actions available to executives”. 
Notwithstanding its implication for strategy, managerial discretion could also have other 
important national-level implications. As such, studies are called for to assess its implication 
on the national-level (Wangrow et al., 2015). 
The following chapter starts by establishing a theoretical model to propose several 
relationships between managerial discretion and its antecedents from the national-level and 
then discusses its implication for national-competitiveness. Along with that, the author also 
discusses for the mediating role that discretion could play between its national-level 
antecedents and consequences.
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3. Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: Research 
Theories and Hypotheses Development 
Firms are not only subject to internal (organisation) and external (industry) constraints but also 
restrictions relating to their macro-environment. Organizations are faced with several macro 
forces that influence their operations directly or indirectly. These forces are known as 
institutions. Institutional concepts in general, which emerged in the 1970s, have received 
considerable attention in the broader management literature. Such theories suggest that firms 
are dependent on the environment in which they operate. Meyer (2008) classified institutional 
concepts into two categories: old and new institutionalism. The first deals with the idiosyncrasy 
of formations and sees society as a creature of bounded, purposive, and rational and rather free 
actors. In this category, individuals are unrestricted and rationalised social life as being 
delegated by the state. On the other hand, new institutionalism creates a new system in which 
the notion of an ‘actor’, which includes individuals, nation-states or organisations, symbolizes 
the powerful entities that have an influence on society. Apart from this distinction, different 
authors have defined institutions in various ways. For example, North (1991) states that 
institutions are humanly invented restrictions that rule or arrange political, social interaction 
and economic activities. In simpler words, “institutions are the rules of the game in a society” 
(North, 1992: 477). On the other hand, Scott (2001: 49) defines institutions as “multifaceted, 
durable social structures made up of symbolic elements, social activities and material 
recourses”. Regardless of that, almost any definition portrays institutions as robust social 
assemblies.  
Apart from the contradictory exterior position in the field of strategic management, 
research into institutions has been ongoing for some time in the social sciences. In political 
science (Wilson, 1889), sociology (Weber, 1924) and economics (Veblen, 1909), institutional 
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research is viewed as an opposing argument favouring the universal over the local (particular), 
and the abstract over the concrete (Scott, 2001). The core argument of this research emphasises 
the importance of assessing human behaviour in terms of values, structures, relations, 
constraints, social beliefs and expectations. As per the distinction presented in Meyer (2008), 
new institutionalism – particularly that which deals with institutional economics – is the most 
widely used and studied domain of institutional research. It argues that the major purpose of 
institutions, in addition to directing human behaviour, is to reduce uncertainty (North, 1990; 
Coase, 1998). Social interactions between ‘actors’ – either individuals or organisations – within 
society produces complexity, which in turn ignores the expectations of those actors that do not 
fall within the aim of reducing uncertainty. To keep those expectations steady and reduce 
uncertainty, institutions exert constraints on the interactions between these entities (Nelson and 
Nelson, 2002). As such, organisations or individuals within a certain institutional environment 
are simultaneously enabled and restricted by institutions.  
To give a concrete example of why institutions matter and how they differ from one 
country to another, even in terms of their impact on economic performance, North (1991) used 
the example of England’s ‘Golden Revolution’ in 1688, as well as the Netherlands and Spain. 
He showed from economic history that in England, the 1688 revolution brought significant 
developments to the institutional framework of the country, where society moved from being 
controlled by the coercive power of the Crown to a parliamentary supremacy that protected 
property rights and wealth and eliminated government confiscation (North, 1991). Similarly, 
in the Netherlands, actions taken to diversify risk through techniques that avoid uncertainty, 
the development of a flexible government that is open to negotiation and external advice, and 
more structured exchange activities (North, 1991) all led to successful economic growth. By 
contrast, Spain, which was the greatest European power in the 16th century, has suffered a 
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decline in its economic activities due to the focus on ‘personalistic’ links as being vital for 
economic and political activities (North, 1991). In the same vein, Coase (1998) stated that the 
cost of exchange, or transaction cost, is not only dependent on specialisation (division of 
labour) as Adam Smith argued but also on the institutional environment, which includes: social, 
legal and political systems, culture, education system, etc. Institutions therefore govern the 
performance of an economy (Coase, 1998). This historic perspective enforces the important 
function of institutions in lowering uncertainty. This is supported by the fact that even in 
previous centuries, institutions diverged from one country to another. The institutional 
environment also promotes economic growth along with technological advancement as it 
shapes transaction and production costs (North, 1991, 1992). Despite being a facilitator or 
supporter of economic growth, institutions can also be seen from an opposing stance. The 
interactions between entities within a certain society, particularly economic interactions, can 
be dizzyingly complex. Hence, institutions, which provide guidelines for interaction, also exert 
some constraints. Nelson and Nelson (2002: 269) stated that institutions are like “a paved road 
across a swamp” but during the process of getting across, some constraints naturally take place. 
In simpler words, since institutions govern socio-economic interactions, they impose 
constraints on entities’ behaviour. 
Institutional contexts vary drastically across countries, whereby national cultures are 
the most important institutional constraints that exert a strong influence on organisations in 
various ways, all falling within conforming to the national cultural model (Rabl et al., 2014). 
Hofstede (1980: 25) defined national cultures as the “collective programing of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one human group from another”. National culture, through 
normative and institutional pressures, significantly shapes organisational actions, and acts as a 
moderator for management practices (Hofstede, 1993). Similarly, Huang and Van De Vliert 
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(2003) argue that national culture exerts significant pressure on individuals’ perspectives and 
actions. The actions of individuals working in organisations are subject to such influence. In 
other words, the executives of firms operating in a country are subject to the pressures exerted 
by that country’s national culture. As countries differ in their national culture (Hofstede, 2001; 
House et al., 2004) so too does the degree of constraints, which vary from one country to 
another (Davis et al., 1997). In this vein, influential cross-cultural value systems or models 
(e.g. Schwartz, 1994; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1998; Hofstede, 1980, 2001; House 
et al., 2004) have emerged, each using a different methodological approach to rate cultural 
values in several countries. Despite the establishment of various cultural constructs, they all 
reinforce that those values are distinct from one place to another. Out of these, Hofstede’s 
(1980, 2001) typology is the most seminal work within organisational science (Kirkman et al., 
2006). However, more recently, House et al. (2004) developed a new cross-cultural study that 
differentiates from Hofstede’s work in methodological and analytical aspects. For this study, 
House et al.’s (2004) GLOBE model is employed for various reasons, which will be explained 
in more detail in the below methodology sub-chapter.  
Moreover, theory and practice both suggest that some cultures are more distant than 
others (House et al., 2004). Institutions play a crucial role when dealing with international 
business, particularly when entering a new market. Institutional theory and differences in 
culture between the home country of the foreign business and the new country are highly 
appreciated. Such a research stream is mainly seen in strategic management literature when 
implementing market-entry modes or strategies (e.g. Tihanyi et al., 2005; Meyer et al., 2009; 
York and Lenox, 2014; Handley and Angst, 2014). However, the important question to ask is: 
do such institutions also affect domestic businesses? Culture in its core meaning is the general 
homogeneity that characterises some groups and differentiates between them; it is a 
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combination of institutions, norms and values that govern how societies interact or manage 
exchanges (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1998). Even within the same country, various 
groups possess distinct cultural characteristics; this means that they face different institutions 
(e.g. different rules in various US states). The idea of the new institutional theory, which is 
linked to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), focuses on the ‘taken-for-granted’ feature of 
institutions, which create behaviour patterns. However, such behaviours may not always have 
economic effectiveness (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001). Consequently, external 
institutions exert a meaningful influence on organisations’ actions or decision-making to the 
extent that they sometimes limit the range of operations available (Oliver, 1991). DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983), along with Scott (2001), emphasised that organisations operating in a 
similar institutional environment are subject to isomorphic pressures that in turn will limit their 
activities and make them more homogenous in terms of their structure and available actions. 
This is due to the coercive, normative and regulatory pressures imposed by institutions (Scott, 
2001). Such isomorphic pressures are not only seen in international business but are also 
applicable to local businesses as well. Despite the variation in the degree of pressures, 
institutions are also viable when studying domestic business phenomena. 
Before proceeding forward, it is important to understand the classification of 
institutions. North (1990) classified them into two categories: formal and informal. Informal 
institutions are the implicit form of institutions that are unwritten and exist outside the legal 
framework (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006). They provide informal constraints related to taboos, 
traditions, customs, sanctions and codes of conduct (North, 1991). Thus, they represent codes 
of behaviour, which include values and norms that shape the interactions between entities 
within a certain society. By contrast, formal institutions are written based on legal systems and 
consist of political, judicial and economic rules and contracts (North, 1990: 47). Hence, 
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countries’ governmental rules and regulations, legal systems and constitutions are all 
considered the fundamentals of formal institutions/constraints. The major difference between 
these two types of institution is that informal ones are internal and endogenous to society 
(Lipford and Yandle, 1997), whereas formal institutions are externally exercised on society 
and are hence exogenous (Mantzavinos et al., 2004). Accordingly, it is difficult to measure and 
analyse informal institutions due to their abstract nature as opposed to formal ones; however, 
they are more inertial and deeply seated compared to formal institutions (Keefer and Knack, 
2005). This is because in the early history of economic trade, formal institutions were not 
present and the ‘rules of the game’ were based on informal codes, as North (1991) illustrates 
in his example of small-scale villages, where trade was mainly governed by one’s religion and 
social network. Therefore, informal and formal institutions are considered complementary in 
their relationship. In this PhD, the focus will be on informal institutions, particularly national 
culture as measured through a set of practices, and the type of constraints it exerts on corporate 
executives as per the below discussion.  
3.1. Inter-Cultural Variations: Heterogeneity Across Countries 
Within societies, either primitive or advanced, people have structured their relations and 
interactions with others based on various constraints, which they have exerted upon themselves 
(North, 1990). In other words, to provide structure to social interactions, people have restrained 
their behaviours (Colson, 1974). Taking the example of stateless societies, like the ‘Nuer’ or 
‘Tonga’ tribes, order within these societies has been created through social network (Colson, 
1974) despite the lack of formal rules and regulations. Not only in crude societies but also in 
more developed contexts have people followed informal constraints to solve any conflicts 
arising within their societies without resorting to legal redress (e.g. Shasta Country, California) 
(Ellickson, 1986). Due to a shortage of information and computational ability, those constraints 
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play an important role in lowering human interaction costs compared to an environment 
without such institutions (North, 1990). Thus, these institutions are crucial constraints that 
shape human interactions.  
Informal institutions, as stated earlier, are the “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, 
that are created, communicated and enforced outside official sanctioned channels” (Helmke 
and Levitsky, 2006: 5). Informal constraints are also considered as: elaborations, extensions 
and modifications of formal institutions (e.g. power of congressional committees) (Shepsle and 
Weingast, 1987); socially sanctioned norms of behaviour (e.g. duelling as a socially accepted 
means of resolving dispute between gentlemen) (Axelrod, 1986); and internally enforced codes 
of conducts (North, 1990). Whether within families, business activities, social relations or daily 
interactions with others, the supervising structure is the informal institutions (constraints) that 
are based on codes of conduct, conventions and norms of behaviour (North, 1990). The origins 
of informal institutions can be traced back to the information-spreading processes between 
generations and the heritage of those individuals/groups which is labelled culture, as culture is 
the transmission of information from one generation to the another (successor) via the imitation 
and teaching of values, knowledge, behaviour, etc. (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; North, 1990). 
The importance of informal institutions is seen in their influence on major sociological 
processes, including conflict-resolution mechanisms (e.g. Ellickson, 1986), risk management 
and manners of information exchange (North, 1990). These social constraints have been of 
interest to several scholars in various disciplines, such as trust (Knack and Keefer, 1997), social 
capital (Stiglitz, 2000; Keefer and Knack, 2005), dispute resolution (Ellickson, 1986), 
efficiency maximisation (Posner, 1980) and culture (DiMaggio, 1997). Although there are 
diversified interests in studying informal institutions, the scope and boundaries of those 
constraints are still somehow vague (Margolis, 1983; North, 1990). Informal institutions are 
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also seen as an influence on various phenomena within a certain society. For instance, some 
economists have looked at the impact of trust on transaction cost (low trust, high transaction 
cost), which in turn impacts the degree of economic growth achieved (Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
Keefer and Knack, 2005). Scholars working in other academic fields like politics have 
examined the effect of corruption as a feature of low informal constraints on the formal political 
structure (Lauth, 2000). 
Clearly, informal institutions exert considerable influence on a society’s mechanisms, 
but what’s important is in what way informal constraints affect individual behaviour. Barry et 
al. (1959) show that there is a significant relationship between social practices and subsistence 
economy type. Similarly, Berry (1967) reinforced these findings by using the Temne society 
of Sierra Leone and the Eskimos; he found that in low food-accumulation societies (Eskimo), 
people tend to be more individualistic, assertive and adventurous in their behaviour compared 
to high food-accumulation societies (Temne) where individuals rely on consensus and 
collective behaviour. Hence, social structure significantly impacts people’s behaviour. Culture, 
as the basic origin of informal institutions, involves the transmission of information from one 
generation to another, which includes knowledge transmission to and learning by successive 
generations (North, 1990), along with the idea that individuals’ interpretation of environmental 
stimuli is based on a schema or rule-based mental models (Walsh, 1995). Therefore, those 
institutions impact individuals’ behaviour through a problem-based process, which is 
established upon learning, path-dependence and bounded rationality (Crossland and Hambrick, 
2011). In other words, individuals’ interpretation and classification of environmental stimuli 
using their path-dependent knowledge base act as a problem-solving function that deals with 
any upcoming external events (Mantzavinos et al., 2004). Simply, when faced with 
environmental events, people rely on these mental models that have been acquired through 
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learning to overcome or deal with the ambiguity associated with such events. This is known as 
‘representational redescription’ (Clark and Karmiloff-Smith, 1993), which relates to the idea 
that knowledge is stored as a solution for a specific problem (Mantzavinos et al., 2004). With 
time, because individuals have created this form of predefined and rational response, in 
societies those responses are the acceptable behaviour when dealing with external stimuli. 
Thus, responses to certain actions are positively reinforced and become schematic (Crossland 
and Hambrick, 2011). Since informal institutions represent codes of conduct, they also signify 
powerful influencers affecting individuals’ behaviour (Geletkanycz, 1997). Accordingly, due 
to these social codes of conduct and rules along with respective norms, social order emerges 
(Mantzavinos et al., 2004). These social norms, which are the “shared perception of appropriate 
behaviour” (Miller, 1999: 1056), hold significant power that prompts people to act in a way 
that is acceptable to others and diverges from their personal inclinations (Miller, 1999). 
Evidently, informal institutions affect individuals’ behaviour.  
3.1.1. Inter-Cultural Variations: Cultural Practices as Antecedents of Managerial 
Discretion 
How do informal institutions (national culture) influence organisations and executives? 
“Societal cultural values and practices affect what leaders do” (House et al., 2002). Since 
individuals form organisations, and working forces are embedded in certain societies, then 
informal institutions have a direct impact on organisational behaviour as well. Like normal 
people, executives possess an array of religious, theoretical, political, social and other values. 
National culture plays a crucial role in influencing managerial views, which in turn lead to 
different organisational responses. In other words, strategic formulation processes and 
outcomes are a result of cultural-value pressures (Hambrick and Brandon, 1988; Schneider, 
1989). As previously stated, knowledge and beliefs are the filters through which individuals 
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interpret environmental events; likewise, executives interpret environmental stimuli using their 
idiosyncratic lenses of knowledge, values, perceptions and assumptions to respond to an 
incident. Since “firms reflect their top managers” (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), through 
‘behaviour channelling’, executives’ strategic mind-sets reside in their own socially inherited 
values (Hambrick and Brandon, 1988). As such, informal institutions exert social pressures on 
managers to align their behaviour appropriately with the environment (Van Maanen and 
Laurent, 1993). In their findings, Schneider and De Meyer (1991) suggested that the cultural 
heritage of Latin European executives exhibited a significant influence on their orientation 
towards environmental adjustment. In the same vein, a study of executive commitment to the 
status quo (CSQ) by Hambrick et al. (1993) illustrated that executives’ CSQ is strongly 
influenced and related to their own social contexts and backgrounds, which in turn significantly 
affects their behaviour in relation to change. By focusing solely on the national culture, using 
Hofstede’s (1980, 1991) typology, Geletkanycz (1997) argued that cultural values have an 
important impact on executives’ mentalities and act as a stronger influence compared to 
industrial factors (industry tenure). Precisely, he found that executives’ openness toward 
changing organisational strategy and leadership profiles is strongly associated with their 
cultural values (Geletkanycz, 1997). Therefore, the argument that societal values shape 
executives and organisational behaviour has been reinforced.  
Moving forward, how do informal institutions shape discretion? Going back to the 
routes of managerial discretion, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) argued that for executives to 
have discretion, alternative actions available for those executives should fall within the ‘zone 
of acceptance’ of powerful stakeholders. This does of course depend on the relative power of 
these stakeholders; even if they perceive a CEO’s actions as objectionable, they may not have 
the power to stop them. The latter has been discussed and empirically tested by Crossland and 
Chapter 3 – Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: Research Theories 
and Hypotheses Development 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
112 
Hambrick (2011), who introduced a wider set of formal institutions and investigated their 
impact on managerial discretion. However, future studies could also consider how additional 
formal institutions, such as corporate governance systems of legitimacy, can impact managerial 
discretion across countries. One area of interest that is missing from the literature and merits 
more attention is national culture, which is the core of this PhD.  
The first condition of Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), which relates to actions falling 
within the accepted zone of powerful stakeholders, is associated with informal institutions. As 
formerly deliberated, institutions in general exert constraints on individual behaviour, thus 
when individuals’ actions do not comply or fall within the usual accepted behaviour in a 
society, then those actions will be considered intolerable. Similarly, if executives’ actions do 
not comply with the normal business practices used within a certain institutional environment, 
their behaviour will be judged as inappropriate. More than that, if executives take a course of 
action that does not conform to the societal norms available in the society, societal members 
as part of the organisation’s stakeholders might interpret such behaviour as offensive and try 
to sanction it by exerting informal institutional constraints. However, what makes an action 
radical is the perceived view of radicalism that is profoundly associated with the culture that 
exists in each society (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). Consequently, due to the differences 
in societies and their constraints, the degree of influence on executives’ behaviour fluctuates. 
In other words, in certain societies, actions might not be considered objectionable whereas in 
others that have distinct informal constraints, such behaviour would be rejected. Crossland and 
Hambrick (2011) employed dimensions of cultural values (uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism vs. collectivism, power distance, cultural looseness vs. tightness) in their seminal 
work, based on Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) framework. Building on the same logic, the present 
author is investigating the impact of cultural practices rather than values on CEO discretion 
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operating in various national contexts. In doing so, the researcher discusses in detail the 
mechanisms through which cultural practices influence the degree of managerial discretion 
provided to CEOs headquartered in several countries. The study is not a replication of what 
Crossland and Hambrick (2011) did; rather it is an extension of their work in this research vein 
and tackles the concept of cultural influence from a distinct angle (practices). It is true that the 
author is assessing some dimensions already used in Crossland and Hambrick (2011); however, 
the rationale behind that assessment is to reinforce the context dependency of the discretion 
construct and more importantly corroborate extant research on the national construct of 
discretion (Wangrow et al., 2015). By using a more sophisticated cross-cultural model 
(GLOBE by House et al, 2004), the researcher is enhancing the understanding of managerial 
discretion and more importantly uncovering new national-level antecedents or sources that play 
a crucial role in shaping the degree of executives’ discretion. Therefore, in the next part, the 
researcher provides specific hypotheses concerning the impact of several cultural practices 
(institutional collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, future orientation, humane 
orientation, performance orientation, gender egalitarianism, assertiveness and cultural 
looseness) on managerial discretion. 
3.1.1.1. Cultural Practices Vis-à-vis Institutional Collectivism 
Individualism and collectivism as cultural dimensions have been strongly surveyed in the 
literature of national culture and cross-cultural studies (Segall and Kagitcibasi, 1997; House et 
al., 2004). Several scholars have argued that such a cultural dimension is considered the most 
fundamental and above all others (Triandis, 1994; Aguinis and Henle, 2003; Gelfand et al., 
2004). Managerial discretion seems to closely pertain to such a construct. Individuals within a 
certain society experience discretion (high latitude of actions) if their society encourages and 
accepts unilateral, autonomous and idiosyncratic behaviour. Individualism and collectivism 
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can be traced back to the rise of legal and religious institutions (House et al., 2004). People in 
individualistic societies tend to favour personal goals, autonomous actions, personal needs, 
rational behaviour, etc. as opposed to their counterparts in collectivistic environments, who 
tend to be more integrated within certain groups, favour collective behaviour to benefit the 
majority, act interdependently of others, and follow consensus-based decision-making (Smith 
et al., 1996; Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004). Accordingly, such behaviour reflects 
organisational conduct in terms of human resource practices, motivation, job satisfaction, 
accountability, job attitudes, etc. (House et al., 2004). More important is its implication in 
relation to leadership. Smith et al. (1989) found that in individualistic cultures, respondents 
showed a clearer distinction between maintenance performance and task performance 
compared to collectivistic cultures where individuals interpret in-group harmony as being 
closely related to task accomplishment. In other words, people favour team harmony and work 
to accomplish specific tasks in collective environments.  
Moreover, in the United States, a highly individualistic culture (Hofstede, 2001), 
leaders’ cognitive base reflects their cultural values in terms of being independent, forceful and 
strong-willed as opposed to their rivals in Japan – a highly collectivistic society (Hofstede, 
2001) where leaders tend to show more collaboration, self-effacement and interdependence 
(Dorfman, 1998). Jung et al. (1995) showed that transformational leaders are more acceptable 
in a collective society than in individualistic ones due to the emphasis on group orientation, 
respect for authority and work centrality. Thus, in individualistic cultures, leaders act in an 
autonomous way, accomplish tasks without relying on group harmony, and emphasise 
individual discretion (Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Triandis, 1993; Erez and Earley, 1993). Such 
societies provide a wider ‘zone of acceptance’ for executives to idiosyncratically take unilateral 
decisions, and executives have greater leeway in deciding the future of their organisations 
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(Crossland and Hambrick, 2007). Collectivistic cultures do not tolerate individual initiatives; 
instead consensus-based decisions are favoured. For that reason, executives are more 
accountable for firms’ failures in such cultures (Krull et al., 1999). Crossland and Hambrick 
(2007, 2011) empirically exhibited that discretion differs from one national culture to another, 
in which executives enjoy greater discretion in individualistic societies (based on cultural 
values), while others operating in collective cultures possess lower discretion levels. Similarly, 
the author posits that collectivist societies (based on cultural practices) impose greater 
constraints on executives to take consensus-based decisions in which their own interpretation 
and choices would not be deemed important. Thus, the author hypothesises: 
Hypothesis 1: Greater levels of institutional collectivism decrease managerial discretion.  
3.1.1.2. Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Uncertainty Avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance is another dimension of culture that has been studied, interpreted and 
operationalised in several contexts (Hofstede, 2001). Initially used as an organisational 
phenomenon, this norm relates to the extent to which ambiguity is tolerated within a society 
(House et al., 2004). In other words, some environments consider ambiguous events or 
unpredictable actions as a threat and thus prefer rules and orders to uncontrolled situations. By 
employing conventions, rituals, rules and orders, people in high uncertainty-avoidance 
societies will try to minimise unpredictability (House et al., 1997; Hofstede, 2001). As 
Hofstede (2001) argued, individuals in certain cultures establish coping mechanisms 
(technology, laws and religion) to tackle the anxiety generated from uncertainty. On the other 
hand, low uncertain societies are more malleable to accept radical, uncertain, dramatic and 
means-end ambiguity actions (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). In such an atmosphere, people 
are more tolerant to change and are characterised as being less risk-averse, meaning there are 
more risk-takers. Hence, lower uncertainty avoidance behaviour tends to provide a wider ‘zone 
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of acceptance’ for executives’ actions (Crossland and Hambrick, 2007). As such, it allows them 
to have a greater latitude of actions, and thus better discretion. Conversely, in high uncertainty 
avoidance societies, and due to the creation of orders, rituals and rules, such environments 
constrain executives’ behaviour and interpret any radical action as objectionable, providing 
lower discretion. Therefore, when faced with unpredictable situations, executives will have 
wider array of actions to choose from to face such ambiguity (Crossland and Hambrick, 2007).  
For instance, a considerable alteration of the business might be considered 
unobjectionable in low uncertainty avoidance cultures. Crossland and Hambrick (2011) 
empirically found that CEOs of firms headquartered in low uncertainty avoidance (high 
uncertainty tolerance) countries possess higher levels of discretion as opposed to CEOs 
operating in high uncertainty avoidance cultures. This is because in low uncertainty tolerance 
countries, executives are supposed to follow past behaviour and not take any actions that 
deviate from the central tendencies of the firm, industry, sector, etc. in terms of normal business 
behaviour. This means that even in turbulent and depressed situations, executives cannot take 
radical actions (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). Another explanation could be correlated to 
the individual aspect of uncertainty avoidance and the feedback-seeking behaviour. House et 
al. (2004) posited that uncertainty is a notable element of feedback-seeking behaviour. 
Individuals in high uncertainty avoidance environments behave in a way that looks for 
feedback to gather information to build appropriate actions (Morrison, 2002). In such 
behaviours, individuals’ decision-making bases would be significantly related and influenced 
by others’ feedback; in other words, it is a form of collective reasoning. Thus, executives in 
these cultures will take collective decisions instead of individualistic and idiosyncratic 
decisions. Accordingly: 
Hypothesis 2: Greater levels of uncertainty avoidance decrease managerial discretion. 
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3.1.1.3. Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Power Distance 
Some cultural values indicate society’s tolerance for inequality or power distribution (Carl et 
al., 2004). These values include hierarchy (Schwartz, 1994), achievement aspiration 
(Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1998), moral discipline (Chinese Culture Connection, 
1987) and power distance (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004). In the context of this research, 
the author is interested in the latter norm concerning power distance, which is another 
fundamental cultural dimension. Despite being more reflective of the acceptance of inequality 
in a certain society (Hofstede, 2001), it is also suggestive of the status and role of leaders within 
societies (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). Power distance is the norm that relates to the social 
dimension that ratifies and acknowledges power distinction, status, honours and authority 
(House et al., 2004). Meindl et al. (1985) tackled the concept of “Romance of Leadership” in 
which they argued that the attribution perspective that views leadership as a symbol and 
associates positive and negative outcomes to it results in giving greater status and profile to 
leaders. Similarly, Meindl and Ehrlich (1987) showed that performance evaluation is stronger 
when outcomes are attributed to leadership factors, which reinforces the phenomenological 
value of leadership. In other words, society itself provides different lenses through which 
leaders are viewed; in some societies, people romanticise leaders and in others they do not. 
Overall, this research stream (e.g. Meindl et al., 1985; Meindl and Ehrlich, 1987; Chen and 
Meindl, 1991) emphasises that some societies strongly attribute outcomes (either positive or 
negative) to leaders. In this sense, and because of the culturally contingent base of attribution 
(Krull et al., 1999), leaders in those countries are having higher power distance and a greater 
profile. 
In general, leadership has been considered widely influential across countries where 
some of the leadership characteristics are deemed universal. For instance, charismatic 
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leadership is a universal feature of successful leadership (Den Hartog et al., 1999). However, 
despite such universalism of characteristics, leaders and their status are viewed distinctly across 
countries. Particularly, leaders’ status, role or powers within certain societies vary significantly 
from one country to another (House and Javidan, 2004). In some societies, leaders are 
privileged and highly respected for their power and status, which leads them to have a greater 
influence on their followers and provides them with a wider array of available actions 
(Crossland and Hambrick, 2011; House et al., 2004). For instance, Adsit et al. (1997) found 
that in high power distance countries, employees are reluctant to challenge their managers and 
are more likely to follow them, even in the case of disagreement. In other words, in these 
societies, leaders are considered to possess more discretion. In contrast, in countries that do not 
promote such privileges, leaders’ actions can come under scrutiny and they are faced with 
higher constraints (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). In these environments, leaders tend to have 
low levels of discretion and are figureheads or facilitators rather than as empowered decision 
makers (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). 
However, Crossland and Hambrick (2011) did not find any significant positive 
relationship between power distance and CEO discretion; in contrast, they found a negative 
relationship. This means that low discretion countries could stress the symbolic role of leaders, 
which provides them with some degree of elevated status (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). 
However, there is no empirical support for such an argument despite some scholars considering 
a constitutional monarch as a real illustration of this relationship (Rose and Kavanagh, 1976). 
Also, due to the sampling and countries being studied in Crossland and Hambrick’s (2011) 
work, the relationship between discretion and power distance was not salient; this might not be 
the case if the sample of countries was extended. Accordingly, the author reinforces the positive 
relationship between power distance and discretion. Therefore, the researcher argues that in 
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societies characterised by higher power distance, leaders are more romanticised, have greater 
acceptance from stakeholders and as such possess greater degree of discretion as opposed to 
leaders in low power distance societies. 
Hypothesis 3: Greater levels of power distance increase managerial discretion. 
3.1.1.4. Cultural Practices Vis-à-vis Future Orientation 
Future orientation has been associated with time (Seijts, 1998) and is considered a rudimentary 
value orientation that distinguishes most societies and cultures (House et al., 2004). House et 
al. (1999) defined future orientation as: the cultural dimension that is encouraged and 
appreciated by a society in which individuals tend to plan for future events and delay current 
gratification. Put simply, it is the norm, which emphasises future-oriented behaviour. The 
association between future orientation and time is not a recent phenomenon. The Ancient 
Greeks used to identify time as ‘Chronus’ – a point in time from which to reference all other 
less significant events (Leach, 1961). Recently, time has become a significant factor 
representing the orientation towards accomplishing specific objectives, innovation and 
progression (Teather and Chow, 2000). Such a philosophical view reinforces the idea of future 
orientation as a crucial cultural dimension that is associated with future-oriented behaviour. In 
this vein, several cross-cultural scholars (e.g. Hofstede and Bond 1988; Trompenaars and 
Hampden-Turner, 1998; Hofstede, 2001) have argued the variation of future orientation across 
countries. Despite the contradicting findings in previous works (House et al., 2004), the core 
argument is that future orientation is positively related to time urgency (Schneider, 1989). In 
other words, societies characterised with high future orientation tend to have a greater sense of 
time urgency, and time is a crucial parameter for various events. Time offers differentiated 
temporal frames that give order, meaning and coherence to objects, events and experiences 
within a certain societal environment. Having a sense of time urgency is very important as it 
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helps individuals to prioritise events in their life. If people do not value time as a crucial 
element, they look more at their current situation and do not develop plans for their future. 
Societies with low future-orientated behaviour are more lenient towards enjoying current 
moments or solving current problems without having the willingness to plan for long-term 
goals (House et al., 2004). This behaviour results in individuals avoiding future anxiety and 
not taking into consideration the impact of current events on pursuing future objectives 
(Keough et al., 1999). In here, people rely on their past experiences. By doing so, they will be 
maintaining their status quo (Keough et al., 1999; House et al., 2004). Earlier discretion 
literature shows that commitment to the status quo in relation to executives (also as individuals 
within a societal culture) diminishes their level of discretion (e.g. Hambrick et al., 1993; 
McClelland et al., 2010). Executives operating in countries with low future orientation are 
more constrained in their strategic actions, meaning that they possess low discretion. On the 
other hand, countries with high future orientation are more interested in planning for long-term 
goals and willing to foresee those goals. Such a cultural foundation allows greater tolerance for 
innovation (House et al., 2004) and provides a greater array of actions to be implemented 
because it is having an open-ended and not time-limited orientation (Lang and Carstensen, 
2002). Therefore, future orientation tends to be positively related to discretion. 
Moreover, the future involves uncertainty, challenges, unpredictable events, unclear 
situations and vague understanding. Individuals who are more tolerant of ambiguity and 
uncertainty tend to plan for their future and demonstrate future orientation because they seek 
broader options and set various goals to achieve. Interestingly, House et al. (2004) showed a 
positive correlation between future orientation practices and uncertainty tolerance. This 
indicates that societies tolerating uncertainty have greater future oriented behaviour. For 
instance, Horovitz (1980) argued that French firms that operate in a low uncertainty tolerance 
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environment (based on Hofstede, (2001) score) tend to have low future orientation compared 
to their British rivals. France also scored low in terms of its national level of discretion in 
Crossland and Hambrick’s (2011) work. Thus, future-oriented behaviour, which involves high 
uncertainty tolerance, enhances CEO discretion. In such societies, shareholders tend to 
embrace future returns on their investment and interests regardless of the means that have been 
adopted to reach those results. Here, CEOs can formulate strategies from a variety of options 
where time does not act as a constraint facing executives’ actions. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 4: Greater levels of future orientation increase managerial discretion. 
3.1.1.5. Cultural Practices Vis-à-vis Humane Orientation 
Humane orientation is another cultural norm that characterises societies from one another. Such 
a cultural dimension is manifested in the way individuals within a certain society treat each 
other, or in simple words care about each other. It relates to how much a society promotes 
unselfish, caring, generous, friendly, kind and fair features of individuals (House et al., 1999). 
These individual norms represent salient motivational factors that lead people’s behaviour, 
where the more benevolence, love, kindness, etc. they show to each other, the more they are 
considered as humane-oriented (Triandis, 1995). Additionally, in this type of environment, 
paternalism, which is a form of benevolence, plays a crucial role in determining people’s 
behaviour (James et al., 1996; Kanungo and Aycan, 1997). Here, people in possession of power 
tend to act as parents for their subordinates, where they care about their personal problems, 
offer help and have an informal relationship with them (House et al., 2004). In other words, 
leaders in general and executives tend to be more lenient with their employees and care about 
their own personal problems. Thus, any decisions that negatively impact them or any of their 
relatives (as part of the community) would be discarded. For instance, Gebert and Steinkamp 
(1991) showed that in Nigeria, which is a highly humane-oriented society (House et al., 2004), 
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organisational leaders tend to have a paternalistic relationship with their employees and in 
some cases companies hire employees’ family members just to help, even though such recruits 
might not possess any of the relevant skills for the post. This illustrates that in such societies, 
executives are constrained by the humane orientation cultural norm, which exerts pressure on 
them to act in favour of the whole community. Thus, in relation to managerial discretion, 
executives’ latitude of actions is limited and they are unable to foresee unilateral decisions due 
to their potential impact on the society. 
On the other hand, some societies encourage self-fulfilment, material possessions, self-
interest, pleasure and power as the dominating factors that motivate individuals’ behaviour 
(House et al., 2004). These cultures are classified as low in terms of humane orientation. House 
et al.’s (2004) findings illustrate that when the humane orientation norm increases, society 
overall tends to be more collectivistic. In other words, solidarity, benevolence, altruism, etc. 
go hand in hand with promoting collectivism. Similarly, to individualistic societies, low 
humane orientation environments provide greater acceptance for a greater array of actions, 
tolerate bold decisions and permit an individual edge, and therefore provide greater managerial 
discretion. 
An example of such enhanced discretion can be seen in the case of Procter and Gamble 
(P&G) in 2012. P&G is a US public firm that operates in the fast-moving consumer goods 
(FMCG) industry. In 2012, it adopted a turnaround strategy to cut 5,700 jobs in a four-year 
plan to enhance performance (FT, 2012). As P&G was operating in the US – a country 
considered to have low humane orientation (House et al., 2004) and where executives enjoy 
more discretion (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011) – the public backlash to this proposal was not 
strong enough to convince the company’s executives to change their mind. Accordingly, 
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societies characterised by low humane orientation provide greater discretion to CEOs of 
companies headquartered in such environments. 
Hypothesis 5: Greater levels of humane orientation decrease managerial discretion. 
3.1.1.6. Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Performance Orientation 
Performance orientation is another cultural norm that characterises societies. It refers to the 
reward for innovation, performance improvement and high standards (House et al., 2004). 
Despite not receiving much attention in the literature (House et al., 2004), performance 
orientation appeals to the ways in which people are oriented in a certain society. In this vein, 
McClelland et al. (1958) were the first scholars to tackle the concept of performance orientation 
using a similar label: need for achievement, which relates to people’s need to continuously 
perform better, have progressive improvements, conduct challenging tasks with low 
probabilities of success and have a passion for innovation. In line with other norms, 
performance orientation varies according to the variance in the national culture. It is a crucial 
force that shapes and impacts people’s economic and social behaviour (e.g. Hofstede and Bond, 
1988). Likewise, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) supported that achievement as a cultural 
norm, which refers to the individual success, impacts individuals’ behaviour in societies. Some 
researchers (e.g. Bigoness and Hofstede, 1989) argued that ‘achievement’, or what House et 
al. (2004) labelled as ‘performance orientation’, is a universal norm where most societies seek 
to perform better. These findings were based on managers’ perceptions when asked to rank 
their most important goals. Overall, there is a universal voice that emphasises the importance 
of controlling one’s own future and working hard to achieve it. On the other hand, a group of 
scholars (e.g. Schneider and Barsoux, 1997) debated that achievement is not a universal feature 
because societies differ in their cultural norms, values and practices that influence the 
universality of such norms. For instance, 88% of American managers consider reaching results 
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the most important goal for success as opposed to their French counterparts, who deem the 
possession of high potential as the most important aspect (Laurant, 1986). Such a 
differentiation illustrates the variation in people’s performance orientation across countries. 
Parsons and Shils (1951) proposed two significant differences between societies: achievement 
and ascription. Achievement-oriented countries accord status based on accomplishment, 
whereas ascription-oriented countries assess people on who they are individually. In 
achievement-oriented societies, judgment or evaluation is purely based on results or 
performance (House et al., 2004).  
In relation to discretion, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) stated that CEOs’ effects on 
their companies’ performance go hand in hand with the degree of discretion they are afforded. 
In other words, to properly judge a certain CEO’s performance and dismiss them for poor 
performance, there should first be an assessment of the degree of discretion provided to that 
CEO as CEO dismissal and poor performance relationships have been empirically tested to be 
negative (e.g. Brickley, 2003, Crossland and Chen, 2013). Thus, dismissal is respectively a 
result of poor executive (CEO) performance (Murphy, 1999; Dahya et al., 2002). Most 
importantly, Crossland and Chen (2013) asserted the important mediating role of managerial 
discretion between poor firm performance and CEO dismissal. In that sense, it can be posited 
that performance-oriented societies tend to provide greater leeway of actions and accordingly 
dismiss CEOs for poor performance. 
Moreover, societies that appreciate seniority and older age lean towards an ascription 
feature and are less performance-oriented (Schneider and Barsoux, 1997). In some societies 
(e.g. Japan), higher positions tend to be mostly occupied by senior (older) individuals (e.g. 
House et al., 2004). In other countries that are characterised by greater discretion, CEO entry 
age is low (e.g. US). Hence, it might be argued that performance-oriented environments that 
Chapter 3 – Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: Research Theories 
and Hypotheses Development 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
125 
do not judge individuals on their seniority and attribution tend to provide executives with a 
broader zone of acceptance.  
Another characteristic of a performance-oriented society is the belief that individuals 
are in control of the events happening in their lives (locus of control). Locus of control 
represents individuals’ ambitions, higher standards for performance, thirst for betterment, etc. 
(Rotter, 1966; Hofstede and Bond, 1988). Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) argued 
that individuals from the US tend to be in control of their lives whereas people in Venezuela 
are not. Such a distinction represents the variance of the degree of locus of control across 
societies. Locus of control has been covered in significant depth in the field of managerial 
discretion. Internal CEOs (in control) tend to demonstrate risk taking and innovative strategies 
(Miller et al., 1982), improve performance (Anderson and Schneier, 1978), be more task-
oriented (Miles and Snow, 1978) and perceive greater discretion (Carpenter and Golden, 1997), 
all of which describes individual characteristics in a high performance-oriented society. 
Additionally, societies with high performance orientation greatly appreciate financial rewards 
and bonuses (House et al., 2004). In the discretion vein, CEO performance-based compensation 
has been significantly and positively associated with greater discretion (e.g. Rajagopalan and 
Finkelstein, 1992; Rajagopalan, 1997; Boyd and Salamin, 2001). This (financial reward) also 
represents an important norm appreciated in high performance countries. Thus, in such 
societies, CEOs possess a wider array of strategic actions to choose from. Accordingly, the 
author hypothesises: 
Hypothesis 6: Greater levels of performance orientation increase managerial discretion. 
3.1.1.7. Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Gender Egalitarianism 
“Societies that are relatively unconcerned with demarcating men from women are less common 
than those concerned with affirming men’s’ masculinity” (Coltrane, 1992: 88). One of the most 
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obvious ways in which societies differ is through their acceptance of gender equality. Each 
society prescribes and proscribes various roles for men and women (Hofstede, 1998). Societies 
appreciating gender equality try to minimise gender-role differences, whereas others try to 
increase the gap between genders (House et al., 1999). Like Hofstede’s (1980) 
masculinity/femininity cultural dimension, House et al. (2004) developed a new cultural norm 
labelled gender egalitarianism. As the name suggests, it relates to the equality between men 
and women in a society. Societies high on gender egalitarianism tend to have more women in 
positions of authority, have more women participating in the labour force, accord women a 
higher status and afford women a greater role in the society. In contrast, societies low on gender 
egalitarianism tend to have fewer women in positions of power, offer less status to women and 
afford women no/smaller decision-making authority (House et al., 2004). These core 
differences in relation to gender equality have a significant influence on societal behaviour. 
Masculine countries show greater achievement motivation and tend to follow a bolder style of 
management (Triandis, 1994). Such societies appreciate independent behaviour over 
honouring moral obligations and encourage success and competition over nurturance and 
solidarity (Doney, Canoon and Mullen, 1998). Organisations operating in such cultural 
environments provide unequal opportunities for men and women, particularly in the upper 
echelons, and encourage results over processes and more importantly adversarial decision-
making over negotiation and consensus (Erez, 1994). When societies value results over 
processes, they provide a wider array of actions for top managers to choose from. In this sense, 
executives will have greater leeway over the methods and strategy adopted to pursue a specific 
goal. In organisational terms, executives will have more ‘technical discretion’ (Caza, 2012). In 
countries where the means-end ambiguity is high, executives will have greater freedom in 
taking quantum rather than incremental initiatives (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011), thus 
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providing them with greater discretion. Furthermore, House et al. (2004) empirically found 
that gender egalitarianism is strongly associated with participative leadership style/attributes. 
In other words, the more that a society values gender equality and accords women similar 
importance to men, the more the leaders in such cultural environments are expected to have a 
participative leadership style that encourages input from others in decision making. Contrary 
to the autocratic style, participative leadership is based on a consensus-based decision-making 
style and does not value leaders’ autonomous behaviour (House et al., 2004). When executives 
are surrounded by such cultural norms, they are not able to pursue idiosyncratic bold actions 
because stakeholders would see such behaviour as objectionable. Accordingly, managerial 
discretion is likely to be less pronounced in countries that encourage gender egalitarianism. 
Moreover, one of the core elements of discretion is that executives should tolerate risk 
in relation to taking any strategic initiatives. Executives with high discretion are characterised 
as being risk takers (Roth, 1992). Also, environments that encourage risk-taking behaviour 
tend to provide more managerial discretion (Makhija and Stewart, 2002). Taking that into 
consideration, women or female CEOs are shown as taking strategic actions that do not pose 
any risk (Bernasek and Shwiff, 2001). In a study of CEO gender effect on firm performance, 
Khan and Vieito (2013) found that CEO gender matters in terms of firm performance, where 
male CEOs tend to have a greater effect on firm performance compared to their female 
counterparts. Additionally, they found that when a female CEO leads a firm, the risk levels are 
much smaller than when companies are headed by a male CEO (Khan and Vieito, 2013). For 
instance, female board representation and participation in firms’ upper echelons results in a 
lower number and size of acquisitions – a strategy that is associated with greater risk – that a 
firm engages in (Chen et al., 2015). In relation to discretion, it has been clearly articulated 
within the literature that discretion leads to greater CEO effect on firm performance; therefore, 
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it could be argued that female CEOs have lower discretion levels compared to their male 
counterparts.  
Risk-taking behaviour is not the only characteristic that differs between male from 
female CEOs; power is another example. In comparison to male CEOs, female executives are 
given less power in their hierarchical position (Muller-Kahle and Schiehll, 2013). As such, 
power, which is a fundamental element that enhances managerial discretion, is lacking when 
females achieve CEO positions. Thus, it can be concluded that women CEOs, due to their lack 
of power, have lower discretion levels than male CEOs.  
Another key difference between male and female executives is compensation packages. 
Female CEOs receive a lower compensation package compared to male executives (Mohan 
and Ruggiero, 2007), and these packages are more performance-based for male CEOs as 
opposed to their female equivalents (Kulich et al., 2011). CEO compensation packages are 
positively associated with the degree of managerial discretion (e.g. Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; 
Finkelstein, 2009). The more discretion a CEO possesses, the higher their compensation 
package would be. Female CEOs who receive lower compensation packages may experience 
lower discretion levels as opposed to male executives. 
Although these arguments may hold true, they only refer to the individual stereotype 
where differences in the individual levels of discretion based on gender may not be aggregated 
to the national level. This is because culture is a contextual characteristic that shapes the 
proscription of gender roles (Abdullah et al., 2015). Women leaders are perceived as lacking 
the traits of successful leadership (Eagly et al., 1992); theories on leaders’ influence on 
organisation performance may not be applicable to female executives (Kulich et al., 2007). 
This is due to the taboo placed on women’s behaviour, especially in masculine societies that 
do not appreciate gender equality (Hofstede, 1998). In these societies, women rarely break the 
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glass ceiling to reach higher corporate positions. However, even if they succeed in breaking 
the glass ceiling, their behaviour will be highly constrained and they are expected to take 
predefined actions (Cook and Glass, 2014). As such, CEOs’ latitude of actions will be tight. In 
contrast, when societies appreciate gender equality and assign more roles to women, they exert 
less taboo on women’s behaviour and see women as being as competent as their male 
counterparts. These societies provide a wider zone of acceptance for CEOs actions and enable 
them to take unexpected movements that could alter the firm outcomes. Accordingly, the 
author hypothesises that: 
Hypothesis 7: Greater levels of gender egalitarianism increase managerial discretion. 
3.1.1.8. Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Assertiveness 
Assertiveness represents another important informal institution that characterises a society. 
Despite not being tackled directly (as a separate societal norm) by previous cross-cultural 
scholars, it represents a crucial societal norm that has an influence on people’s behaviour. 
Assertiveness, along with other societal norms (performance orientation and gender 
egalitarianism) used in the GLOBE construct, has been generated from Hofstede’s (1980, 
2001) MAS (masculinity and femininity) index (House et al., 2004). However, the correlation 
between these two was not significant due to the differences in the construct (House et al., 
2004). Assertiveness relates to the MAS index, which states that people in masculine cultures 
tend to be more challenging, dominant, and place greater emphasis on recognition, 
advancement and earnings than those in feminine societies where caring and cooperation are 
central features (Hofstede, 1980, 2001). However, it differs from the assertiveness norm. 
Assertiveness is the level to which people within a certain society tend to be dominant or 
forthright in their relationships with others (House et al., 1999). Here it is important to note the 
difference between assertiveness and aggressiveness. Negative aggressive behaviour relates to 
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the form of behaviour that involves physical harm, hostility, threat, etc. (e.g. Crawford, 1995; 
Loeber and Hay, 1997), whereas assertiveness is more of a mid-point between being meek or 
shy and being aggressive (Rakos, 1991). At the same time, assertiveness resembles positive 
aggressive behaviour, which involves individuals taking the initiative and being enterprising, 
challenging, confident, fast, forceful etc. (House et al., 2004). 
This dimension emphasises the importance of expressing the self or one’s own desires 
and opinions and expressing them explicitly (Booream and Flowers, 1978). It also relates to a 
set of communicative skills, individual self-interest (House et al., 2004) and individual 
pragmatism and rationality (Rakos, 1991). When talking about assertiveness, it is important to 
state that such a norm is situational and dependent on the current surrounding status (House et 
al., 2004). For instance, according to Kelly et al. (1980) and Crawford (1988), assertive 
behaviour varies according to gender (men versus women). Likewise, assertiveness varies 
depending on culture (e.g. Rakos, 1991). In these classifications, assertiveness is seen through 
the psychological lens. However, another group of scholar’s views assertiveness as a set of 
personality qualities. Goldberg (1990), in his ‘Big Five’ personality model, talked about 
extraversion (people who tend to be dominant, assertive, adventurous, etc.), which strongly 
looks like assertiveness, and stated that agreeableness is more in line with a non-assertive 
personality (House et al., 2004). Watson and Clark (1997) argued that extroverts or people 
with an extroverted personality are more often seen in leadership roles. Similarly, Judge et al. 
(1999) found that an individual being non-assertive does not predict career success and leads 
people to stay in low positions. A non-assertive personality therefore negatively impacts the 
individual in relation to their management potential (Howard and Bray, 1988). In other words, 
individuals that are assertive tend to achieve higher hierarchical positions compared to their 
non-assertive counterparts. CEOs are more assertive than other individuals within the 
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organisation that have low hierarchical position because individuals in the upper echelons show 
more assertive behaviour, forcefulness and self-confidence (Fagenson, 1990; House et al., 
2004). But, how could such a cultural norm refer to managerial discretion? The view of 
dominance that is taken from assertive behaviour reflects the way people aim to be in control 
of their lives, influence nature and not surrender to external pressures (Schein, 1992). House et 
al. (2004) argued that the ‘doing’ orientation, which is more related to people overseeing their 
environment, tends to have and value greater assertiveness compared to ‘being’ societies that 
surrender to external forces. Additionally, Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) linked 
the orientation of societies that conduct business to Rotter’s (1966) locus of control work. They 
argued that societies with a greater internal focus (like Rotter’s internal locus of control) are in 
control of their environment and have a dominating attitude. This means that assertive 
behaviour reflects an internal orientation of a society (House et al., 2004). As previously 
mentioned, ‘internal’ CEOs tend to have and perceive a greater level of discretion (e.g. 
Dollinger et al., 1997; Carpenter and Golden, 1997; Key, 2002). Therefore, assertive behaviour 
would be positively linked to managerial discretion in the sense that dominant and in-control 
behaviour provide a wider latitude of actions and allow individuals in higher positions (like 
CEOs) to implement their own decisions. 
Moreover, assertive countries tend to appreciate competition and competitive 
behaviour over cooperation (House et al., 2004). Competitiveness exists in countries that 
implement a free-market economy in which the support is for firms’ competition and individual 
decisions (North, 1990; Reed, 2001). In this stream, Makhija and Stewart (2002) found that 
executives in free-market economies (e.g. the US) have a greater sense of power towards 
decision outcomes, are more comfortable with uncertainty and perceive further outcome 
accountability. In other words, in free-market economies, executives tend to possess a greater 
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level of discretion. Additionally, in the US, a high-discretion country (Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011), people believe in competition (Kohn, 1986), which is the crucial feature of 
human nature (Bonta, 1997). Hence, societies that appreciate competition allow greater 
discretion, and as assertive behaviour appreciate competition, thus assertiveness reflects greater 
CEO discretion. 
Furthermore, assertiveness is also seen as a means of communication. Here, scholars 
have argued that there exists a negative relationship between non-assertive behaviour and 
indirect language (Holtgraves, 1997). In assertive cultures, people tend to use ‘low-context’ 
language, which refers to the use of explicit, clear and direct speech (Schneider and Barsoux, 
1997). From such a perspective, a variety of scholars in the discretion field have looked at CEO 
letters to shareholders and conducted a content analysis of those letters to measure various 
variables such as attentional homogeneity (e.g. Abrahamson and Hambrick, 1997; Cho and 
Hambrick, 2006), risk-taking behaviour (e.g. Bowman, 1982, 1984), and many others. The way 
that individuals interpret and see their world is reflected in the language they use (Whorf, 
1956). When individuals use direct language, they create impressions to others of their own 
opinion and how powerful they perceive their logic to be. In this context, by using ‘impression 
management’, executives perceive more discretion, and by doing so they will enlarge their 
latitude of action (Carpenter and Golden, 1997). Thus, it could be argued that in assertive 
countries, executives tend to perceive greater discretion.  
As a result, assertiveness as a cultural norm is related to competition, individual 
accomplishment, performance judgment, a can-do attitude, the valuing of results over 
relationships, rewarding performance, internal individuals and foreseeing challenging targets, 
etc. (House et al., 2004), all of which act as appropriate foundations for greater discretion. 
Therefore, the author hypothesises that: 
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Hypothesis 8: Greater levels of assertiveness increase managerial discretion. 
3.1.1.9. Cultural Practices Vis-à-vis Cultural Looseness 
The presence of cultural norms or informal institutions alone is not sufficient if they are not 
enforced within a certain society (Ingram and Clay, 2000). Countries vary in terms of the 
degree to which they sanction deviant behaviour that does not comply with their societal norms 
(e.g. Strauss and Quinn, 1997; Gelfand et al., 2006). Put simply, every culture has its own 
norms that people tend to follow but the degree to which these are enforced within society is a 
crucial element showing their importance. If norms are not enforced, any deviation and 
behaviour not complying with those informal institutions would be acceptable, thus cultural 
norms would no longer be important. This leads on to the concept of cultural tightness-
looseness, which refers to the strength of applying social norms and the degree of sanctioning 
in an environment (Gelfand et al., 2006). The strength of social norms refers to the clearness 
and pervasiveness of these norms, whereas the degree of sanctioning reflects the level of 
tolerance for deviation from these norms (Gelfand et al., 2006). Several scholars (Pelto, 1968; 
Triandis, 1989; Carpenter, 2000; Gelfand et al., 2006, 2011; Uz, 2015) have looked at this 
cultural characteristic that differs between countries. Cultural tightness-looseness is distinct 
from the previously discussed social norms because it looks at the overall enforcement of other 
cultural norms (e.g. individualism, uncertainty avoidance, etc.). Thus, it is unique but at the 
same time complementary to other cultural dimensions (Gelfand et al., 2006). Cultural 
tightness-looseness has several antecedents that play a prerequisite role in having a tight or 
loose society, such as socialisation processes, media, freedom and criminal justice system, 
individual psychological attributes, etc. (Gelfand et al., 2006). Kirton (1976) distinguished 
between two types of decision-making styles: adaptors, who are more cautious, reliable and 
disciplined; and innovators, who are more creative and challenge the constraints of the 
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prevailing paradigms by deriving new ideas from outside the system. Also, innovators tend to 
take risk in their actions and ignore procedures and customs (Kirton et al., 1991). 
Moreover, cultures that tend to have stronger norms (tight societies) exert greater 
isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), making members of such a society more 
homogenous. The link between homogeneity and tight culture and heterogeneity and loose 
culture has been tackled by Triandis (1989) and later reinforced by Carpenter (2000). If a 
culture is heterogeneous, then its standards, norms and acceptable behaviour are not ubiquitous 
(Uz, 2015), thus implying a low degree of sanctioning. Loose cultures, which tolerate and 
appreciate deviant and innovative behaviour, should provide greater latitude of action for 
executives. Simply, this is because in loose societies, not abiding by the overall norms is not 
seen as objectionable by other societal members. Also, innovation, which introduces a 
tendency towards changing the status quo, is appreciated in loose societies as opposed to in 
tight ones (Uz, 2015). Empirically, Crossland and Hambrick (2011) tested this proposition 
based on subjective measures derived from Gelfand et al., (2011) on a sample of developed 
countries (e.g. US, UK, etc.) and found a significant and positive relationship between loose 
culture and CEO discretion. Consistent with Crossland and Hambrick’s (2011) findings, the 
author reinforces such relationship and argues that, loose culture provides greater latitude of 
actions to executives as opposed to a tight society that restrains the array of activities available. 
Thus: 
Hypothesis 9: Greater levels of cultural looseness increase managerial discretion. 
3.2.  Intra-Cultural Variations: Heterogeneity within countries 
Up to this point, the author has focused on the direct relationship and effects of an array of 
cultural practices representing the inter-cultural variations, operationalised as the central 
tendency of a given society/country, on managerial discretion. The author now moves to 
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discuss an important but under-researched construct of intra-cultural variation and how it may 
affect the degree of discretion accorded to CEOs in a national environment. While most 
research around national-level managerial discretion adopts the assumption that societal 
members in each country are homogenous (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011), the researcher 
argues that CEO discretion is also dependent on the degree of variation within countries, 
whereby more variation (heterogeneity) negatively affects the level of managerial discretion 
afforded to CEOs. 
To many scholars, the variations between members of a society/country are commonly 
referred to as cultural differences (Hofstede, 1991). However, members of a culture ought not 
to be like others, where in some cultural environments, there exists a degree of 
homogeneity/heterogeneity (variation) in behaviour innate to that society (Carpenter, 2000; 
Uz, 2015). Most the research focuses on the ‘central tendency’ of societal members, which 
denotes the typical members of a country. Quantitatively, the central tendency of societal 
members on a specific characteristic is mainly represented by the cultural means of such 
attributes (Au, 1999). The essence of cross-cultural research is to offer scientific interpretation 
of cultural differences rather than simply presenting the differences between countries (e.g. 
Mullen, 1995). Not considering within-country variance or diversity may well lead to missing 
an opportunity for a more nuanced, holistic and comprehensive approach to studying national 
culture. As such, intra-cultural variation, which has been ignored by cross-cultural researchers, 
is an important construct to further understand cultural implications. 
Au (1997, 1999, 2000; Au and Cheung, 2004) is among the main allies of the intra-
cultural variation construct and perhaps the only scholar who makes the most explicit and 
strongest argument for the integration of the intra-cultural variation construct in cross-cultural 
studies. He argues that several factors could play an important role in determining intra-cultural 
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variation. Amid these factors are individual demographics, moral discipline, government and 
organisation policy along with other variables (e.g. ethno-linguistic (Puia and Ofori-Dankwa, 
2013)). However, Au (1999) emphasised that societal members’ behaviour within a given 
country may well be regarded as the prominent antecedent of intra-cultural variation. 
Therefore, in this chapter the author incorporates this cultural construct on the previously 
studied cultural dimensions (cultural practices derived from House et al. (2004)) to assess its 
effect on managerial discretion. 
This is particularly important in the context of managerial discretion as it helps to define 
the boundaries of executive actions. In other words, it may be perceived that a CEO operating 
in a homogenous culture would be faced with established practices, limiting any attempt to 
deviate from the ‘central tendency’ of the society. In such cases, the array of actions would be 
narrow. On the other hand, a CEO in a heterogeneous society would have a wider array of 
actions to choose from, as the boundaries of the central tendencies are wider. However, this is 
not necessarily the case as will be seen in the below discussion. This chapter complements the 
rising number of studies that criticise the consideration of cultural homogeneity within a given 
country (e.g. Beugelsdijk et al., 2014; Shenkar, 2012). The author’s attempt is to go one step 
further in arguing that intra-cultural variation, even if some cultural practices are shared, leads 
to a negative effect on managerial discretion. The author relaxes the homogeneity assumption 
of national culture and, like other scholars (e.g. Venaik and Midgley, 2015), believes that there 
would be significant heterogeneity within and across countries, which will play a role in 
changing the degree of discretion an executive can have.  
Before developing this line of reasoning, it is important to highlight the current 
discussion on intra-cultural variation and put the concept into its proper context, which is 
present in the next section. Following that, the author describes the theoretical building blocks 
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for the proposed relationship between intra-cultural variation and managerial discretion, which 
are used to develop the hypothesis. This is followed by a discussion on the methodology and 
the statistical analysis used to test the proposed relationship; finally, the author concludes with 
the contributions and implications of this chapter. 
3.2.1. Intra-cultural variation as antecedent of managerial discretion 
Culture is an important concept to many scholars in a wide range of disciplines. Influenced by 
the work of Hofstede (1980, 2001) and more recently House et al. (2004), the scholarly 
community, particularly the cross-cultural business party, has constantly represented culture 
based on national scores. Notwithstanding the acceptance and importance of these national 
scores, studies have been criticised from various angles, such as construct validity (e.g. Brewer 
and Venaik, 2014), ideological basis (e.g. Ailon, 2008), and homogeneity assumption (e.g. 
Dheer et al., 2015). Particularly relevant is the latter assumption that most earlier works have 
taken for granted. As argued by some academics, such a supposition may be acceptable if the 
cross-cultural variance is greater than the within-country variance (Hanges and Dickson, 2008; 
Ronen and Shenkar, 2013), which is not always the case in cross-cultural research (Venaik and 
Midgley, 2015). 
Recent discussion in the cross-cultural and international management literatures 
showed the importance and appropriateness of within-country variance (intra-cultural 
variation) to uncover various cultural implications (e.g. Au and Cheung, 2004; Peterson et al., 
2012; Tung and Verbeke, 2010). A typology presented by Klein and Kozlowski (2000) argue 
that the conceptualisation of a group has three main properties: global, shared and 
configurational. The global aspect relates to the encompassing properties that are mostly 
dominant and recognisable, such as political system, economic growth, etc. Although the 
shared and configurational properties both emerge from the characteristics of a group (in this 
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case a country), the shared properties are common amongst all the group members that embrace 
such a particularity. By contrast, the configurational property is not shared and is unique to 
each group member (Ralston et al., 2014). These differences are mainly due to either meso-
level (e.g. religion, region) or individual-level attributes (e.g. age or gender). While most the 
works in the cross-cultural literature have relied on the first two properties of Klein and 
Kozlowski’s (2000) typology, some have incorporated the within-country differences to 
provide a better understanding of the impact of culture. Recently, Venaik and Midgley (2015) 
incorporated the configurational perspective and reconciled it with the national averages 
theoretical construct to develop cultural archetypes. Similarly, Richter et al. (2016) argue that 
the configurational perspective allows for a more holistic understanding of cultural dimensions 
and their consequent effects.  
Moreover, Tsui et al. (2007) argue that culture scholars rely heavily on the 
consideration of the global and shared properties of national culture and assume that shared 
property, using mean scores, is the main characteristic of a nation. Similarly, the observations 
of Au and Cheung (2004) explicitly indicate the lack of consideration of the dispersion of 
behaviour or practices within a country. In their review of cross-cultural studies, Kirkman et 
al. (2006) pointed to this gap and encouraged researchers to employ the intra-country variation 
construct. Such importance is also reflected in Kirkman et al.’s (2009) study of Chinese and 
US employee-manager relations, in which they concluded that to understand culture, one needs 
to know the within-country variance and not only the shared attributes of a society. In the same 
vein, Steel and Taras (2011) described in their meta-analysis study that almost 90% of variance 
in cultural attributes can be found within countries. Therefore, the adoption of the 
configurational perspective, which has been recognised by some scholars (e.g. Fisher et al., 
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2011; Gurven et al., 2008; Lenartowicz and Roth, 2001), is crucial to provide new insights and 
develop the cross-cultural field. 
The idea of intra-cultural variation can be dated back to early research on ecological 
fallacy, which states that individuals in a group do not necessarily possess the average 
attribute(s) of that group (Robinson, 1950). Such an argument has been also present in 
anthropological studies, such as Pelto (1975) who offers a thorough discussion on the factors 
that have made the homogeneity assumption so popular and attractive and the implications that 
intra-cultural variation has on the advancement of such theory. Early works (e.g. Au, 1999; 
Chan et al., 1999; Schwartz and Sagie, 2000) show that intra-cultural variation exhibits 
inconsistent correlations with cultural means and provide differing findings. Au and Cheung 
(2004) empirically demonstrated that intra-cultural variation and cultural mean are not 
substitutes, which provides supporting argument for the importance of studying the 
implications of both constructs. The fundamental importance of intra-cultural variation is to 
show the extent to which the shared practices within a society are widely and deeply shared 
amongst its members (Puia and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013). Drawing on the multi-layered construct 
of culture (Leung et al., 2005), Tung (2008a) argued for the necessity to account for intra-
national variation when conducting cross-cultural research. Despite these calls, studies have 
continued to adopt the global and shared perspective when conducting cross-cultural research 
(Ralston et al., 2014), which has led to fallacious assumptions of cultural homogeneity within 
a country (Tung and Verbeke, 2010). The answer for this could be multi-faced, in part due to 
methodological issues (i.e. the unavailability of published large-scale data on within-country 
variation) (Fisher, 2009) and in part to a lack of appreciation of the contribution that such a 
construct could bring to our understanding (e.g. Buchholz et al., 2009).  
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As previously stated, to the extent to which cross-cultural variation is greater than 
within-country variation, the use of national scores would be justifiable (Hanges and Dickson, 
2006). This represents the main argument of the proponents of the national culture perspective 
who believe that individual norms (i.e. behaviour, values, beliefs, etc.) constitute the dominant 
thrust of shared enculturation (Schwartz, 1999: 26). While acknowledging this fact, the 
homogeneity of a given culture (country) is not universal and some researchers have already 
shown that. In the field of international marketing, appreciation of intra-country variation or 
heterogeneity in attitudes, practices and even values are considered essential for various 
marketing strategies, such as customer segmentation and positioning (e.g. Broderick et al., 
2007; Ter Hofstede et al., 2002; Wedel et al., 1998). In other disciplines, intra-cultural variation 
has been shown to influence organisational and social outcomes, particularly Au and Cheung 
(2004), who empirically illustrate that intra-cultural variation has a negative effect on job and 
life satisfaction as opposed to the cultural mean. Au and Cheung (2004) were not the only 
scholars that investigated the role of within-country variation and work-related issues; likewise, 
Hoorn (2015) discovered that intra-cultural variation explains, by far, the difference in work 
values within a country. Also, the salient effect of within-country variance has been uncovered 
by Tung and Baumann (2009), who compared individuals’ behaviour towards material 
possession and savings among a sample of countries (e.g. Canada, Australia, China). Their 
findings strongly suggest that there were more similarities across countries than within 
countries based on the individual background of a group. Others established a strong link 
between intra-country variation and technological innovations. Puia and Ofori-Dankwa (2013) 
employed the within-country diversity framework to explore the relationship between cultural 
diversity (within a given country) and national innovativeness. Their findings suggest that 
intra-cultural variation is independently and positively related to national innovativeness. 
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Within business ethics, Ralston et al. (2014) tested the utility of intra-cultural variation on two 
cultural dimensions (individualism and collectivism) to predict the ethical behaviour of 
managers. In their study of 48 societies, they found that variation within countries make a more 
suggestive contribution to explain the perception of ethical behaviour. Another example of the 
use of intra-cultural variation in international business and cross-cultural studies is Beugelsdijk 
et al.’s (2014) work on foreign affiliates’ sales. The study’s findings suggest that the 
overestimation of foreign affiliates’ sales is significantly and positively related to the intra-
cultural variations of the host country. 
With the progression of cross-cultural research, scholars have further developed a 
somewhat old construct (dated back to Pelto, 1968) to gauge the extent of the clarity and 
pervasiveness of norms in each country and how much tolerance exists there for deviant 
behaviour (Gelfand et al, 2006). Cultural tightness and looseness is a related construct to intra-
cultural variation based on within-country variance. In loose cultures, norms are expressed 
within a broad range of alternative means and there exists a lack of regularity, discipline and 
regimentation. Such cultures tend to tolerate divergent practices. In contrast, cultures that are 
tight have established strong and clear norms by developing order and sanctioning systems for 
governing deviant behaviour.  
Given these characteristics, it is expected that intra-cultural variation in tight cultures 
is smaller than in loose societies. As previously discussed, cultural tightness-looseness has its 
roots in various academic disciplines, including sociology (e.g. Boldt, 1978b), anthropology 
(Pelto, 1968), psychology (Berry, 1966) and of course international business and cross-cultural 
research (Gelfand et al., 2011; Ross et al., 2015). Research has discovered that national 
contexts of tightness and looseness vary widely between countries and that such a construct is 
distinct from the actual cultural dimensions (Aktas et al., 2016; Gelfand et al., 2011). This 
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construct has been linked to several organisational, managerial and national outcomes (Taras 
et al., 2010), such as negotiation (Gunia et al., 2011), stock-price synchronicity (Eun et al., 
2015), job satisfaction for expatriate manpower (Peltokorpi and Froese, 2014), organisational 
creativity (Chua et al., 2015) and even terrorism (Gelfand et al., 2013). Recently, cultural-
tightness and looseness have been linked to managerial discretion (Crossland and Hambrick, 
2011), which is empirically validated in the first empirical chapter of this thesis. However, 
cultural tightness-looseness and intra-cultural variation are not the same construct (as can be 
seen in the empirical explanation below and in the following theoretical section); both may 
well be related to each other particularly in the sense of greater variety of behaviour but differ 
in quantitative and theoretical terms.  
From a theoretical perspective, cultural tightness-looseness has two main dimensions; 
the first relates to the strength and clarity of social norms – in other words the pervasiveness 
of these norms within a given society; and the second relates to the strength of sanctioning, 
which means the degree of tolerance that a society has towards deviant behaviour (Gelfand et 
al., 2006). Whereas, intra-cultural variation refers to the actual distribution of behaviour of the 
population in given culture (Au, 1999). Its key component is the heterogeneity in a society’s 
practices and values (Venaik and Midgley, 2015) and the extent to which societal members do 
not follow the central tendency of the society (variance of attributes) (Au, 1999). Also, the 
antecedents of intra-cultural variation mainly lie within the actual members of the society as 
opposed to cultural tightness-looseness, where the proxies are mainly related to exogenous 
factors. From a quantitative standpoint, the operationalisation of these constructs is completely 
different. Intra-cultural variation is mainly operationalised using the standard deviation of 
behaviours (Au, 1999; Au and Cheung, 2004) or using proxy measures such as ethno-linguistic 
diversity (Beugelsdijk et al., 2014). On the other hand, cultural tightness is measured through 
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a set of variables that relates to historical, ecological and societal factors. The main measure 
developed by Gelfand et al. (2011) considers ecological and historical threats, socio-political 
institutions, legal system, etc. Even recent operationalisation techniques (Uz, 2015) have 
incorporated socio-political, threat to survival, psychological and behavioural-inhibition 
factors. The distinction between these two constructs has been illustrated by extant research. 
For instance, the Netherlands, a relatively loose culture (Gelfand et al., 2011), has small 
variation, whereas, India, which scored very high on Gelfand et al.’s (2011) scale, is 
characterised as having high intra-cultural variation (Au, 1999). 
Therefore, it important to note that these two constructs are different and that the 
empirical examination in this chapter is neither a replication nor a different measure of the 
previously tested construct of cultural looseness (please refer to chapter 5); this is a new 
investigation into the effect of intra-cultural variation on managerial discretion. To achieve the 
desired conclusion, which illustrates whether intra-cultural variation adds to our understanding 
of managerial discretion on a national level, the author takes a conservative approach and 
controls for the construct of cultural tightness-looseness.  
How might intra-cultural variation affect managerial discretion?  
Like Crossland and Hambrick (2011), the author found that cultural looseness is 
positively related to managerial discretion. This is because in loose societies, standards of 
behaviour are more ambiguous, which leads to less restrictiveness, whereas tight cultures 
provide clear expectations on how entities (including executives) should behave in that culture. 
If intra-cultural variation is like tightness-looseness, which is not the case, as discussed earlier, 
then we may expect it to have a positive relationship with managerial discretion. In contrast, 
the author speculates that intra-cultural variation would negatively affect managerial 
discretion. The logic can be linked to various management and non-management theories. 
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Starting with the latter, in the discipline of international marketing, studies find that intra-
cultural heterogeneity is an important construct for marketing managers as they need to 
understand the behaviour, attitudes and values of a distinct set of customer segments, which is 
indeed important for positioning purposes (Broderick et al., 2007). When managers are faced 
with such a diverse set of customer groups, decisions become tougher and little latitude exists 
in their decision making. The same argument is echoed in the management literature, 
particularly the upper echelons theory. Executives have restricted information-processing 
abilities and must be selective in where they focus their attention (Abrahamson and Hambrick, 
1997). Because discretion confers options and the diversity associated with the selection of 
these options (Nelson, 1991), the greater the uncertainty in each environment (in this case 
society), the more executives will consider a wider variety of means to diverse ends 
(Abrahamson and Hambrick, 1997). Countries that scored high on uncertainty avoidance have 
been characterised as being low on intra-cultural variation (Au, 1999). This means that the 
array of options available to executives in these environments is less diverse, implying low 
managerial discretion. 
Furthermore, existing work in the stakeholder realm argues the importance of treating 
various stakeholder groups well, as it contributes to organisational performance (e.g. 
Donaldson and Peterson, 1995; Harrison et al., 2010), which is the focal objective of 
executives. Stakeholders are categorised into two main types: self-regarding, who only care 
about themselves (Fehr and Falk, 2002); and reciprocal, who care about others and try to punish 
unfair treatment even if that punishment is costly (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). Philips et al. 
(2011) argue that executives, and by extension their firms, have the latitude to choose actions 
in response to existing internal or external events. However, it is well documented in the 
discretion literature that this latitude is limited and subject to various internal (e.g. firm 
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characteristics, executive individualities) (Wangrow et al., 2015) and external (e.g. industry 
and country characteristics) (Crossland and Hambrick, 2007) factors. Proponents of 
stakeholder research have emphasised the important role of external factors in influencing 
executives’ behaviour. The argument lies in the premises that firms function within a collection 
of constituencies that have a varying degree of power (Mitchell et al., 1997), which ultimately 
leads to constraints on executives’ actions. Thus, it would be almost impossible to explain the 
viability of stakeholder influence as an external factor affecting firms’ outcomes without 
acknowledging the condition of this influence, which is the degree of managerial discretion. If 
executives are not accorded enough discretion, then it is unreasonable to hold them accountable 
for mistreating stakeholders. 
Research shows that the heterogeneity of stakeholders is well observed across cultures 
and even within an environment (country or industry) (e.g. Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006). 
These stakeholder groups impose strong normative and coercive pressures on organisations 
(Delmas and Toffel, 2004), which consequently lead to pressures on executives’ actions 
(institutional argument based on Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). Top managers are exposed to 
and face a population of distinct stakeholder groups, each with different motives and 
heterogeneous behaviour (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2014). In their own words, Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1987: 374) state that: “To us, constraint exists whenever an action lies outside the 
‘zone of acceptance’ of powerful parties who hold a stake in the organisation… Extending the 
concept to other types of stakeholders, one can think of board members, bankers, regulators, 
employees, customers as well as other parties, as all having their own zones of acceptance”. 
Hence, actions that are acceptable by a given stakeholder group may well be objectionable to 
others. In such an instance, executives exposed to a diverse set of stakeholder groups are 
strongly challenged to take actions that are in line with the acceptance scale of these 
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stakeholders. Bear in mind that discretion exists to the extent to which actions fall within the 
zone of acceptance of stakeholders (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). In this case, there will be 
more than one zone of acceptance, with each related to a stakeholder group, because of the 
development of cultural archetypes due to greater heterogeneity (Venaik and Midgley, 2015). 
Stakeholder theory distinguishes between the various stakeholders a manager is exposed to and 
recognises that interests differ both between and across these stakeholder groups (Wolfe and 
Putler, 2002). Executives’ discretion in this case is a function of both the holder-specific 
discretion, particularly to each stakeholder group, and the aggregate discretion, which is 
common across all stakeholder groups. In the cultural realm, managerial discretion was 
considered from the latter dimension – the aggregation of stakeholders’ zones of acceptance 
using cultural values (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011) or practices, as seen in the previous 
chapter. However, the particularity of each stakeholder group’s zone of acceptance is of great 
importance. This is because increasing the heterogeneity within a given context would lead to 
the creation of several cultural archetypes, which in turn increases the institutional constraints 
that are imposed on executives operating in such a context. Any actions that do not conform 
with the zone/s of acceptance of most stakeholder groups would be perceived as objectionable 
and as such will lead to cultural misfit, illegitimacy and inefficiency (Roth et al., 2011). 
Therefore, the latitude of available options or actions would be limited.  
In contrast, in societies with low intra-cultural variation, executives need to adapt to 
few stakeholder groups, which allows them to foresee a broader set of actions. It is easier for 
individuals to attend to a homogenous culture as opposed to a heterogeneous one (Au, 1999), 
because the contact with a divergent set of exemplars may become confusing, and thus provide 
further constraints on the information-processing ability of executives (Abrahamson and 
Hambrick, 1997). According to cognitive theorists, executives encounter more information 
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than their cognitive capability can integrate (Surroca et al., 2016); for that reason, they focus 
(pay attention to) on domains that they perceive as being critical. This attention pattern will 
therefore determine their strategic agenda (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). In the absence of the 
pressure generated from a variety of stakeholder groups, executives would not be tended to 
adhere to a diverse set of societal expectations (Campbell, 2007). It becomes easier for an 
executive in this situation to make greater strides to interpret and comprehend a smaller set of 
information, which will ultimately be reflected in more strategic change (Cho and Hambrick, 
2006) and the generation of new choices (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Consequently, the 
latitude of actions increases. An executive focusing on one stakeholder group may well be in a 
position of high discretion vis-à-vis that individual group, but at the cost of added constraints 
from other stakeholder groups. In societies with a limited number of stakeholder groups (low 
intra-cultural variation), the opportunity cost to attend to the powerful stakeholder groups 
decreases and executives can attend to the needs of a concentrated set of individual stakeholder 
groups, which ultimately generates higher discretion.  
Accordingly, the author hypothesises that: 
Hypothesis 10: Greater intra-cultural variation reduces the degree of managerial discretion. 
3.3.  National Competitiveness as Consequence of Managerial Discretion 
National competitiveness is the relative position of a country among others in the international 
market (Cho and Moon, 1998), and refers to the establishment of an environment that sustains 
more value creation for its businesses (Garelli, 2003). National competitiveness is a matter of 
considerable importance for both business and national economy leaders (Thompson, 2004). 
In today’s globalised world, executives and policy makers need to assess the extent to which 
the external environment is competitive and could attract more competition. For the economics 
school, national competitiveness is a straightforward issue mainly related to the factor costs 
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and largely determined by the relative exchange rate, labour and land costs (e.g. Fagerberg, 
1996; Reinert, 1995).  
On the other hand, for scholars in the management field, this concept is more broadly 
conceived, where national competitiveness tends to be more related to complex institutional 
and systematic factors of the macro-political economy which affect the micro-economic 
activities of firms within competitive environments (countries) (e.g. Strange, 1998; Krugman, 
1996). This complexity brings more uncertainty through which top executives need to steer 
their firms via appropriate strategies (Luo, 2001). As such, national competitiveness is a 
function of the efficiency of domestic institutional environments in fostering competitive 
activity within its territory (Thompson, 2004). In other words, to achieve national 
competitiveness, countries should create institutional environments that are consonant with 
business needs. From this standpoint, executives of firms operating in an environment would 
prefer policy makers to establish policies that aim at providing a domestic institutional 
environment that would enable those executives to draw on a broader array of actions. 
Earlier research has emphasised that countries vary in their competitiveness levels and 
their attitudes towards competitiveness (e.g. French and Jarrett, 1994; Ho, 2005). This 
difference is mainly triggered by the varied cultures that each country is characterised by. From 
early treaties of cultural variables (Weber, 1904), culture has played a critical role in advancing 
nations, particularly enhancing overall country performance. The differences in national 
culture do not only explain human or organisation behaviour but also national performance 
(Franke et al., 1991). From Hofstede’s (1980) study to the most recent cultural model of House 
et al. (2004), the results have shown a significant positive effect of culture on national 
performance and economic development.  
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Despite the direct link between national culture and economic growth, scholars have 
debated that other important external factors exist (e.g. economic factors) which affect 
economic performance (Yeh and Lawrence, 1995). Economic freedom was found to mediate 
the relationship between national culture and economic growth (Johnson and Lenartowicz, 
1998). Economic freedom or economies that are more open tend to grow faster and perform 
better than other economies which are strained by regulations (e.g. Dollar, 1992; Sachs and 
Warner, 1995). This is since open economies help to protect private property, allow freedom 
of choice and most importantly encourage individual autonomy and entrepreneurial behaviour 
(Gwartney et al., 1996; Reed, 2001). Since market demand is constantly changing, which 
causes great uncertainty (Aoki, 1995), in such economies or countries, executives can foresee 
a broader range of actions and are not constrained in terms of the type or scale of strategy that 
they could implement. This is consistent with the tenets of task-environment discretion 
(Finkelstein, 2009). These countries are more innovative, value competition and promote 
specialisation (Johnson and Lenartowicz, 1998), all of which provide executives with greater 
freedom to choose which products and services to produce, how to compete, and afford them 
greater freedom in terms of their decision making (North, 1990). Similar findings are echoed 
in Makhija and Stewart (2002) who argue that differences in the national context and free 
market versus centrally planned economies have an important role in determining the risk 
orientation of executives. They find that managers in free-market economies are equipped with 
more tolerance for ambiguity and are more accountable for organisational outcomes, which in 
turn increases their propensity to take risky actions (Makhija and Stewart, 2002). This is 
consistent with Crossland and Chen (2013), who demonstrate that executives across countries 
based on that country national characteristics are more accountable for poor firm performance 
and their dismissal rate is higher. They also show that a country’s level of managerial discretion 
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plays a crucial role in determining the accountability of its executives regarding poor firm 
performance. 
Since the nature of firms is strongly determined and influenced through responses to 
the constraints and opportunities available in their specific environment (Child, 1981), 
organisations tend to be configured in a way to match or comply with their given institutional 
environment (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). For instance, Kwok and Tadesse (2006) find that 
national culture has a positive and significant effect on the financial systems adopted in a 
country. This is because financial systems are a function of the controllability of the 
environment (Rajan and Zingales, 2003), in the sense that the broader national environment 
dictates the type of financial systems that can be implemented in a country. In countries with a 
flexible institutional environment (e.g. free-market), the decision-making processes are vague 
and cannot be easily predicted. As such, the executives of firms operating in such environments 
should be allowed more managerial discretion (Sharpman and Dean, 1997). In contrast, 
countries with a rigid institutional environment constrain executives’ behaviour and limit their 
latitude of actions. Countries with more national-level discretion provide executives with a 
wider array of behaviours, which may in turn allow faster firm action, more innovation and 
heterogeneous strategies. By aggregating the competitive success of firms to the national level, 
it seems that the overall national-level competitiveness increases (Thompson, 2004). This 
happens because national performance is not inherited but rather depends on the capacity of a 
nation’s industry to innovate and upgrade (Davies and Ellis, 2000; Porter, 1990; Snowdon and 
Stonehouse, 2006). This is the case for both the industries and the actual firms that can drive 
national performance. Zahra (1999) argues that societies with greater entrepreneurial 
orientation are more competitive than others. The greater the entrepreneurial orientation in a 
country, the higher the latitude of executive actions. This is because such characteristics allow 
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more innovation and tolerance of uncertainty, which in turn drives global competitiveness (Lee 
and Peterson, 2000). Thus, country-level managerial discretion should act as an important 
trigger for enhanced national competitiveness. 
The way firms contribute to the overall performance of a country is based on their 
strategic behaviour (Francis, 1992). Generally, national competitiveness does not equate 
directly to the relative international market price of factor inputs but rather stems from the free 
and undistorted competitive activity within the domestic institutional environment (Thompson, 
2004). As such, when an executive has a greater latitude of actions and can choose strategic 
initiatives without any environmental constraints, the overall competitive scale of the domestic 
market increases, leading to greater national competitiveness. There has been much evidence 
that firms in different countries tend to foresee different strategies due to the institutional 
context of the countries in which they operate (e.g. Thomas and Waring, 1999). Firms that 
innovate and seek growth opportunities through innovation and the development of products 
and markets tend to provide executives with more discretion (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 
1992). By following this orientation, they tend to bear high ambiguity and uncertainty in cause-
effect relationships. Countries that are the home of such firms should be more competitive than 
others. In contrast, countries with low discretion seem to limit executives' array of actions. In 
this case, firms operating in these environments tend to foster strategies that are like 
competitors and focus on building stable strategies. For instance, Japan, a low-discretion 
country, is the home of firms with homogenous strategies (Porter et al., 2000). When 
companies follow stable strategies, and are more constrained in their behaviour, they will in 
turn have a reduced latitude of executives’ actions (Rajagopalan, 1997).  
As such, the author argues that national-level managerial discretion plays an important 
role in driving the competitiveness of countries. 
Chapter 3 – Antecedents and Consequences of Managerial Discretion: Research Theories 
and Hypotheses Development 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
152 
Hypothesis 11: Managerial discretion has a significant positive relationship with national-
level competitiveness. 
3.4. Managerial discretion as a Mediator Between Culture and National 
Competitiveness 
Furthermore, national competitiveness is closely related to the ability of a society to 
tolerate changes and adapt to the uncertainty surrounding future development opportunities 
(Mackic et al., 2014). Societies’ outcomes and efforts to adapt to external changes and internal 
integration are important contributors to national competitiveness (Javidan and Hauser, 2004). 
In the same vein, Lee and Peterson (2000) argue that a society’s propensity to generate 
autonomous, risk-taking, innovative, competitively aggressive and proactive behaviour 
depends on that society’s cultural attributes. These societal characteristics trigger more 
managerial discretion. Additionally, as argued in the preceding sections, earlier research has 
highlighted the importance of national culture in driving a country’s performance. In this vein, 
Petrakis et al. (2015) show that culture is a long-term strategic instrument that drives national 
competitiveness. Particularly, House et al. (2004) empirically demonstrate that cultural 
practices are positively related to national competitiveness. The author argued in an earlier 
chapter (chapter 5) that cultural practices have a direct relationship with managerial discretion, 
and in turn the author suggests here that discretion also drives national competitiveness. 
Logically, this implies that managerial discretion inhabits a mediating role between cultural 
practices and national competitiveness. Constraints derived from the institutional environment 
(national culture) will significantly affect the degree of managerial discretion available to 
CEOs in that environment, which in turn will influence the competitiveness of that national 
context.  
Accordingly, the author hypothesises that: 
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Hypothesis 12: Managerial discretion mediates the relationship between national cultural and 
competitiveness. 
For clarity, a summary of all research hypotheses is provided in Table 1, this 
includes the anticipated effect of each hypothesis.  
Table 1: Summary of Research Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis Effect 
Institutional 
Collectivism (IC) 
Greater levels of institutional collectivism decrease 
managerial discretion. 
Negative (-) 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UA) 
Greater levels of uncertainty avoidance decrease 
managerial discretion. 
Negative (-) 
Power 
Distance (PD) 
Greater levels of power distance increase managerial 
discretion. 
Positive (+) 
Future 
Orientation (FO) 
Greater levels of future orientation increase managerial 
discretion. 
Positive (+) 
Humane 
Orientation (HO) 
Greater levels of humane orientation decrease managerial 
discretion. 
Negative (-) 
Performance 
Orientation (PO) 
Greater levels of performance orientation increase 
managerial discretion. 
Positive (+) 
Gender 
Egalitarianism (GE) 
Greater levels of gender egalitarianism increase 
managerial discretion. 
Positive (+) 
Assertiveness (AA) 
Greater levels of assertiveness increase managerial 
discretion. 
Positive (+) 
Cultural 
Looseness (CL) 
Greater levels of cultural looseness increase managerial 
discretion. 
Positive (+) 
Intra-Cultural 
Variation 
Greater intra-cultural variation reduces the degree of 
managerial discretion. 
Negative (-) 
National 
Competitiveness 
Managerial discretion has a significant positive 
relationship with national-level competitiveness. 
Positive (+) 
Mediation Role 
Managerial discretion mediates the relationship between 
national cultural and competitiveness. 
Positive (+) 
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4. Research Design and Methodology 
4.1.  Introduction 
The preceding chapters discussed the main research aims and objectives along with providing 
a background to the relevant literature by emphasizing on the national-level construct of 
managerial discretion, and demonstrated the development of the theoretical model. The 
following tackles the different methodological approaches currently employed in the broader 
strategic management field and provides an overview of the adopted methodological approach 
in this thesis. 
Research projects, regardless of the academic field, should follow certain 
methodological criteria to be accomplished. Research in general helps to solve a problem by 
answering related questions. However, research methodologies are chosen in accordance with 
the research topic in question and the problem itself. Also, researchers are strongly advised to 
follow and look at the various research methods used literature, which is related to their topic, 
and build on it to have a complete model for answering their research question(s). Basically, 
the process of research should take into consideration the following (Malhotra, 2000; Bryman 
and Bell, 2011):  
• Type of research (descriptive, exploratory, causal, etc.) 
• Type of data to be used in the analysis, which forms the research paradigm (quantitative 
(numeric) or qualitative (words), etc.) 
• Finally, the direction of reasoning, which is mainly associated with the identification 
of research paradigm. This includes: deductive, inductive, abductive, etc. 
Once the research type has been identified, researchers investigate what kind of data 
should be used and how to collect it. In this vein, numerous data-collection techniques are 
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available. These should be selected according to the research needs. In other words, the core 
criterion to select the data collection method is how it could help in answering the research 
question (de Vaus, 2001). Such decisions should not only take into consideration the strengths 
and weaknesses of the selected method but also, as previously mentioned, how it could 
contribute to reaching an appropriate answer for the research question. 
The core focus of this thesis is to understand and examine a theoretical framework that 
enables further development of the field of managerial discretion, and to empirically asses the 
focused components of the model, particularly, the relationship between cultural practices, 
intra-cultural variation and managerial discretion and the implication for the competitiveness 
of countries. Any attempt to test or develop a theory puts a great pressure on the researcher to 
carefully account for the ontological and epistemological position. This chapter and 
particularly the below sections describe the nature of knowledge and the tools that would be 
employed to access that knowledge within the context of this research. The following sub-
sections are organised as follows: first, the researcher starts with an overview of the different 
philosophical underpinnings to business research in general and the strategic management and 
discretion research followed by a discussion on the theory development and the research 
paradigm adopted in this thesis. Second, the author discusses in depth the different constructs 
and variables used in this research and provides and overview of the research design, 
operationalisation techniques, survey design, sample and finishes by discussing the statistical 
techniques implemented to test the proposed relationships between the variables. 
4.2.  Philosophical Underpinnings to Business Research 
It is well acknowledged that there isn’t a universal best approach for researchers to adopt when 
looking to discover a reality, researchers have enough discretion to choose the appropriate 
research approach for their specific study. Blaikie (1993) argues that there are strengths and 
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weakness associated with adoption of a particularly research strategy or approach, these pros 
or cons should be carefully evaluated to make appropriate judgment. However, research 
strategies are subject to a range of influences, which were categorised by Blaikie (1993) as: 
pragmatism, worldview, personality, professional socialisation and social context. Pragmatism 
simply refers to matching the research methodology with the nature of the research itself, such 
influences present the research strategy as a mean to an end. Worldview influences are factors 
that shape the research methodology in a way that is compatible with the individual ideological 
views, beliefs, religion and values. However, the Worldview may well be described as a narrow 
perspective, whereby it limits the range of approaches that could be selected to do the research. 
Personality influences are also subjective in nature and focuses on the preference for 
ambiguous approaches, whereby researchers would either go for a linear positivist approach or 
choose to engage with a more complex and ambiguous interpretivist approach. Lastly, the 
social context would also influence the research methodology by emphasizing the importance 
of meeting funders or consumers’ expectations and most importantly that the methodology 
should be acceptable by these entities.  
Blaikie (1993) asserts that these influences are not exclusive and the choice of a 
research methodology may well be dependent on a combination of all these factors. However, 
this equivocal assumption would confuse researchers and offer little guidelines on how to use 
information to make an appropriate choice. Despite that and due to the lack of cogent 
foundation for investigating knowledge, it is crucial for researchers particularly social 
researchers to explicitly discuss their perspective of ontology (meaning what constitute social 
reality) and epistemology (how researcher came to access that reality) (Johnson and Duberley, 
2000). Additionally, researchers should recognise the influences and biases that led to the 
adoption of a specific research approach. By following such strategy, researchers would be 
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able to evaluate the different options and present the most appropriate option to recognise the 
strengths, weaknesses and the limitations of their research strategy. 
The philosophical position usually determines the way reasoning and observations are 
connected to each other and guides the path in which the researcher understands and 
approaches the study and the search for reality which will clarify the research design as well 
(Blumberg et al., 2008). Such philosophical orientation or position is well connected with Kuhn 
(1962) definition of a paradigm. In his argument, Kuhn (1962) relates paradigms to models of 
observation and understanding that direct or shape how researchers see and assess reality. 
These sources of guidance, paradigms, are required to identify the research problem, select 
appropriate methods and define the ontology, epistemology and the nature of the enquiry 
(Benton and Craib, 2010). Ontology deals with what researchers think is the reality and how 
they view the world, whereas epistemology explores the representation of knowledge of social 
reality under question and what is considered as evidence for such a reality and finally the 
methodology is about the process in which we get to the knowledge (Mason, 2002; Bryman 
and Bell, 2011; Hennink et al., 2011). Therefore, these paradigms play an important role in 
influencing the investigation of the researcher and the methods that he/she employs in their 
search for answers (Doyle et al., 2009). 
According to Creswell (2009), there are two main research philosophes, which were 
generated from the Western scientific tradition as appropriate for research in the social 
sciences, positivist and interpretivist. Starting with the latter, interpretivist (social 
constructivist) deals with the complexity in views rather than focusing on meanings of 
variables, rely on the researchers and participants view of the situation in question (Creswell, 
2009). Whereas, the former, the positivist is mainly considered as a deterministic approach in 
which some factors determine outcomes. Such philosophical orientation identifies and 
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evaluates the cause of an outcome, observe and measure the objective reality that exists in an 
environment without relying on personal judgements (Myers and Avison, 2002). There are also 
other philosophical approaches but these mainly rely on views from both preceding 
philosophies such as critical realism (Archer et al., 1998). Such approach challenges the single 
objective reality that exists in the positivism and the shared reality that exists in the 
interpretivism. 
4.2.1. Issues on Philosophical Approaches 
As mentioned earlier, Benton and Craib (2010) argued that philosophical positions in general 
are required and expected to define the ontology, epistemology, the relationship between 
human beings and their environment (human nature) and the methodology. These dimensions 
are shown in figure 4, which illustrates the subjective/objective dimensions of Burrell and 
Morgan (1979).  
Figure 4: The subjective/objective dimension of Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
The Subjectivist Approach  The Objectivist Approach 
Nominalism ONTOLOGY Realism 
Anti-Positivism EPISTEMOLOGY Positivism 
Voluntarism HUMAN NATURE Determinism 
Ideographic Methodology Nomothetic 
 
The existing debate in social sciences on ontology relates to the positions of internal 
realism, relativism and nominalism. Realism refers to the acceptance of one truth and that 
evidences or facts can be revealed, oppositely, nominalism deals with the acceptance that there 
is no truth and that such evidences or facts are human made (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). 
Moreover, the contrasting view on the epistemological position is reflected in the positivism 
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and the subjectivism orientations. Positivism believes that reality exists in the external world 
and it can be studied by applying traditional methods that are adopted in the natural sciences 
(Bryman, 2012). In here the application of methodological approaches is nomothetic, which 
means focusing on the replicability and the deductive reasoning of testing theory through 
quantitative assessments (Neuman, 2007). On the other hand, the anti-positivism approach or 
also referred to as interpretivist or social constructionism falls into the ontology of relativist by 
if reality is determined by how individuals view it rather than objectives factors (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). In here, researcher favour the ideographic methodology whereby the 
explanation focuses on the aspect of the social world through details descriptions of 
relationships (Neuman, 2007). 
Business research in general is not a unique type of research that requires consideration 
of the philosophical underpinnings without taking into consideration the external reality. 
Research in the business and management discipline does not exist in a bubble and is not 
separated from other social sciences disciplines or any other academic adherences that business 
practitioners hold (Bryman and Bell, 2011). The business and management field is not only 
concerned with the nature of firms or how they operate but also is concerned with findings 
solutions to organisational problems which are directly related to management practices. As 
such, the uniqueness of the business and management research is seen in the relationship 
between theory and practice, which should ultimately be very close. However, Gummesson 
(2000) argues that academic researchers and business practitioners each place different 
emphasis on theory and practice, whereby scholars contribute to theory development using 
fragmented pieces from practice and business practitioners contribute to practice by using 
fragmented pieces of theory. This has created a gap between business researchers and 
practitioners particularly as the latter has lost interest in business and management research 
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findings (Tranfield and Starkey, 1998). Therefore, business researchers must relearn how to 
regain the interest of the business community to retain value and purpose for their research. 
One of the important facts that would combine and fill in the gap between business researchers 
and practitioners is the search for the objective reality and the reliance on evidence and facts, 
which as discussed earlier would mainly exists in the positivist approach. 
To identify the appropriate and relevant philosophical approach to be implemented in 
this research, the author considered the five dimensions of influence presented in table 2.  
Table 2: Positivism vs. Interpretivism 
Ontology 
Positivism Interpretivism 
External Reality Socially Constructed Reality 
Single Reality Multiple Contexts 
Causal Laws Multiple Realities 
Generalisable Relative 
Predictive Without Independence 
Reductionist Interpreted by Observer 
Observer Independence Subjective 
Objective  
 
This study as stated earlier, in part corroborate extant research (Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011) and build on previous research within the strategic leadership research 
particularly managerial discretion research. In such context, this stream of research has mainly 
relied on the positivist approach to objectively assess the external reality and identify the 
different antecedents and consequences of managerial discretion. Similarly, in this thesis, the 
author is interested and aims to investigate the relationship between different variables that are 
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considered as external realities as per earlier research (Crossland and Chen, 2013; House et al., 
2004; Wangrow et al., 2015) and focuses on the causal relationship between these variables. 
Additionally, the context of this research is dispersed and consists on different countries (18), 
so the nature of the research itself would mainly emphasize the positivist approach to reach 
generalisability, but indeed to a certain extent. Also, the assessment, is mainly objective 
without relying on personal neither participants’ observations and judgement, simply because 
the examination relates to CEOs, which tends to exaggerate their potency on firms’ outcomes 
(Hambrick et al., 1993). Not to forget that the investigation also includes the assessment of 
national culture, which is considered as an external reality and generalised across a collective 
(Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004), as such, the positivist approach would be more 
appropriate for the present research. 
4.2.2. Theory and Theory Development 
Theory is one of the greatest words in social sciences, which most academics are eager to 
develop and enhance in different disciplines. It may look an easy and straightforward word, 
but theory is a complicated notion that could have several meanings. According to Abend 
(2008), theory, could be used as the general proposition of logical connection between systems 
of general propositions that establish the relationship between two or more variables; or it could 
be an explanation of specific social phenomena; or interpret empirically social phenomena to 
come up with a specific conclusion; or it could relate to how people understand, explain, 
interpret and represent the social world. Notwithstanding these differences in the use of the 
word theory, theory is mainly constituted of four elements: definitions of variables, domain in 
which the theory is applied or applies, set of relationships between variables, and specific 
factual claims or predictions (Bunge, 1967; Hunt, 1991; Reynold, 1971). Thus, theory outlines 
the exact definitions in a domain to provide explanation on how and why relationships between 
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variables are logically tied up so that it gives particularly factual claims. Academics in the 
management discipline argued that a good theory aims to provide clear explanation of why and 
how specific relationships lead to outcomes (Wacker, 1998). Such good theory should also be 
accompanied with important feature or virtues, which are: uniqueness, conservatism, 
generalizability, fecundity, simplicity, consistency, empirical riskiness and abstraction 
(Popper, 1957; Kuhn, 1980). These features should be present in any empirical examination of 
relationships aiming to explain outcomes. In this research, the theory development takes into 
consideration all these features and tried to address each one. The aim in this study is to explain 
how and why managerial discretion vary across countries, using a set of cultural dimensions to 
explain such changes, and most importantly how and why such relationships drives country 
competitiveness. The uniqueness of theory in this research relates to the empirical investigation 
of managerial discretion construct using a new set of antecedents and consequences that 
haven’t been assessed previously in the extant literature. The current theory development of 
the national level of managerial discretion has been limited in its domain to the cultural values 
of countries, namely individualism, uncertainty tolerance and power distance, however, in this 
research the theory of discretion has a superior position as it considers a wider array of cultural 
dimensions by not limiting its domain to cultural values only, but instead looking at practices 
and intra-cultural variation as well. Thus, reaching conservatism.  
Moreover, the domain of the theory presented in this thesis is not also limited in terms 
of the applicability and generalizability of the theory, but instead investigate the theory in 
different cultural contexts, namely 18 countries from 6 different regional clusters, therefore 
broadening the domain of theory application to reach the virtue of generalisability. The internal 
consistency of the theory relates to the adequate explanation of the proposed relationship, 
which has been provided in the preceding chapter but most importantly is the use of cultural 
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practices which adequately represents the incumbent behaviour in a society instead of 
individual preferences which exists in research employing values. Also, the present theory 
considers the fecundity feature, by generating new undiscovered models and hypotheses as 
opposed to previous research. Finally, the empirical investigation employed in this thesis 
strengthen the theory development of managerial discretion and shows its independence from 
time and space, as it has shown similar findings in different places and time by corroborating 
it with Crossland and Hambrick (2011) and Crossland (2008). Therefore, all the characteristics 
of good theory have been matched and followed in this thesis, to further develop the research 
on managerial discretion particularly from the national-level.  
4.2.3. Research Paradigms for Theory Building 
Research paradigms has been frequently used as a notion in the social sciences, however it 
tends to confuse the reader about the actual meaning of research paradigms as it may hold 
several meanings. Burrell and Morgan (1979) were amongst the authors that provided a 
clarified set of research paradigms sharing the same meaning. That is the way a researcher 
examine social phenomena from which specific understandings can be generated and the 
desired explanations endeavoured. Figure 5 provides an illustration of these paradigms that are 
arranged in a way to meet four main conceptual dimensions: radical change, regulator, 
subjectivist and objectivist. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Research Paradigms according to Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
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In the business and management discipline, the radical change dimension relates to the way a 
judgment is being made on organismal affairs and it offers new ways in which these 
organisational affairs could be conducted to change the usual order of things. This dimension 
implements a critical perspective on organisational phenomena. On the other hand, the 
regulation perspective or dimension, seeks to understand the way in which organisational 
phenomena is regulated and provides suggestions on how to improve the current behaviour. 
Subjectivism seeks to view of organisational and social phenomena as a subjective reality 
based on the interpretation of social actors (informants) and the researcher him/herself, but also 
provides very detailed explanation of a specific situation (Remenyi et al., 1998). Such 
paradigm goes hand in hand with the interpretivist research orientation. Finally, the objectivist 
paradigm views social phenomena as existing in an external form to social actors including the 
researcher. It doesn’t consider the judgement of social actors but try to explain and understand 
social phenomena in an objective manner, which goes along with the positivist research 
orientation (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
The choice of the research paradigm in this study is a direct consequence of the research 
orientation and the philosophical position outlined in the preceding sections. The philosophical 
position adopted for this research is not superior to any other research orientation, but is 
legitimised via the identification of the different factors that influence the researcher selection 
(Blaikie, 1993). It is somehow consciously identified due to the philosophical orientation. In 
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this thesis, the objectivist paradigm is a perfect fit with the theory development as it aims to 
explain and understand external realities, namely culture, managerial discretion and national 
competitiveness, where all these variables are independent from individual preferences of 
social actors and reflect the mechanisms in which the link or relationship between these 
variables exists. Also, for the sake of maintain a good theory development, the features of good 
theory should also be reflected in the choice of research paradigms. For instance, if the 
researcher is to adopt a subjectivist research paradigm, the generalizability of the research 
would be limited, which will jeopardize the development of a good theory. Instead, the 
objectivist paradigm would enhance the generalizability of the research findings due to the way 
relationships are being examined that do not involve any subjective interpretation. 
Furthermore, the empirical investigation employed in this research which aims to answer the 
different research questions, uses data that are external to the organisation and are objectively 
measured. This empirical research is mainly classified as the ‘real world’ empirical 
investigation (Wacker, 1998) as it tackles theoretical relationships in the real world. 
4.2.4. Constructs and Variables 
Before identifying and explaining the different constructs and variables used in this research, 
it is important to provide an explanation or distinguish between what researchers mean by 
constructs and variables. Construct in social sciences, is a proposed attribute of something that 
often cannot be measured in a direct way but instead is assessed different indicators or variables 
(Cronbach and Meehl, 1955; Messick, 1995). As noted earlier, this research investigates the 
relationship between inter-cultural, intra-cultural variations and managerial discretion and the 
implications for national competitiveness. Therefore, there are four main constructs used in 
this thesis: inter-cultural variation, intra-cultural variation, managerial discretion and national 
competitiveness. Each of these constructs is represented by different variables and is 
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operationalised using different measurements. The operationalisation techniques are described 
in depth in the below sub-section 4.4.2. Table 3 provides a summary of the constructs and 
variables used in this research. 
Table 3: Summary of Constructs and Variables 
Constructs Variables 
Inter-Cultural Variation Cultural Practices: 
- Institutional Collectivism 
- Uncertainty Avoidance 
- Power Distance 
- Future Orientation 
- Humane Orientation 
- Performance Orientation 
- Gender Egalitarianism 
- Assertiveness 
- Cultural Looseness 
Intra-Cultural Variation Heterogeneity in cultural practices: 
- Institutional Collectivism 
- Uncertainty Avoidance 
- Power Distance 
- Future Orientation 
- Humane Orientation 
- Performance Orientation 
- Gender Egalitarianism 
- Assertiveness 
Cultural Looseness 
Managerial Discretion Freedom in decision making accorded to 
CEOs in a specific country 
National Competitiveness Global Competitiveness Index: 
- Institutions 
- Infrastructure 
- Macroeconomic Environment 
- Health and Primary Education 
- Higher Education and Training 
- Goods Market Efficiency 
- Labour Market Efficiency 
- Financial Market Development 
- Technological Readiness 
- Market Size 
- Business Sophistication 
- Innovation 
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Cultural practices variables are measured through a set of surveys from House et al. 
(2004) illustrating the present behaviour of societal members in each society. House et al 
(2004) used a stratified sample of middle managers employed by 951 separate organisations in 
the three main industries: food processing, financial services and telecommunications services. 
Two version of surveys have been employed, alpha which relates to the cultural values of 
societies and asks questions on how things should be in a society, thus reflecting the individual 
preferences of respondents. The other survey, beta, which has been used in this research, relates 
to the cultural practices and asks questions about how things are now in each society, so here 
respondents are observers of their society. Each cultural practice (i.e. institutional collectivism, 
etc.) is measured via a set of questions that closely relates to people’s behaviour in terms of 
this specific cultural dimension. For further details on the measurement and validity of each 
cultural practice, please refer to Hanges and Dickson (2004). Intra-cultural variation is 
represented by the heterogeneity in behaviour on each cultural practice and is measured via the 
standard deviation of individual responses of middle managers. Detailed explanation of the 
measurement is provided in section 4.4.2.5. Managerial discretion is represented as the freedom 
in decision making accorded to CEOs in a specific country and is measured via a questionnaire 
addressed to senior management consultants. Finally, global competitiveness index as shown 
in Table 3, is represented via a set of variables ranging from institutions to innovation. Figure 
6 provides and explanation of the variables that constitute each of the pillars. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Global Competitiveness Index Framework: Explanation on the Twelve Pillars 
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Source: World Economic Forum, 2017 
As can be seen from the Figure 6, the variables used to represent the global competitiveness of 
countries does not include any cultural measurements of variables, also do not include variables 
that could be used to operationalise managerial discretion. As such, there are no replication of 
variables in any of the constructs used in this research. 
4.3. Research Design 
The design of research refers to the plans and processes that extend the explanation from broad 
assumptions to a more detailed set of methods for collection of data and analysis (Creswell, 
2009). Drawing upon the earlier discussion, the research design implemented in this research 
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follows the quantitative assessment of the different conceptual (constructs) elements that are 
investigated. The objective of the quantitative assessment I to explain, test and validate the 
theoretical hypotheses proposed by the researcher in the aim of exhibiting the relationship 
between the variables (Bryman and Bell, 2011).  
In relation to this PhD in general, the author is investigating the manifestations and 
national-level antecedents of CEO discretion in several countries. This research question has 
been formulated after a critical assessment of the available literature. It stems from the research 
problem identified and includes an enquiry into what the national-level antecedents of 
discretion are from an institutional perspective, how much these impact CEO discretion, and 
the contexts in which this phenomenon occurs. Therefore, to best represent the ‘how much’ 
part of the question, the quantitative research approach would be more appropriate.  
The qualitative paradigm would significantly help in answering the overall research 
question but cannot quantify the effect of the inter-, and intra-cultural variations on managerial 
discretion, which is crucial in this stream of research (discretion research) (Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011). Additionally, and as will be seen in more detail in the sub-sections below, 
the literature on discretion has developed several approaches to operationalising CEOs 
discretion. However, the most direct methods were either through quantitative assessment 
using surveys (e.g. Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995; Crossland and Hambrick, 2011) or via 
the combination of both the quantitative and qualitative paradigms using interviews and 
surveys (e.g. Carpenter and Golden, 1997). The qualitative approach involves a subject 
assessment of discretion that would significantly yield biased responses, particularly because 
CEOs might exaggerate their latitude of actions (Hambrick et al., 1993). Thus, the author is 
adopting the quantitative research approach using surveys to answer the research question. 
Surveys are important data-collection techniques that are best used in conjunction with the 
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‘how much’ questions (Bryman and Cramer, 1994), especially if using scales (in this case a 1 
to 7 Likert scale). More importantly to add is the assessment of informal institutions. In cross-
cultural literature, most studies have been examined using the quantitative (surveys) approach. 
In fact, the development of those surveys’ questions was initially sought using a qualitative 
technique (e.g. Hofstede, 1980; House et al., 2004); however, the operationalisation of cultural 
norms was then numerically assessed to give specific scores to each country. Hence, as this 
PhD uses cultural dimensions to assess their impact on discretion, it is more appropriate to 
employ the quantitative technique.  
Data accessibility must also be considered. This research involves looking at a member 
of top management teams, CEOs. Apart from the bias associated with directly collecting data 
from these individuals, it is often challenging gaining access to a useful number of CEOs to 
interview, especially within the wide context of this study (18 countries). Due to their time 
constraints, the geographical spread of this research, and other factors, it would be very difficult 
to get access to a sufficient sample. It is also worth noting that even with the use of surveys, 
the author has faced several challenges, including acquiring a sufficient and reliable number of 
panellists to participate in the study. Luckily, after several months of data collection and several 
email waves (reminders), the candidate could get enough participants and completed responses. 
It is also worth mentioning that the key enquiry of this research is to investigate the impact of 
national institutions on the discretion level of CEOs of public firms headquartered in several 
countries. Discretion is highly dependent on the context in which it is studied (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987). The discretion of CEOs of private firms is distinct from those of public 
firms, simply because of the various organisational aspects related to each firm type. Therefore, 
the nature of firms involved in this research also has played a role in influencing the 
implementation of the quantitative research approach. 
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4.3.1. Approaches to Research Design 
There are several research design approaches that could employed in business and management 
research, namely: quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods. Most research in the strategic 
management discipline and strategic leadership literature employs the quantitative paradigm 
with few studies using mixed methods. This is according to the literature review presented in 
chapter 2, and according to the publication in top academic journals. In this research and as 
previously explained, the author is employing the quantitative research design to be in-line 
with the extant research and due to the topic being investigated. The below section explains 
the reasons behind this approach from two different view, based on the research objectives and 
the time frame employed. 
4.3.1.1. Research Design Approach based on Aims and Objectives 
As previously mentioned, the adoption of the quantitative research design is derived from the 
philosophical position of the researcher, but also redirects to the main research questions and 
the objectives of this thesis. The thesis aims to answer the ‘what’ and ‘why’ in terms of the 
antecedents and consequences of managerial discretion and its role at the national-level. The 
quantitative research in such case is more reasonable as it looks for facts that can be usefully 
thought when trying to provide answers for the ‘what’ questions (Barnham, 2015). As such, 
the author follows the deductive reasoning to represent the most common view of the 
relationship between the theory and research. Here, the researcher knows about a specific 
domain and theoretical assumptions and try to deduce hypotheses, which are subject to 
empirical analysis aiming to provide further development of the theory and research (Bryman 
and Bell, 2011). The process of the research based on the research questions and objectives 
follow the below deductive structure shown in figure 7. 
Figure 7: The Deduction Research Process 
Chapter 4 – Research Design and Methodology 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
172 
 
The process may well seem to be straight forward; however, it is important to note that there 
may be instances where the researcher view on the theory may change and as such the research 
design and analysis. For instance, if new theoretical ideas or research findings have emerged 
during the process in which the research is carrying out his/her investigation, or it may be that 
the relevance of the data for the theory may become apparent after collecting the data, or the 
data may not provide good fit for the theory and research hypotheses. For that reason, the 
researcher has regularly kept an eye on the advances of the literature and any new publication 
that tackle the concept of managerial discretion. Additionally, the author monitored the 
research development of the field of upper echelon in general to see if new theoretical insights 
have emerged which could alter the adopted research design in this thesis. Finally, and as 
mentioned earlier, the research strategy is in-line with mainstream research in the discretion 
and upper echelon literatures and the way it was built complements extant research, so the fear 
of not being able to fit data to the research hypotheses and theory was not a concern. 
4.3.1.2. Research Design Approach Based on Time Frame Employed 
Theory
Hypotheses
Data 
Collection
Findings
Hypotheses 
confirmation 
or rejection
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The research design should also complement the time frame employed to make sure that 
findings are generalisable and most importantly are applicable in different times, which 
ultimately contribute to good theory development. Recall, that one of the key elements or 
feature of a good theory is abstraction, meaning being independent of time and space (Wacker, 
1998). The time frame employed in this research is validated by previous research and 
complement such research stream. Crossland and Hambrick (2011), Crossland and Chen 
(2013), Hambrick and Quigley (2015), and many others have used 10 years as their time frame 
of study and carried out an empirical quantitative research to further develop the concept of 
managerial discretion. Similarly, and as will be seen in the coming sections, the time frame 
employed in this thesis is also 10 years. It is important to mention that despite being in-line 
with the extant research in the discretion literature, the time frame in some of the empirical 
investigations is somehow of minimal implication. As shown in the below section 4.4.2.3. data 
gathered to measure managerial discretion showed strong correlation with Crossland (2008) 
and Crossland and Hambrick (2011) data which both were collected around a decade ago. 
Moreover, the construct of culture (inter- or intra) are both stable and independent of time, 
simply because culture is a construct that does not change overnight and takes decades to 
experience some slight changes. To prove this point further, Beugelsdijk et al. (2015) recently 
showed that culture change is relatively stable overtime and that cultural distance is kept the 
same even after 60 years of replicating the same analysis. Therefore, providing further support 
for the use of quantitative research design and the employed time frame. 
 
4.3.2. Primary Vs. Secondary Sources of Data 
Primary data are thought to be data collected by the researcher him/herself, whereas secondary 
data are those collected by other professional sources (maybe other researchers) where the main 
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researcher will probably have not been involved in the collection (Dale et al., 1988; Bryman 
and Bell, 2011). Another distinction between primary and secondary data, is the accessibility 
of these data. If data are being published regularly or are published in trusted sources, like 
articles and books, and are available to use by any researcher, these will be considered as 
secondary. On the other hand, data that are used in other studies but have not been published 
and are given to a researcher to be used in their study, then it will be considered as primary. 
The author used a mixture of primary and secondary data. Primary data are collected via a 
survey questionnaire of senior management consultants to illustrate the score of managerial 
discretion per country. Data on intra-cultural variation are considered as secondary data 
published by House and colleagues (2004). These secondary data relate the scores of cultural 
practices in each of the studied countries. Data on intra-cultural variation are primary as these 
are not being published by any researcher before and were sought to be used in this thesis only 
with the consent of the original author. Finally, data on global competitiveness index are 
secondary as these are published by the World Economic Forum on a yearly basis. This is not 
a surprise for research in the strategic management discipline particularly discretion literature, 
as most studies tend to use a mixture of both primary and secondary data (Wangrow et al., 
2015). Detailed explanation on the operationalisation techniques of each variable is available 
in section 4.4.2. 
4.3.3. Objective Vs. Subjective Measures of Data 
Subjectivity or objectivity of data relates to the philosophical position of the researcher, where 
mainly positivist researchers tend to use objective measures as opposed to interpretivist who 
uses subjective measures. The subjectivity of data may be associated with the researcher and 
respondents’ views but also can be related to the respondents view only (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). For example, the number 1 has a clear mathematical representation that does not change 
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from one researcher to another, in such scenario, the data become objective. Whereas, the word 
data may well be interpreted differently by different people, in this case it becomes subjective. 
Objective data are not only present in quantitative research and subjective data are not 
presented in qualitative research as well. In this research, the author mainly uses objective 
measures. Starting with managerial discretion, one might argue that because the researcher is 
asking for the individual opinion of the senior consultant and answers provided are closely 
related to the respondent perception, the data on managerial discretion are subjective. However, 
Bryman and Bell (2011) argue that objective data uses the qualitative reality to convert it to 
quantitative simulation, whereby the number defines the external reality in a mathematical 
manner, meaning in numbers. Here, respondents are used as observers of the external world, 
particularly the freedom of decision making that is accorded to executives, as such their 
answers is based on objective reality without involving their individual preferences or 
perceptions. Moreover, measures of cultural practices are also considered as objective 
measures, as here respondents are used as observers of their society and particularly the 
behaviour in their society on each cultural dimension (Javidan et al., 2006). There is no 
subjectivity involved in their rating, they only report what is currently happening in their 
cultural environment. Also, the measures of national competitiveness are also considered 
objective as these reports numerical data on various outputs, such as institutions, economic 
development, etc. Pillars included in the measurement of the global competitiveness index are 
all analysed and interpreted the same by different individuals. After all, we are better observers 
of others than ourselves (Hofstede, 2001) and as such when respondents act in this way they 
will provide objective measures of data. 
4.3.4. Scales of Measure 
Chapter 4 – Research Design and Methodology 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
176 
Researcher carrying out a survey as a measurement instrument, should make sure to choose the 
correct scale for the measurement of the variable. Likert (1932) is most used scale for survey 
instruments in various disciplines particularly business and management. Originally, the scale 
is 5 points, however other scholars have used a semantic differential such as 7 points (e.g. 
Osgood et al., 1957), 11 points (e.g. Thurstone, 1928) and some have even used 101 points 
such as the American National Election Survey (Miller, 1982). Robinson and colleagues (1999) 
have provided a catalogue of scales that used from 2 points to 10 points in their survey 
instrument. Therefore, it appears that there is no standard for the number of the points used in 
a survey scale and is mainly related to either common practices or most importantly to the 
theoretical assumption for the construct being measured. Krosnick and Presser (2010) carried 
a literature review and empirical analysis on all the different scales used and concluded that 
the most optimal choice is to use 7-point scale as this would increase reliability, validity and 
discern natural scale differentiation. Moreover, Krosnick and Presser (2010) argued that the 
use of a specific scale should be in-line with a stream of research and should be corroborate 
extant research. A direct point supporting the use of the 7-point scale that is adopted in this 
thesis. Along with enhancing reliability and validity of the scale, the author has used the 7-
point scale to be in-line with the extant literature particularly with Crossland and Hambrick 
(2011). 
4.4. Survey Design 
Research that uses survey as the main measurement instrument is very important for the 
contribution to the advancement in theory development (Babbie, 1990). Scholars have 
distinguished between different type of survey research, mainly they argued of three different 
types: exploratory, confirmatory and descriptive (Filippini, 1997; Malhorta and Grover, 1998; 
Pinsonneault and Kraemer, 1993). Exploratory surveys are used when researchers are 
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interested in preliminary insights to a specific topic as it helps to provide the basis for a more 
in-depth investigation. Confirmatory or theory testing surveys are used when knowledge on a 
phenomenon or topic has already been articulated in a theoretical fashion. In this case, surveys 
are employed to gather data with specific purpose or aim to test the adequacy of the proposed 
theoretical concepts or relationships. On the other hand, descriptive surveys are aimed to 
understand the relevance and description of a specific phenomenon. It doesn’t aim for theory 
development, instead it is used for descriptive purposes such as describing how a particularly 
phenomenon is distributed in each population (Wacker, 1998). 
In this research, the survey instrument used to measure managerial discretion belongs 
to the confirmatory type whereby the author is aiming to test the proposed theoretical 
hypotheses. The author articulated a theoretical framework using well defined concepts, such 
as culture, theories, models and propositions with the specific aim to test the adequacy of the 
proposed relationships between the different variables. Despite adopting the survey design of 
Crossland and Hambrick (2011), the author checked that the employed design is in-line with 
the broader survey research design and the confirmatory type of surveys. Following Sekaran 
(1992) and Wacker (1998), the researcher first provided a clear identification of definition of 
the actual construct of managerial discretion and used an example to make sure that the 
language used in the survey is somewhat loose, avoiding any technical language. Second, the 
researcher presented the proposition and discussed the role of the constructs, this is shown in 
the objective of the study and in the description of the research project. Here the author 
highlighted that discretion is used as a dependent construct when investigation its relationship 
with culture and as an independent construct when assessing its implication on national 
competitiveness. Finally, the author has set the boundaries of the conditions under which the 
relationships between culture, discretion and national competitiveness holds using references 
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of other constructs as control variables, also by clearly stating to respondents that the researcher 
is only interested in the national-level of managerial discretion and not the individual, 
organisation or industry levels. 
4.4.1. Email Invitation(s) to the Survey 
Apart from the recruitment email or email invitation, three email reminders have been sent on 
a timely manner to the respondents to complete the online questionnaire. The author used this 
strategy to follow up on non-respondent to make sure that responses are provided in a timely 
fashion as it is argued that late respondents are like non-respondents (Linder et al., 2001). For 
that reason, the author has put a time frame for the data collection and any responses received 
after the deadline were considered as inappropriate. Before judging the late response, the author 
has considered all the late responses, which were mainly 7 and check the individual 
questionnaire received by these respondents. It is quite interesting, that all the 7 respondents 
provided individually the same rating to all countries, for example late respondent 1 provide 
the rate of 5 for all the 18 countries under investigation, late respondent 2 provided the score 
of 6 to all the 18 countries. This is indeed inappropriate and their answers are invalid and were 
dropped from the final sample. 
4.4.1.1. Pre-notification and Email Content 
After screening the expert panel that should be used in this research, sent an email to each of 
the respondent as a recruitment of invitation letter to seek their participation in the research 
project. The content of the invitation letter as seen in figure 8, request the participation of the 
senior consultant and give a brief overview of the research project along with few details on 
the researcher and the actual PhD program undertaken by the researcher. Additionally, the 
invitation letter includes a copy of the survey link, so the respondent can check before granting 
his/her participation. Once the respondent agrees to participate he/she needs to provide the 
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researcher with their consent (the form is shown in figure 9) and then would be able to complete 
the questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Invitation Letter 
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Figure 9: Online Consent Form 
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4.4.1.2. Personalisation 
Each email sent to respondents is being personalised and addressed solely to them using their 
first and last name. This was done using a mail merge feature from Gmail, which allows senders 
to send emails with the same content to a list of respondents but personally addressed to each 
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recipient. Therefore, the researcher used this feature on all correspondences with the 
respondents, that includes: invitation letter, consent form, and the survey itself.  
4.4.2. Measuring Instrument 
As previously explained the researcher used survey as the main measuring instrument for the 
data collection related to the construct of managerial discretion. The survey questions are based 
on Crossland and Hambrick (2011), which have used the same measuring instrument and 
questionnaire to derive managerial discretion scores for their sampled countries from 
international fund managers. Details of the questionnaire is provided in the below sub-sections. 
4.4.2.1. Length and Structure of the Questionnaire 
The survey is based on one question which relates to the degree of managerial discretion that 
is accorded to CEOs in a particularly country. Senior consultants are first given an explanation 
on managerial discretion based on Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) original definition. Then 
a short scenario is presented to give a practical meaning for the concept of discretion, to make 
sure that all respondents are getting the same perspective of managerial discretion. Afterwards, 
a list of the sampled countries is provided and respondents are kindly asked to rate the 
discretion of CEOs on a 7 point Likert type scale. Figure 10, illustrates the survey 
questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Managerial Discretion Questionnaire 
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4.4.2.2. Measurements Used in this Study on Managerial Discretion 
Because managerial discretion is an intangible concept and has a multi-dimensional foundation 
(Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995), determining its level consists of examining various proxy 
measures (please refer to Boyd and Gove, 2006, and/or Wangrow et al., 2015). In the empirical 
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studies carried out so far, scholars have looked at theorised antecedents (Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011) of discretion such as organisational-level antecedents, including sales, size, 
R&D intensity, company structure, advertising intensity, volatility and firms’ strategic 
orientation (e.g. Roth and O’Donnell, 1996; Rajagopalan, 1997; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; 
Boyd and Salamin, 2001; Kim, 2013; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012). Others have used industry 
(or task-environment) level variables, including regulatory conditions, market growth, product 
differentiability, attentional homogeneity, industry capital intensity, demand instability, etc. 
(e.g. Magnan and St-Onge, 1997; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Datta and Rajagopalan, 
1998; Finkelstein, 2009; Hambrick and Quigley, 2014; Keegan and Kabanoff, 2008; Peteraf 
and Reed, 2007). Another cluster of researchers employed individual executives’ 
characteristics, measuring variables such as locus of control, perception, commitment to the 
status quo, tenure, age, education, risk-taking behaviour, etc. (e.g. McClelland et al., 2010; 
Miller et al., 1982; Roth, 1992). These measures represent an indirect approach of assessing 
the degree of managerial discretion within a certain environment. These studies have 
preserved/treated discretion as a “black box”, whereby it was associated with various 
individual, organisational and/or industry specific variables. As Wangrow et al. (2015: 124) 
suggested, “future research could pilot…industry experts, academics and managers to assess 
the level of discretion in firms…and nations”. This call represents the need to look at discretion 
directly without relying on the antecedents and proxy measures originally proposed by 
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987).  
In an approach to assess discretion directly, Carpenter and Golden (1997) measured 
discretion by asking executives about their perception of their own level of discretion. Despite 
employing a direct measure, Carpenter and Golden (1997) did not take into consideration 
respondents’ bias. Executives tend to exaggerate their potency or impact on firms’ outcomes, 
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hence they will discuss a greater latitude of actions available to them than may be the case 
(Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995). As Hambrick et al. (1993: 414) noted, “suggesting to a 
group of executives that they may not have much leeway over their organisations is a sure way 
to get them upset”. Accordingly, adopting such a methodological approach would be 
inappropriate. 
Interestingly, some progress took place where a group of scholars started to measure 
discretion directly in a more innovative manner. Using expert panel ratings, Hambrick and 
Abrahamson (1995) were the first to introduce this direct measurement, which they employed 
in a later study (Abrahamson and Hambrick, 1997). Here, discretion degrees/scores were 
gathered from two groups of experts: scholars (14 academics) and security analysts (17 
analysts) (Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995; Abrahamson and Hambrick, 1997). Crossland 
and Hambrick (2011) departed from the same position where they measured national discretion 
level using two expert panels: academics and fund managers. More recently, Crossland and 
Chen (2013) also used the country discretion scores generated by Crossland and Hambrick 
(2011) in their study to investigate the role of discretion in assessing CEOs accountability for 
poor performance in various countries. Therefore, an expert panel, if appropriately selected, 
provides consistent and valid assessments of organisational phenomena including business 
strategies (Snow and Hambrick, 1980), strategic decision procedures (Fredrickson, 1986), etc. 
Notwithstanding its probable perceptual bias, an expert panel possesses the advantage of rating 
discretion itself directly and more closely than other measures. Additionally, the use of an 
expert panel provides scores with a minimum bias compared to CEOs for instance, and these 
panellists possess better knowledge in multiple contexts due to their exposure to several 
environments, and most importantly the relative objectivity of their answers (Hambrick and 
Abrahamson, 1995; Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). Using other theorised antecedents of 
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discretion is not relevant in this research. The aim is to assess the relationship between culture 
(cultural practices previously introduced) and discretion at the national level. If the author used, 
for instance, power distance as a proxy measure indicating greater discretion, the measurement 
does not reflect discretion itself, hence, there is a need to have separate measures – one for 
discretion and another for cultural dimensions. Accordingly, by following this approach and in 
the aim of reaching consistency in the measurements (Boyd and Gove, 2006), the author sought 
national discretion scores from an expert panel consisting of senior management consultants. 
4.4.2.3. Measurements Used in this Study on Inter-Cultural Variation 
Within cross-cultural studies, several models have been developed to illustrate differences in 
culture across countries (such as: Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987; Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 
2004). In the strategic management field and particularly managerial discretion, previous 
authors have mostly employed Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) model. For instance, Crossland and 
Hambrick (2007, 2011), the only work so far tackling discretion at the national level, used 
Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) scores of national values to operationalise cultural differences across 
countries. Hofstede (2001) and the GLOBE by House et al. (2004) are both highly valued 
cultural models (Shi and Wang, 2011). Although Hofstede (2001) is the most widely cited 
model in cross-cultural research (Kirkman et al., 2006), GLOBE has been characterised as the 
‘most sophisticated’ cross-cultural project undertaken in the field of international business 
(Leung, 2006). In this PhD, the author is seeking to get cultural ratings for the countries studied, 
thus it is crucial to decide on which cross-cultural model to employ. To justify the choice, it is 
essential to review some of the discussion presented in cross-cultural and international business 
literatures.  
An enormous debate took place in the 37th volume of the Journal of International 
Business Studies (2006) concerning cross-cultural research; it centred on the differences 
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between the GLOBE and Hofstede models. In his critique of GLOBE, Hofstede (2006) referred 
to the differences between his and House et al.’s (2004) model. He argued that fundamental 
transformations existed particularly in relation to the measurement, data collection and research 
designs. He claimed that GLOBE did not exactly measure societies’ culture but instead 
operationalised individual preferences. A counter-argument was raised by Javidan et al. (2006) 
in the same volume, quarrelling that the GLOBE model is theory-driven, showing its 
convergent-emergent nature and that Hofstede’s model is not action-driven research simply 
because it does not take into consideration the processes or steps used in an action research. 
Further, they assert that Hofstede’s isomorphic scales do not capture the national culture; 
surveying IBM, a sole organisation, yielded different phenomena from measuring national 
culture. Additional critiques of Hofstede showed that his model suffers from homogenous 
sampling, time relevancy, corporate culture impact and factor structure problems (Orr and 
Hauser, 2008). Hofstede (2006) condemned GLOBE of using two measures (practices and 
values) to identify national culture, insisting that the cultural values in his own model were a 
more accurate reflection of aggregate national culture. However, self-rating of values does not 
reflect national culture characteristics (Fischer, 2006); such an approach is accompanied with 
several problems (e.g. Bierbrauer et al., 1994; Oyserman et al., 2002) and yield ambiguous 
cross-cultural comparisons (Heine et al. 2001).  
An alternative to that is asking individuals to rate behaviours within a certain culture 
(e.g. Peterson and Fischer, 2004). By doing that, individuals would be able to report on 
descriptive norms (Cialdini and Trost, 1998) related to a society (Ehrhart and Naumann, 2004). 
These two methods differ significantly in their measurement of national culture. For instance, 
Terracciano et al. (2005) examined the difference between self- and national character by 
showing that both methods of ratings possess weak correlation (r=0.04). Similarly, GLOBE’s 
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(2004) overall scores of values and practices presented weak correlation (r=-0.26). Thus, at 
best there is a weak relationship between self-ratings and ratings based on asking individuals 
about the common behaviours/norms in their societies. The former measure eliminates the 
objectivity element associated with assessing cultures (Fischer, 2006). In that sense, people 
would subjectively rate cultural dimensions, taking their own individual preferences into 
consideration. On the other hand, if individuals rate how their collective behave, this yields 
objective scores excluding personal inclinations. Such an approach allows them to become 
observers of their society. Hofstede (1980, 2001) is an example of cross-cultural studies that 
adopt the former method (self-rating), denoting that cultural values determine practices. This 
view is based on two assumptions: ecological values assumption, which suggests that knowing 
individual values is sufficient to know the culture, and the onion assumption, which means that 
by knowing cultural values, we would predict what happens in that culture (Javidan et al., 
2006). In this vein, GLOBE took a different standpoint where it rejected the first assumption 
by using respondents as informants to report on their society’s culture (the latter method 
presented above) and tested the second assumption by comparing the correlation between self-
rating (values) and respondents’ assessment of their societies (practices). The negative 
correlation between GLOBE values and practices empirically contradict the onion assumption 
by showing that people in a certain society hold views on what ‘should be’ based on what they 
really observe in action through cultural practices. This negative correlation was later explained 
using microeconomic insights, associating it with the law of diminishing marginal utility 
(Maseland and van Hoorn, 2009). Maseland and van Hoorn (2009) argued that the value 
surveys lack a fundamental factor that is helpful to differentiate between the marginal 
preferences of individuals within a culture (currently what value surveys measure) and the 
underlying values or the relative weight of values people attach to certain objectives. In a 
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cultural sense, having more of a certain cultural dimension (practices) would yield less 
preference to asking more of it (values). Thus, measuring marginal preferences (self-rating) 
“fail[s] to measure cultural values” (Maseland and van Hoorn, 2009: 528). In contrast, Brewer 
and Venaik (2010) analysed all 38 GLOBE scales and identified that the logic of marginal 
utility would not be compatible with all the GLOBE scales but only a few. Although they agree 
with Maseland and van Hoorn (2009) that cultural values measures through self-ratings may 
not accurately reflect cultural values, they found that the relationship between practices and 
values is more complex than simply explaining it through the lens of marginal utility, and in 
fact they assure that GLOBE values measures do not reflect marginal preferences (Brewer and 
Venaik, 2010). 
Following Venaik and Brewer’s (2010) case of uncertainty avoidance, in which various 
motivational factors played a role in impacting respondents ratings, Brewer and Venaik (2010) 
advised that there should be an individual analysis of each cultural dimension to explore the 
reason behind these negative correlations. Analogously, Taras et al. (2010) agree with this 
logic of individual interpretation and affirm that the law of diminishing marginal utility 
explains the negative relationship but is not the sole explanation. To add further to the debate, 
Taras et al. (2010) argued that buyer’s remorse, the degree of value internalization, vocal 
minority, anchoring and priming, referent shift, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, the use of 
correlation coefficients, response bias, analysis level and potential moderators all together play 
a role in shaping the differences between values and practices. Thus, they should be considered 
as useful factors to explain the negative relationship between these two. Regardless of these 
propositions, values or self-rating measurements showed debatable and controversial findings 
as opposed to cultural practices, which seem to be a more useful operationalisation of societal 
culture particularly due to respondents’ (middle managers) ability to provide valuable 
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responses. Accordingly, the implementation of value-based survey questions generally 
provokes marginal preferences instead of underlying values, therefore using them to measure 
culture would elicit problematic assessments (Maseland and van Hoorn, 2009). The construct 
of GLOBE practices was found to be a better identifier of national character stereotypes and 
not an indicator of individuals’ personality traits (McCrae et al., 2008). Put simply, GLOBE 
practices reflect the shared beliefs in a society. Additionally, the referent measures of cultural 
models provide a more appropriate construct for measuring societal outcomes (Klein and 
Kozlowski, 2000; Fischer, 2006; Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010). As discretion at the national 
level illustrates a societal outcome, therefore, practices would be a better construct to employ 
that shows the national instead of societal members’ characteristics of various cultural 
dimensions.  
Furthermore, in the aim of supporting the use of GLOBE practice dimensions, the 
author has sought additional arguments from the cross-cultural and international business 
literatures. For instance, Venaik and Brewer (2010) identified the differences between GLOBE 
and Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance (UA) scales. They argued that GLOBE’s UA practices 
capture rule-orientation practices of UA due to their significant positive relationship with 
World Governance Indicators. On the other hand, Hofstede’s UA scale measures the stress 
constituent of UA due to its significant positive relationship with national stress level 
indicators. Venaik and Brewer (2010) differentiate between GLOBE UA practices and values, 
in the sense that the values dimension captures people’s aspirations as opposed to the reality 
captured in practices. While higher rule-oriented uncertainty avoidance is accompanied with 
greater constraints, executives would not be able to implement radical actions. In other words, 
societies with low uncertainty avoidance provide executives with a greater array of actions that 
are not considered objectionable (Crossland and Hambrick, 2007). Hence, the rule-orientation 
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measurement of UA would appropriately reflect the range of accepted actions rather than 
emphasising the importance of stress as an indicator of constraints on executives’ actions. 
Moreover, Brewer and Venaik (2011), in a later study, showed the misrepresentation 
of Hofstede’s individualism and collectivism dimensions. Through content analysis, Brewer 
and Venaik (2011) argued that Hofstede’s individualism is more related to the self-orientation 
dimension; on the other hand, the collectivism scale does not operationalise the collectivity of 
a society but rather illustrates its work-related values (Oyserman et al., 2002; Gelfand et al., 
2004; Brewer and Venaik, 2011). Further, GLOBE’s in-group collectivism has been tested to 
reflect family collectivism instead of societal collectivism (Brewer and Venaik, 2011). 
However, institutional collectivism, as measured in the GLOBE scales, is considered as being 
a more accurate reflection of the operationalisation of the individualism and collectivism 
cultural dimensions (Brewer and Venaik, 2011). Therefore, further support is provided to the 
use of GLOBE’s institutional collectivism scores compared to the Hofstede dimension. 
Another example by Venaik et al. (2013) showed the drawback of Hofstede’s cultural 
dimension, particularly long-term orientation (LTO), which is like the future orientation (FO) 
scale used in the GLOBE model. Venaik et al. (2013) argued through content analysis of the 
items’ scale that Hofstede’s LTO is associated with conflicting items that are reliant on the past 
and tackles items (e.g. ordering, sense of shame, etc.) that do not operationalise time 
orientation. GLOBE’s FO practices focus on the tangible future aspect of time and planning in 
relation to the present, which is conceptually consistent and unidimensional (Venaik et al., 
2013). Since the conditions impacting discretion change over time (Crossland and Hambrick, 
2011), measuring the impact of future preferences/aspirations using GLOBE values would not 
yield an accurate effect on discretion. This provides additional support for the use of GLOBE 
practices scales to assess the impact of national culture on executives’ discretion. 
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Several other differences can be seen between these two models in terms of 
methodology, data collection, participants, cultural dimensions, country coverage, etc. House 
et al. (2004) developed two measures of cultural norms labelled ‘As Is’, relating to cultural 
practices, ‘Should Be’, which refers to individual cultural values, as opposed to Hofstede’s 
model, which only includes cultural values. Furthermore, Hofstede’s model has been 
constructed using one international corporation (IBM) and by the effort of a sole researcher as 
opposed to 172 researchers creating the GLOBE model seeking cultural scores from middle 
managers working in several domestic firms belonging to different industries (food, finance 
and telecommunication). Thus, GLOBE’s stratified sampling has helped in limiting the 
corporate and industry impact on participants’ responses. 
Consequently, and due to the above-presented differences, researchers are free to 
choose which model to employ according to their research needs. In terms of this thesis, the 
author employed the GLOBE (House et al., 2004) cultural model instead of Hofstede’s (2001) 
due to the above-explained and the following reasons: first, the author’s aim is to discover new 
national-level antecedents of managerial discretion. Using Hofstede (2001) would not provide 
any additional informal institutions dimensions’ even if the author chose to employ Hofstede’s 
most recent work (Hofstede et al., 2010). Instead, GLOBE, which measures six additional 
cultural dimensions, would provide rich national-level antecedents that could be tested in 
relation to discretion. Second, the informal institution perspective in which discretion has been 
investigated; there is a focus on how stakeholders assess whether executives’ actions are 
objectionable. In this sense, it looked at the array of executives’ actions that fall within the zone 
of acceptable practices; studying individual values would therefore not be appropriate due to 
its intangible nature (House et al., 2004). Values are personal perceptions or preferences for 
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certain behaviour; however, practices (tangible) emanate what really is the behaviour (what is 
really happening) in a culture.  
Third, economic developments of countries along with modernisation predicted that 
cultural values would be affected (Beugelsdijk et al., 2015). Even Hofstede (2001) argued that 
economic wealth has a large impact on cultural dimensions; he gave the example of increased 
wealth, which makes society more individualistic. Smith (2002) was cautioned about such 
propositions by considering national wealth to be an integral part of culture instead of being an 
extraneous variable. Empirically tested, this relationship between cultural dimensions and 
economic indicators has shown an intertwined and non-unidirectional relationship depending 
on the individualities of each dimension (House et al., 2004). Hence, using Hofstede’s scores 
collected during the 1970s would not accurately reflect the cultural status of, for example, the 
1996-2005 period, which is examined in Crossland and Hambrick (2011) nor a more recent 
era, such as 2005 to 2014, which is the time-frame of this PhD. Culture within a society might 
change over time, but the proportion of change is very slow and low. However, as put by 
modernisation theorists (e.g. Inglehart, 1997) economic development goes together with 
variations in values, norms and beliefs, thus cultures particularly values do change with time. 
Although such variation is dependent on time, the cultural differences across countries is 
somewhat stable (Beugelsdijk et al., 2015), therefore using Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) scores as 
they are would provide inaccurate measures of the current somehow developed culture. Fourth, 
GLOBE’s country practices showed strong correlation with Hofstede’s (2001) scores as 
opposed to the GLOBE values. For instance, GLOBE’s power distance practice scores have 
.57 correlations with Hofstede’s power distance rate as opposed to GLOBE’s power distance 
value, which only provides a .03 correlation score.  
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Hence, by using House et al.’s (2004) practices, the author would also be in line with 
other cross-cultural and organisational studies that shifted from using Hofstede (e.g. Rabl et 
al., 2014) and allow for basic comparison with Crossland and Hambrick’s (2011) findings. 
Lastly, Hofstede in his own words indirectly supported the logic of using the GLOBE practices 
when he stated: “we are all better observers of others than of ourselves” (Hofstede, 2001: 9), 
and “GLOBE’s ‘as is’ measure corresponded with what I called a shared value” (Hofstede, 
2006: 887). As such, the GLOBE practices represent a more accurate and valid measure for 
assessing national culture in the context of discretion. Although GLOBE is a more recent cross-
cultural model, it has been less criticised in the literature as opposed to Hofstede due to the low 
presence of controversial issues (Venaik and Brewer, 2010). Accordingly, due to the above-
presented extensive review of the relevant arguments, and by following recent management 
literature (Basuil and Datta, 2015), the author has employed GLOBE’s practice scales to 
operationalise the cultural dimensions of the countries under investigation. 
Cultural-Looseness Measurement 
The cultural tightness-looseness construct can be dated back to Pelto’s (1968) study, in which 
he showed the difference between traditional tight and loose societies. Pelto (1968) relied on 
several measures to operationalise tight and loose societies, including: corporate ownership, 
legitimate use of force, degree of political control and theocracy. Lomax and Berkowitz (1972) 
later used communication patterns, cohesiveness and orderliness to try to classify the degree 
of tightness for gardening and hunting societies. Similarly, Barry et al. (1959) looked at food 
supply to justify their proposition that agriculture societies rely heavily on rules and routines, 
which make them more lenient towards being tight. 
However, recent research has departed from assessing the antecedents of tight/loose 
societies towards establishing direct measures of this construct. In this vein, Gelfand et al. 
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(2011), using a survey instrument, asked a sample of respondents from 33 nations about their 
degree of agreement with some situational statements. By aggregating individual responses to 
the macro-level (country), Gelfand et al. (2011) could provide tightness scores for the studied 
countries by using a six-item scale. The items on the cultural tightness-looseness scale assessed 
the extent of the clarity and the number of social norms, overall compliance of societal 
members with social norms and the degree of tolerance for deviant behaviour (norm violation) 
(Gelfand et al., 2011). An example of the items used in their original questionnaire include: 
“In this country, there are clear expectations for how people should act in most situations”, and 
“there are many social norms that people are supposed to abide by in this country”. Analysis 
demonstrated that the scale used had metric equivalence across all societies, with reliability 
value of 0.85, rwg (j) of 0.85, intra-class correlation coefficients ICC (1) and (2) are 0.13 and 
0.97 respectively. This shows the trustworthiness and validity of their cultural construct of 
tightness-looseness. Therefore, and in line with previous studies (e.g. Crossland and Hambrick, 
2011; Aktas et al., 2016), the author used Gelfand et al. (2011) scale to operationalise cultural 
looseness. 
Control Variables 
Earlier work in the discretion literature particularly from the national-level (Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011) have explored a variety of national variables that directly affect the degree of 
managerial discretion available to CEOs headquartered in each country. These variables have 
been covered extensively in the literature chapter and the theoretical background section of this 
thesis. As can be gleaned from these preceding sections, from the informal institutions part, 
cultural values – particularly individualism, uncertainty tolerance and power distance – were 
directly related to managerial discretion. Also, formal institutions have shown a significant 
effect on managerial discretion; these variables were: ownership structure (concentrated versus 
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dispersed), legal origin (common versus civil) and employer flexibility. Therefore, the author 
has controlled for these variables when running the regression models. 
Societal values of several cultural dimensions – institutional collectivism (opposite to 
individualism), uncertainty avoidance (opposite to uncertainty tolerance), power distance, 
future-, humane-, and performance orientations along with gender egalitarianism and 
assertiveness – have been used as control variables, representing the effect of informal 
institutions. These were operationalised using House et al.’s (2004) cultural values scores. 
Ownership dispersion and legal origin have been operationalised using data from La 
Porta et al. (1999). For the first variable, La Porta et al. (1999) calculated the proportion of 
companies that were widely held across several countries. To be considered as widely held, a 
company needs to have a less direct impact from shareholders, which is measured as the 
indirect and direct control rights that exceed a certain level. These authors have produced such 
measures in four different ways: for two different levels, 10% and 20%, and for two different 
firm sizes – medium and large – based on market capitalisations. The author used the ownership 
dispersion measure as the mean for these proportions. 
Like the above, legal origin was also operationalised using La Porta et al. (1999), who 
classified countries based on their legal origin, either common-law or civil-law. Here, the 
author created a dummy variable, where 1 refers to countries with common-law legal origin 
and 0 refers to countries with civil-law origin. 
Finally, for employer flexibility, data have been taken from Botero et al.’s (2004) 
employment law index. These authors have developed an employment law index based on 
several variables, such as: alternative employment contracts, cost of firing employees, 
collective dismissals protection, complexity of the dismissal procedure, labour union power, 
rigidity of employment laws, social security laws, autocracy, government employees protection 
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etc. Despite the existence of other employment protection indices (e.g. Estevez-Abe et al., 
2001), the author has used Botero et al.’s (2004) index due to its wider country coverage.  
Table 4 depicts the original scores of all the cultural dimensions (practices and cultural 
looseness) along with the scores for the control variables.
Chapter 4 – Research Design and Methodology 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
198 
Table 4: Country-level scores for all variables: Managerial discretion, cultural practices and control variables 
Country 
D
is
c
r
e
ti
o
n
 
Cultural Practices 
Control Variables 
Formal Institutions Informal Institutions (Cultural Values) 
IC_P UA_P PD_P FO_P HO_P PO_P GE_P AA_P OD LO EF CL IC_V UA_V PD_V FO_V HO_V PO_V GE_V AA_V 
Australia 5.73 4.31 4.40 4.81 4.09 4.32 4.37 3.41 4.29 0.40 Com 0.35 -4.4 4.47 3.99 2.77 5.21 5.60 5.99 5.02 3.83 
Austria 4.90 4.34 5.10 5.00 4.47 3.77 4.47 3.18 4.59 0.02 Civ 0.50 -6.8 4.78 3.65 2.52 5.15 5.68 6.12 4.83 2.85 
Canada 5.59 4.36 4.54 4.85 4.40 4.51 4.46 3.66 4.09 0.52 Com 0.26 -5.3 4.20 3.73 2.73 5.34 5.58 6.13 5.04 4.15 
Egypt 3.30 4.36 3.97 4.76 3.80 4.60 4.15 2.90 3.91 0.10 Civ 0.37 -9.2 4.72 5.24 3.20 5.60 5.13 5.71 3.34 3.22 
France 5.02 4.20 4.66 5.68 3.74 3.60 4.43 3.81 4.44 0.22 Civ 0.74 -6.3 5.27 4.65 2.96 5.35 5.91 6.10 4.71 3.57 
Germany 5.04 3.82 5.27 5.59 4.23 3.38 4.29 3.21 4.72 0.26 Civ 0.70 -7.0 4.97 3.70 2.70 5.21 5.60 6.26 5.02 3.23 
Italy 4.82 3.75 3.85 5.45 3.34 3.66 3.66 3.30 4.12 0.09 Civ 0.65 -6.8 5.20 4.52 2.51 6.01 5.57 6.11 4.88 3.87 
Japan 4.53 5.23 4.07 5.23 4.29 4.34 4.22 3.17 3.69 0.47 Civ 0.16 -8.6 4.01 4.40 2.76 5.42 5.53 5.37 4.41 5.84 
Korea 4.76 5.20 3.52 5.69 3.90 3.73 4.53 2.45 4.36 0.31 Civ 0.45 -10.0 3.84 4.74 2.39 5.83 5.61 5.41 4.23 3.69 
Kuwait 3.30 4.32 4.02 4.97 3.18 4.44 3.79 2.59 3.56 0.31 Civ 0.53 -9.2 5.04 4.65 3.02 5.62 5.06 5.89 3.50 3.61 
Netherlands 5.36 4.62 4.81 4.32 4.72 4.02 4.46 3.62 4.46 0.20 Civ 0.73 -3.3 4.76 3.34 2.61 5.24 5.41 5.71 5.10 3.13 
Qatar 3.73 4.78 4.26 5.05 4.08 4.79 3.76 3.86 4.39 0.10 Civ 0.53 -9.2 5.10 4.82 3.18 5.92 5.31 5.94 3.49 3.72 
Singapore 4.98 4.77 5.16 4.92 4.88 3.29 4.81 3.52 4.06 0.17 Co 0.31 -10.4 4.42 4.08 2.84 5.46 5.66 5.70 4.43 4.28 
 Spain 4.81 3.87 3.95 5.53 3.52 3.29 4.00 3.06 4.39 0.12 Civ 0.74 -5.4 5.25 4.80 2.23 5.66 5.63 5.85 4.82 4.01 
Sweden 4.91 5.26 5.36 4.94 4.37 4.09 3.67 3.72 3.41 0.11 Civ 0.74 -9.5 3.91 3.45 2.49 4.96 5.72 6.01 5.19 3.49 
Switzerland 5.20 4.26 5.24 5.03 4.58 3.86 4.70 3.29 4.10 0.50 Civ 0.45 -6.9 4.65 3.52 2.67 4.91 5.66 6.09 4.89 3.57 
UK 5.73 4.31 4.70 5.26 4.31 3.74 4.16 3.67 4.23 0.65 Com 0.28 -6.9 4.39 4.17 2.82 5.15 5.52 6.03 5.20 3.76 
USA 6.09 4.21 4.15 4.92 4.13 4.18 4.45 3.36 4.50 0.75 Com 0.22 -5.1 4.20 3.99 2.88 5.34 5.51 6.14 5.03 4.36 
Countries with no original published scores, have imputed scores based on geographical proximity.
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4.4.2.4. Measurements Used in this Study on Intra-Cultural Variation 
Earlier research has focused on archival data to measure intra-cultural variation; works in 
political economy and international business have relied on ethno-linguistic diversity as a 
proxy to account for intra-cultural variation (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Mauro, 1995; Puia and 
Ofori-Dankwa, 2013). The use of ethno-linguistic diversity as an antecedent of intra-cultural 
variation has been well documented since Au’s (1999) discussion of such construct. This proxy 
is useful because distinct ethnic societal groups or sub-groups, even if they have similar or 
different mother tongues, tend to behave differently and have different norms (Alesina et al., 
2003; Beugelsdijk and Maseland, 2011; Tung and Baumann, 2009). Along with the use of 
ethnic background and language as a representation of intra-cultural variation, some studies 
have incorporated religion as another indicator (e.g. Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011). Others 
have relied on the World Value Survey to measure within-country variation or heterogeneity 
(Au and Cheung, 2004; Venaik and Midgley, 2015). These measures represent an indirect 
attempt to measure intra-cultural variation.  
Beugelsdijk et al. (2014) argue that intra-country variation is best measured through 
data on the behaviour and values of the societal members or a representative national sample. 
But these data are mostly unavailable in archival formats and it is cumbersome to collect such 
large-scale data from a wide set of countries. Also, the main cross-cultural models that 
introduce the various cultural dimensions such as Hofstede and GLOBE do not report the 
variation within each country and only publish the mean or variation across countries. 
Fortunately, this challenge has been overcome in this research. The author was able, through a 
series of discussions with one of the co-authors of the GLOBE model, to outsource data on 
intra-cultural variation within each of the studied countries. Professor Paul Hanges was kind 
enough to provide the standard deviation scores for each dimension for all the GLOBE 
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countries (62 societies), which indeed includes the sample of this study. The datasheet and 
consent provided by Prof. Hanges can be requested from the author. However, as a matter of 
courtesy, the researcher does not report the standard deviation scores of each country as these 
have not appeared in print yet and were provided as primary data. 
Therefore, the author operationalises intra-cultural variation using the average of the 
standard deviation score reported by all respondents (societal members) per country. Standard 
deviation is an appropriate and reliable estimate to measure the relative dispersion within a 
country (Au, 1999). The usefulness of standard deviation has been of interest to several 
scholars. Some (e.g. Smith, 2004; Van Hemert et al., 2002; Uz, 2015) regard this measure as a 
useful construct to reflect the dispersion of behaviour/norms in a culture. On the other hand, 
Hofstede (2001) criticises the use of such a measure and encourages researchers to neutralise 
it as it may well lead to biases in data, particularly in cross-cultural comparisons. Indeed, it is 
agreed among scholars that culture affects the responding style (Fisher and Schwartz, 2011), 
such as the differences between the extreme response style (using the extreme ends of a scale) 
and the acquiescent response style (tendency to positive responses). However, it is crucial to 
emphasise that these two (response style and standard deviation) are not identical and that they 
differ from each other (Cheung and Rensvold, 2000). Quantitatively speaking, the response 
style, either acquiescent or extreme, is about the relative extremity in respondents’ answers 
across several variables. In contrast, standard deviation is about the variation in a variable 
across respondents. Of the two groups of respondents from different cultural backgrounds with 
identical means, the group with a more extreme response style could have a similar, smaller or 
even larger standard deviation. To prove the point even further, consider the example of 
Taiwan, Kuwait and Qatar. Taiwan is an Asian country that scored almost the same (5.15) as 
Kuwait and Qatar (Middle Eastern) on the cultural dimension of institutional collectivism. It is 
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widely acknowledged that respondents from Asian cultures tend to avoid extreme ends as 
opposed to Mediterranean cultures that tend to avoid the midpoint of a scale (Hui and Triandis, 
1989). In terms of standard deviation, Taiwan had an overall score of 0.97 as opposed to Kuwait 
and Qatar which scored 0.60 and 0.84 respectively. If standard deviation is like response style, 
then Taiwan, Kuwait and Qatar should have had similar scores, whereas in this case they all 
showed different within-country variation to the extent that Qatar resembled Taiwan more than 
Kuwait. 
Moreover, relevant to this study, the use of standard deviation captures the extent to 
which stakeholders’ (in this case societal members) behaviour and norms vary from the central 
tendency (mean) of the overall society. This enables a better conceptualisation of the zone of 
acceptance of stakeholders’ condition that the author has used to link the institutional and 
managerial discretion arguments. In the first empirical chapter, the author uses the central 
tendency on selected cultural behaviours to show how the dominant behaviour in each country 
could affect managerial discretion. Instead, in this chapter, the author is interested in examining 
if variation from the central tendency of a society affects the degree of managerial discretion. 
Therefore, the use of standard deviation would enable the author to capture the extent of that 
variation and how it could alter managerial discretion. 
The standard deviation score was developed as the ratio of deviation on each of the 
preceding eight cultural practices or behaviours. The average standard deviation of each 
respondent per dimension (cultural practice) per country was aggregated to represent the 
national level variation of that dimension. The scores were then combined to show an aggregate 
level of dispersion on all dimensions. To test the hypothesis, the empirical examination will 
consist of testing variation on each cultural practice and then on the overall behaviour in each 
country. 
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Control variables 
To escape the bias of omitted variables, the author considers the inclusion of several control 
variables. Like the preceding chapter, all control variables in this analysis are the variables that 
exhibited a direct relationship with managerial discretion in the extant discretion literature. 
That is, the author controlled for the national formal institutions measured by: ownership 
dispersion, legal origin and employer flexibility (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). Ownership 
dispersion and legal origin have been operationalised using data from La Porta et al. (1999); 
data for employer flexibility have been taken from Botero et al.’s (2004) employment law 
index. Along with these variables, the author also controlled for cultural tightness and 
looseness. Although differences exist between cultural tightness and looseness and intra-
cultural variation, some authors (e.g. Chan et al., 1996; Aktas et al., 2016) argue that cultural 
tightness-looseness is a fundamental construct affecting the degree of cultural variation. 
Therefore, it was necessary to control for it to empirically show the direct effect of intra-
cultural variation. Cultural tightness-looseness was operationalised using the reverse of 
Gelfand et al.’s (2011) scores. For a detailed discussion on the measurement of each of the 
control variables, please refer to the first empirical chapter. 
The author did not control for cultural dimensions (practices or values) as these were 
already reflected in the intra-cultural variation construct and were omitted from the statistical 
model due to multi-collinearity between cultural values, practices and the measure of intra-
cultural variation. The subsequent section describes the statistical analysis used to test for the 
relationship between intra-cultural variation and managerial discretion. 
4.4.2.5. Measurements Used in this Study on National Competitiveness 
To study the implications of managerial discretion for national-level competitiveness, the 
author conducted an international field study using the publicly listed database of the World 
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Economic Forum (WEF) to derive country-level competitiveness scores. The Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) generated by WEF was used as the dependent variable, which 
represents the national level competitiveness of countries. Consistent with studies in the 
management literature (e.g. House et al., 2004; Herciu and Ogrean, 2008; Casero et al., 2013; 
Petrakis et al., 2015; Welsh et al., 2016), GCI is considered one of the main aggregate 
indicators of national competitiveness, which has been widely used by earlier researchers (e.g. 
Thompson, 2004). Despite, the existence of other national competitiveness measures – mainly 
the World Competitiveness Index (WCI) by the International Institute of Management 
Development – the author chose GCI for several reasons.  
First, the GCI covers all the countries that are present in this PhD sample; it has scores 
for Egypt, Kuwait and Qatar. Second, it directly relates to Crossland and Hambrick’s (2011) 
criticism that the 2008 GCI report places Japan, a low-discretion country, and the United Sates, 
a high-discretion country, both within the top 10 most competitive countries (Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011: 815-816). Therefore, to empirically challenge their proposition and be 
consistent with the existing literature, the author chose the GCI as the appropriate national 
competitiveness measure. Both the GCI and the WCI share similar basis since they started as 
a sole index but have split away since 1996. Additionally, both indices are highly correlated 
(r=0.89) (Thompson, 2004), particularly for the 15 countries out of the whole sample of this 
study (except: Egypt, Kuwait and Qatar) (r=0.69, p<0.001). As such, there is no significant 
difference between the use of GCI or WCI, but due to the reasons explained above, the author 
used the GCI. 
The GCI is developed by the World Economic Forum in collaboration with Professor 
Xavier Sala-i-Martin from Columbia University. It is a result of two other measures – the 
Growth Competitiveness Index and Business Competitiveness Index – which are also aimed at 
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measuring national competitiveness. It incorporates variables that respond to the continuous 
advancement in economic research and accounts for changes in the international landscape 
(Herciu and Ogrean, 2008). GCI examines the comparative weaknesses and strengths of 
competitiveness across 131 countries by classifying economic development based on Porter et 
al. (2002) and by taking into consideration 114 indicators that capture economic development 
and productivity, which are categorised into 12 pillars. According to WEF (2016), these pillars 
are as follows: institutions (e.g. legal and administrative framework), infrastructure (e.g. 
transport, roads), macroeconomic environment (e.g. interest rates), health and primary 
education (e.g. health and education level), higher education and training (e.g. educational 
attainment), goods market efficiency (e.g. production), labour market efficiency (e.g. skilled 
labour), financial market development (e.g. business investment climate), technology (e.g. 
technological advancement), market size (e.g. export), business sophistication (e.g. networks) 
and finally innovation (e.g. R&D). The 12 categories reported above are then organised into 
three sub-indices – basic index, efficiency enhancer index and innovation and sophistication 
index – which are given different weights depending on the economic stage of development of 
each country, as proxied by the share of exports and GDP per capita (Schwab et al., 2015). 
Data included in the construction of the GCI are both soft and hard. Soft or secondary data are 
collected from recognised databases such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Bank and Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, to name a few. The primary or hard data are 
collected from the WEF’s Executive Opinion Survey, which captures the perspectives of more 
than 14,000 business leaders and executives around the world on topics related to national 
competitiveness and their view of the competitiveness level of the country in which they reside 
or operate (WEF, 2016). 
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Control variables 
Previous research has shown the importance of national culture in driving economic 
performance and how culture can advance the economic development of countries (e.g. 
Petrakis et al., 2015). Studies have also shown that national culture can increase wealth, which 
will in turn enhance countries’ economic performance (Hofstede, 2001). Particularly, House et 
al. (2004) examined the direct association between national cultural dimensions and country 
competitiveness. As a result, the first control variable is national culture, measured as a set of 
cultural practices and values as per House et al. (2004) along with the cultural tightness-
looseness dimension as per Gelfand et al. (2011).  
In addition to the national cultural influence, formal institutions are expected to 
influence countries’ economic development (e.g. Minkov and Hofstede, 2012; North, 1990), 
and as such their national competitiveness. For instance, studies in the corporate governance 
literature have demonstrated the increased importance of the governance systems implemented 
in various countries; this includes, for instance, the ownership structure (La Porta et al., 1999) 
of publicly listed firms. Therefore, to control for ownership structure, the author uses the mean 
score of all four proportions that exist in La Porta et al., (1999). These scholars calculated the 
proportion of firms that are widely held if shareholders’ rights do not exceed a certain 
threshold. 
Moreover, Millar et al. (2005) argue that countries characterised by an Anglo-American 
system and a common legal law origin are more developed economies. Thus, the country legal 
origin plays an important role in driving a country’s economic development and as a result its 
competitiveness. Accordingly, the author also controls for the legal origin based on La Porta 
et al.’s (1999) classification of common versus civil legal law origins; each country was coded 
either 1 for common law origin or 0 for civil legal low origin.  
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Furthermore, the employee protection and legislation that help to sustain long-term 
employment in a country would positively contribute to reducing that country’s 
unemployment, which in turn is healthy for economic growth. Hence, the author controls for 
the employment protection as per Botero et al.’s (2004) employment law index, which was 
constructed using three indicators: employee protection legislation, collective dismissals 
protection and company-based protection.  
Additionally, the author controls for the country’s level of entrepreneurial behaviour. 
It has been argued that entrepreneurship is an important contributor to socio-economic growth 
and development and generally enhances national prosperity and competitiveness (e.g. Zahra, 
1999; Lee and Peterson, 2000). As such, and following Autio et al. (2013), the author adds 
another control variable which is the entrepreneurial behaviour in a country. It is measured 
using the rate of individuals who are active in setting up or establishing firms and those who 
are currently owner-managers of firms who have paid wages to employees for longer than three 
months. These measures are derived from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’s (GEM) adult 
population survey measures. 
Furthermore, because the author is interested in the impact of managerial discretion on 
national competitiveness, which is the relative quality of a competitor to compete at an 
international level with other countries and the probability of winning such competition 
(Francis, 1992), it is important to control for the aggregate economic performance of a country. 
As such, the author controls for the level of economic output per country as it plays an 
extremely important role in allowing countries to be more competitive. Following recent 
studies (e.g. Berry et al., 2014; Macher and Mayo, 2015), the aggregate economic performance 
of countries was operationalised using GDP per capita. However, it is important to note that 
Chapter 4 – Research Design and Methodology 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
207 
due to the highly-skewed nature of GDP per capita variables, the author used logged GDP per 
capita.  
Finally, because economic freedom is considered an essential contributor to the 
development and competitiveness of countries, the author controls for it using the Economic 
Freedom Index published and created by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. 
Economic freedom is strongly associated with greater economic development, healthier 
societies, better per capita wealth, etc. and captures several variables such as: rule of law, 
limited government, regulatory efficiency and open markets.  
Table 5 below shows the mean scores for all the variables per country.
Chapter 4 – Research Design and Methodology 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
208 
Table 5: National-level variables: Independent and control variables 
Country Discretion GCI 
LnGDP 
Per 
Capita 
EFI OD LO ELI EB IC 
In-Group 
IC 
UA PD FO HO PO GENDERE AA CL 
Australia 5.73 5.04 4.53 81.76 0.4 
Common 
Law 
0.35 6.88 4.38 4.98 4.19 3.76 4.65 4.94 5.18 4.21 4.06 -4.40 
Austria 4.90 5.14 4.61 71.21 0.02 Civil Law 0.5 4.98 4.54 5.11 4.41 3.74 4.81 4.70 5.28 3.96 3.74 -6.80 
Canada 5.59 5.28 4.56 79.26 0.52 
Common 
Law 
0.26 6.69 4.29 5.08 4.16 3.78 4.89 5.04 5.31 4.37 4.10 -5.30 
Egypt 3.30 3.88 3.17 56.36 0.1 Civil Law 0.37 4.61 4.61 5.44 4.65 4.06 4.73 4.93 4.99 3.08 3.57 -9.20 
France 5.02 5.10 4.54 63.13 0.22 Civil Law 0.74 2.55 4.60 5.27 4.54 4.12 4.42 4.66 5.11 4.18 3.85 -6.30 
Germany 5.04 5.42 4.6 71.09 0.26 Civil Law 0.7 3.23 4.32 4.90 4.45 4.05 4.66 4.44 5.21 4.05 3.93 -7.00 
Italy 4.82 4.37 4.5 61.70 0.09 Civil Law 0.65 2.85 4.44 5.38 4.16 3.97 4.63 4.60 4.85 4.06 3.97 -6.80 
Japan 4.53 5.39 4.58 72.06 0.47 Civil Law 0.17 3.71 4.60 5.08 4.24 3.94 4.86 4.92 4.80 3.80 4.72 -8.60 
Korea 4.76 5.09 4.27 68.95 0.31 Civil Law 0.45 6.03 4.52 5.61 4.15 4.00 4.90 4.71 4.98 3.37 4.05 -10.00 
Kuwait 3.33 4.59 4.42 65.17 0.1 Civil Law 0.53 4.34 4.77 5.51 4.43 4.07 4.44 4.79 4.92 3.04 3.62 -9.20 
Netherlands 5.36 5.38 4.62 74.89 0.2 Civil Law 0.73 5.3 4.61 4.59 4.02 3.36 4.93 4.64 5.02 4.30 3.73 -3.30 
Qatar 3.73 5.02 4.79 67.01 0.1 Civil Law 0.53 6.75 4.80 5.31 4.41 3.96 4.85 4.87 4.70 3.56 3.92 -9.20 
Singapore 4.98 5.55 4.48 87.63 0.17 
Common 
Law 
0.31 4.17 4.66 5.56 4.70 3.92 5.27 4.58 5.30 4.07 4.23 -10.40 
Spain 4.81 4.62 4.4 68.77 0.12 Civil Law 0.74 4.53 4.55 5.68 4.39 3.88 4.59 4.48 4.93 3.92 4.22 -5.40 
Sweden 4.91 5.53 4.63 71.33 0.11 Civil Law 0.74 3.9 4.57 4.86 4.39 3.67 4.68 4.91 4.87 4.52 3.44 -9.50 
Switzerland 5.20 5.63 4.77 80.18 0.5 Civil Law 0.45 5.3 4.39 4.64 4.35 3.78 4.71 4.71 5.34 4.04 3.78 -6.90 
UK 5.73 5.34 4.6 77.27 0.65 
Common 
Law 
0.28 4.4 4.33 4.87 4.41 3.99 4.72 4.62 5.06 4.44 3.96 -6.90 
US 6.09 5.60 4.67 78.76 0.75 
Common 
Law 
0.22 6.12 4.20 5.01 4.07 3.88 4.75 4.84 5.32 4.19 4.46 -5.10 
Notes: GCI= Global Competitiveness Index, LnGDP Per Capita= Log GDP per capita, EFI= Economic Freedom Index, OD= Ownership Dispersion, LO= Legal Origin, ELI= Employment Law 
Index, EB= Entrepreneurial Behaviour, IC= Institutional Collectivism, In-group IC= In Group Institutional Collectivism, UA= Uncertainty Avoidance, PD= Power Distance, FO= Future 
Orientation, HO= Humane Orientation, PO= Performance Orientation, GENDER= Gender Egalitarianism, AA= Assertiveness and CL= Cultural Looseness. 
Some countries did not have a reported OD and ELI data (e.g. Kuwait), here the author have used geographical proximity according to House et al.’s (2004) regional clusters. Such approach is 
widely used in the management literature particularly for cross-cultural studies (Freeman, 2002; Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). 
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4.5. Sampling 
For this study, the author selected 18 countries in total to illustrate the sample. The countries 
selected are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, the 
Netherlands, Qatar, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. These countries, except, Egypt, Kuwait and Qatar, have been heavily 
used in earlier cross-cultural studies and studies looking at cross-national business phenomena 
(e.g. La Porta et al., 1997; Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). Also, these countries account for 
most the publicly listed companies around the world and constitute the highest percentage of 
the global domestic product (World Bank, 2014). Additionally, by using a similar sample of 
countries to examine managerial discretion, the author would be able to validate previous 
studies (Wangrow et al., 2015). The author chose to include three more countries – Egypt, 
Kuwait and Qatar – to provide more richness to the data and help improve the generalisability 
of the findings. To examine the impact of cultural practices on managerial discretion, it is 
important to have a sample of countries comprising culturally distant countries with greater 
inter-cultural variation that represent different geographical clusters. As such, after the 
inclusion of these countries, six different regional clusters emerged: Anglo, Germanic Europe, 
Latin Europe, Confucian, Nordic Europe and the Middle East (House et al., 2004). It is 
important to note that all independent variables (in this case the cultural practices) are lagged 
before managerial discretion (the dependent variable). House et al. (2004) collected societal 
practices scores from surveys between 1994 and 1996. the dependent variable was collected 
during the years 2014/15. The author chose this lag structure to assert that the antecedent or 
exploratory variables temporally proceed the dependent variable to avoid any problem with a 
causality relationship (Hambrick, 2007) or potential endogeneity (Judge et al., 2008). 
4.5.1. Respondents Population and Sample Selection 
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To produce discretion ratings for individual countries, the researcher, as mentioned earlier, 
followed Hambrick and Abrahamson’s (1995) approach by identifying an expert panel that 
would be able to provide direct and valid measures of discretion. 
Crossland and Hambrick (2011) used eight fund managers to generate discretion scores for 15 
countries. In terms of this research, fund managers were discarded as the aim was to choose a 
sample of panellists more engaged with the concept of CEO discretion. Additionally, fund 
managers are responsible for executing executives’ actions; this means that they will possess 
enough knowledge about the risk-taking behaviour of CEOs. In other words, they would be 
able to distinguish between risk takers and risk adverse CEOs. Such a characteristic is deeply 
rooted in CEOs’ own individualities and does not appropriately reflect the national-level 
constraints imposed by the institutional environment. Instead, the author identified 
management consultants as an appropriate panel to measure CEO discretion in the selected 
sample of countries. This expert panel possesses an extensive knowledge about various 
external (environmental including market and country), internal (related to the firm) and even 
individual characteristics of CEOs. Thus, they would provide discretion ratings based on a 
broader perspective, taking into consideration various aspects and not solely based on CEO 
individualities as in the case of fund managers. 
The following criteria were used during the selection process to ensure significant 
proficiency. Consultants should have at least 15 years of experience in the consultancy 
industry, 10 years of experience handling projects in at least one of the sampled countries, and 
possess a senior position in the company he/she works for. Additionally, they needed to belong 
to one of the major multinational consultancy firms with a highly reputable profile; this 
includes Accenture, Aon Consulting, Bain & Company, Boston Consulting Group, Deloitte, 
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Ernst & Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG, McKinsey & Company, Mercer LLC, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Roland Berger and Strategy&. 
4.5.1.1. Sample Size Obtained with Email contacts 
The author used consultancy firms’ webpages to identify their leadership team. This screening 
resulted in identifying 193 management consultants holding the following positions: principal, 
partner, senior associate, director and managing director. Each panellist was contacted by 
electronic mail requesting his/her participation along with survey links attached to the request. 
If the recipient accepts to participate, he/she clicks on the survey link, gives their consent and 
starts completing the questionnaire. Surveys were in the form of webpages developed and 
created using the Survey Monkey platform. Before viewing the questions, experts were given 
a description about the project and the confidentiality consideration for their responses. Later, 
they were provided with a brief explanation of managerial discretion based on Hambrick and 
Finkelstein’s (1987) original description. Each management consultant was asked to rate on a 
7-point Likert-scale, varying from ‘to a very small extent’ to ‘to a very large extent’, their 
perception of the degree of discretion provided to CEOs in each country in the sample. The 
panellists were also asked to refrain from rating countries with which they were not familiar. 
4.5.1.2. Increasing Sample Size Using Social Media Platforms 
The author tried to social media platforms particularly LinkedIn to increase the sample size, 
however, as per the criteria selected for the selection of the expert panel or in other words the 
management consultants, there were limited data available as details of most of the incumbent 
consultants were already published on their company websites. However, LinkedIn was used 
to confirm the details of the consultants and make sure that there is an alternative channel to 
contact these respondents if for any reason (i.e. security reasons) the emailed failed to reach 
their company email address. 
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4.5.2. Reminders and Response Rates 
Of the 193 management consultants contacted, 57 (29.5%) granted participation and provided 
utilisable responses. Compared to the 25% (8 panellist) response rate achieved by Crossland 
and Hambrick (2011), 57 is satisfactory. The 57 panellists provided 792 ratings, with every 
country receiving between 30 and 56 ratings (overall mean of 44 scores per country). Table 6 
below shows the mean discretion score and other descriptive frequencies per country. 
Table 6: Mean discretion scores and frequencies for all countries 
Countries N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Australia 45 1 7 5.73 1.32 
Austria 41 1 7 4.90 1.45 
Canada 51 2 7 5.59 1.27 
Egypt 33 1 7 3.30 1.67 
France 48 2 7 5.02 1.23 
Germany 48 2 7 5.04 1.25 
Italy 45 1 7 4.82 1.39 
Japan 45 1 6 4.53 1.38 
Korea 41 1 7 4.76 1.43 
Kuwait 30 1 6 3.30 1.62 
Netherlands 47 2 7 5.36 1.34 
Qatar 33 1 7 3.73 1.84 
Singapore 45 1 7 4.98 1.53 
Spain 47 1 7 4.81 1.30 
Sweden 44 1 7 4.91 1.57 
Switzerland 44 1 7 5.20 1.50 
UK 49 2 7 5.73 1.19 
US 56 2 7 6.09 1.16 
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4.5.3. Pre-testing Procedures 
As this study operationalises individual responses (ratings for managerial discretion) from 
different countries, several authors in the cross-cultural literature have flagged a response bias 
problem when surveying individuals from different cultures (e.g. Stening and Everett, 1984; 
Triandis, 1994). For instance, Hui and Triandis (1989) reported that people from Asian cultures 
generally tend to use the mid-point of the scale and avoid any extreme responses, whereas 
individuals from Mediterranean culture avoid mid-point responses and tend to use the extreme 
ends of the scale to show more commitment (Stening and Everett, 1984; Hui and Triandis, 
1989). Therefore, using mean scores for raw data will lead to problematic interpretation. 
Triandis (1995) suggested a method to overcome such response bias; this is achieved by 
calculating the mean and standard deviation of each respondent then subtracting each 
individual mean from the original item score and then dividing it by each respondent’s standard 
deviation. This procedure results in having ‘corrected scores’, which are then aggregated to the 
society level of analysis. However, House et al. (2004) argued that the classical response bias 
procedure has several drawbacks. Initially, the corrected scores become ‘ipsative’ and not 
directly interpretable because they fall outside the original scale used (e.g. 7-point rating scale). 
Accordingly, House et al. (2004) extended the classical response bias procedure by using 
simple regression analysis to generate the new scores. By following this approach, the author 
generated corrected scores by computing the mean and standard deviation for each respondent, 
subtracting the mean from the individual item responses and then dividing it by that individual 
standard deviation. Later, to generate the final response bias-free data, each respondent’s 
corrected score was regressed against his/her original scores. The unstandardised regression 
predicted the values shown in the below equation, which were then correlated against the 
original scores. If the magnitude of the correlation between these two scores (corrected and 
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uncorrected) is high, then the data are declared as being free from respondents’ bias (House et 
al., 2004). 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠) 
Subsequently, to assess the importance of cultural-response bias in the discretion scale, 
a bivariate correlation procedure was performed. Using Pearson correlation, the author found 
a very high correlation between the corrected scores and the original raw scores (r=0.80, 
p<0.01). Furthermore, well-established residual analysis (Draper and Smith, 1981) was used 
to identify any data points that are considered as outliers in the regression model between the 
corrected and uncorrected scores. The author employed such diagnostic tests to identify if any 
of the scores provided to each of the sampled countries exhibit substantial response bias. Figure 
4 below illustrates the studentised residuals for the 792 discretion scores. Such values compare 
the difference between the corrected (regression unpredicted values) and the uncorrected (raw 
scores) scores and assess whether the discrepancy between these two values is large enough 
for a panellist to say that this should be considered as an outlier. To be considered as an outlier, 
the studentised residual should report a value greater than 2 (positive or negative) (House et 
al., 2004). As can be seen from Figures 11 and 12, only very few discretion scores, about 3% 
from the overall rating, are listed as outliers, thus there exists very little evidence that response 
bias associated with panellists’ background is present in the data.  
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Figure 11: Studentised Residuals for Managerial Discretion Scores 
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Figure 12: Studentised Residuals for Managerial Discretion Scores with Fitted Values 
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These raters compromise the entire sample so every country discretion score was rated 
by the same k panellists (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979). The author used ICC (3, k) to assess the 
inter-rater reliability (Judge et al., 2007). The ICC (3, k), by consistency instead of agreement, 
was computed as the survey question asked raters to make comparative rather than absolute 
judgments regarding CEOs’ discretion level in several countries (McGraw and Wong, 1996). 
The ICC (3, k) coefficient was 0.96, indicating high inter-rater reliability (e.g. Chen et al., 
1993; Taggar, 2002) and agreement of ratings among the panellists (senior management 
consultants) (James, 1982). 
Former studies (e.g. Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995; Crossland and Hambrick, 2011) 
validated their professional expert panel rating with another panel compromised of academics. 
The author has tried to follow such an approach and assessed the validity of the consultant 
panel using Crossland’s (2008) academic panel. Crossland’s (2008) work covers several 
countries but only shares 15 countries in common with this research; as such the author 
assessed the validity with his panellists for those 15 countries only. The academic panel showed 
strong consistency and correlation in their scores with the author’s consultants’ panel. The 
country level discretion scores were significantly correlated (r=0.93; p<0.01). Furthermore, as 
an additional validity test and to determine that the consultants provided accurate and usable 
responses, the author considered the discretion scores generated by Crossland and Hambrick’s 
(2011) international fund managers. Similarly, the consultants’ panel country-level discretion 
scores are significantly correlated with the scores of their fund managers (r=0.90; p<0.01), 
providing additional evidence of the validity of the panellists’ ratings in this thesis.  
Figure 13 below shows the variation of managerial discretion across the sampled 
countries along with the trend of panellists rating per country. 
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Figure 13: Heterogeneity of Managerial Discretion Across Countries 
 
4.5.4. Non-Respondents 
The author assesses the possible non-response bias in two ways. First, the author conducts tests 
comparing respondents to non-respondents (and respondents who failed to complete the 
survey) in terms of years of experience and nationality and finds no significant difference 
(p>0.1). Further, he compares the final respondent pool with the total sampling frame (e.g. 193 
compared to 57 final respondents). Again, the findings suggest that there are no significant 
differences (p>0.1). The relatively high response rate and the results of these tests suggest that 
non-response bias is not a concern. 
4.5.5. Summary 
The expert panel chosen for generating managerial discretion scores proved to be an important 
as they provided reliable and accurate responses. Preliminary analysis of the discretion ratings 
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has been also validated with earlier findings namely Crossland and Hambrick (2011) and 
Crossland (2008), therefore providing additional support for the discretion measurement 
adopted in this research. The following section discusses the statistical or econometric 
techniques used to test the proposed hypotheses. 
4.6. Methodology Adopted for Data Analysis 
This section introduces the reasons behind the econometric techniques chosen to test the 
proposed hypothesis. The author used two different techniques, fixed-effect regression analysis 
and multi-level or hierarchal linear modelling. All analyses were carried out using the Stata 14 
software, an advanced econometrics software that is now being highly used in top business and 
management studies (i.e. Quigley and Hambrick, 2015). Before, discussing the hypotheses 
testing, the researcher first provides a descriptive and correlation analysis for the all the 
variables. 
4.6.1. Descriptive and Correlation Analysis 
Table 7 illustrates the bivariate correlations between discretion and all cultural practices along 
with variable descriptive statistics. To provide a visual illustration of the relationship between 
all cultural practices along with the construct of cultural tightness-looseness and managerial 
discretion, the author created the discretion level index based on the mean scores of all the 
respondents by country. Figures 14 to 22 represent the country-level relationship between 
cultural practices (standardized scores) (8 in total) along with cultural looseness and managerial 
discretion.
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations (all variables) 
  
Mean S.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
  
Discretion1 4.88 0.78 -                                       
IC_P2 4.44 0.46 -.160 -                                     
UA_P2 4.50 0.56 .341 .007 -                                   
PD_P2 5.11 0.37 -.028 -.206 -.248 -                                 
FO_P2 4.11 0.46 .479* .390 .707** -.458 -                               
HO_P2 3.98 0.46 -.364 .325 -.292 -.540* -.087 -                             
PO_P2 4.24 0.35 .484* .054 .307 -.127 .622** -.301 -                           
GE_P2 3.32 0.40 .431 .004 .536* -.241 .472* .051 -.003 -                         
AA_P2 4.18 0.36 .417 -.468 .065 .235 .141 -.388 .415 .132 -                       
OD2 0.29 0.21 .556* -.015 -.064 -.057 .183 .170 .342 .054 .010 -                     
LO2 0.28 0.46 .613** -.071 .100 -.278 .344 .041 .381 .327 .090 .615** -                   
EF2 0.48 0.20 -.173 -.257 .201 .244 -.285 -.380 -.380 .090 .170 -.656** -.645** -                 
CL2 -7.24 2.07 .642** -.531* .080 -.235 .086 -.069 .209 .319 .513* .293 .252 .129 -               
IC_V2 4.62 0.47 -.339 -.711** -.039 .200 -.478* -.202 -.291 .072 .345 -.474* -.390 .583* .230 -             
UA_V2 4.19 0.56 -.644** -.054 -.772** .408 -.714** .163 -.350 -.399 -.102 -.223 -.227 -.060 -.412 .312 -           
PD_V2 2.74 0.26 -.409 .022 -.050 -.298 -.055 .594** -.047 .194 -.142 .144 .173 -.350 -.242 .163 .347 -         
FO_V2 5.41 0.31 -.521* -.059 -.794** .320 -.631** .112 -.404 -.341 .034 -.339 -.225 .057 -.307 .321 .780** .109 -       
HO_V2 5.54 0.20 .645** -.009 .430 .434 .330 -.630** .378 .389 .302 .013 .111 .199 .214 -.135 -.397 -.536* -.385 -     
PO_V2 5.92 0.25 .358 -.676** .465 .046 -.034 -.122 -.110 .433 .323 .094 .198 .263 .420 .393 -.387 .050 -.348 .253 -   
GE_V2 4.62 0.60 .904** -.215 .482* .035 .410 -.481* .259 .432 .287 .324 .344 .120 .628** -.216 -.741** -.604** -.602** .704** .439 - 
AA_V2 3.79 0.65 .118 .314 -.334 .130 .024 .131 .032 .015 -.335 .458 .284 -.586* -.120 -.393 .176 .029 .170 .066 -.434 -.002 
n1= 792; n2=18 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.00
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Figure 14: Country-level Relationship between Institutional Collectivism and Managerial 
Discretion 
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Figure 15: Country-level Relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and Managerial 
Discretion 
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Figure 16: Country-level Relationship between Power Distance and Managerial Discretion 
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Figure 17: Country-level Relationship between Future Orientation and Managerial 
Discretion 
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Figure 18: Country-level Relationship between Humane Orientation and Managerial 
Discretion 
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Figure 19: Country-level Relationship between Performance Orientation and Managerial 
Discretion 
 
Chapter 4 – Research Design and Methodology 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
227 
Figure 20: Country-level Relationship between Gender Egalitarianism and Managerial 
Discretion 
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Figure 21: Country-level Relationship between Assertiveness and Managerial Discretion 
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Figure 22: Country-level Relationship between Cultural Looseness and Managerial Discretion 
 
At this simple level, and as illustrated below, there exists some correlation between 
discretion and most the proposed cultural dimensions. Most the proposed relationships are in 
line with the hypothesised direction. As shown in Table 4, the direction of some of the proposed 
relationship has started to emerge. For instance, future orientation is positively correlated with 
managerial discretion (p<0.05). However, some of the relationships are contradictory, 
particularly for power distance and uncertainty avoidance, where both illustrate opposite 
direction of the relationship to what was initially hypothesised. 
Moreover, Table 8 contains some descriptive statistics and reports the bivariate 
correlations between the dependent, managerial discretion, and independent variable, the 
overall intra-cultural variation per country. Figure 23 also shows the relationship between the 
country-level intra-cultural variation across all cultural practices and managerial discretion. At 
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this simple stage, as proposed earlier, we can see that intra-cultural variation has a negative 
relationship with managerial discretion. Additionally, the table shows that there exists a 
significant relationship between the dependent variables and the other control variables (formal 
institutions), reemphasising the importance of controlling these. 
Table 8: Bivariate correlations: Intra-cultural variation and managerial discretion 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
Managerial discretion1 4.98 1.55 -     
Intra-cultural variation2 0.80 0.08 -.330** -    
Control variables        
Ownership dispersion2 0.29 0.21 .271** -.344** -   
Legal origin2 0.28 0.45 .289** -.318** .615** -  
Employer flexibility2 0.48 0.19 -.103** 0.023 -.656** -.643** - 
Cultural tightness2 -7.24 2.01 .287** -.412** .293** .252** .130** 
n1=792; n2= 18; *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Figure 23: Country-level Relationship between intra-cultural variation across all dimensions 
and managerial discretion 
 
Furthermore, Table 9 illustrates the bivariate correlations between intra-cultural 
variation on each dimension (i.e. variation on institutional collectivism) and managerial 
discretion. Again, from this simple statistical step, a significant relationship is seen to exist 
between country cultural heterogeneity, in most dimensions, and managerial discretion. 
Surprisingly, the effect or direction of the relationship is negative on all dimensions, which the 
author will further elaborate on in the discussion section. The author did not anticipate the 
direction of such relationship to exist across all cultural practices, as this is the first empirical 
attempt to test the effect of intra-cultural variation and particularly the variation on each 
dimension of cultural practices and managerial discretion. The researcher therefore had no way 
of predicting that the relationship would be negative for all practices. This is something that 
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has a theoretical contribution on its own. This is particularly common in cross-cultural studies 
that involve new empirical investigations (e.g. Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). 
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Table 9: Bivariate correlations: Intra-cultural variation (each dimension) and managerial discretion 
  
Mean S.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  
Managerial Discretion1 4.88 0.78 -                       
IC_Var2 0.77 0.08 -.673** -                     
UA_Var2 0.86 0.08 -.391 .613** -                   
PD_Var2 0.80 0.11 -.552* .731** .414 -                 
FO_Var2 0.82 0.12 -.797** .733** .375 .785** -               
HO_Var2 0.76 0.10 -.688** .795** .486* .906** .771** -             
PO_Var2 0.80 0.10 -.710** .755** .577* .781** .769** .797** -           
GE_Var2 0.76 0.16 -.648** .621** .653** .615** .474* .680** .710** -         
AA_Var2 0.83 0.09 -.532* .582* .618** .620** .497* .646** .758** .550* -       
OD2 0.29 0.21 .556* -.363 -.428 -.183 -.380 -.213 -.364 -.196 -.335 -     
LO2 0.28 0.46 .613** -.383 -.054 -.279 -.642** -.367 -.392 -.021 -.103 .615** -   
EF2 0.48 0.20 -.173 .146 .130 -.048 .193 .001 .157 -.167 -.089 -.656** -.643** - 
CL2 -7.24 2.07 .642** -.546* -.177 -.282 -.421 -.366 -.257 -.414 -.259 .293 .252 .130 
n1=792; n2= 18; *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
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Furthermore, Table 10 below shows that managerial discretion measures are positively 
correlated with national competitiveness and that control variables included in the multilevel 
modelling significantly affect and have an important influential role on competitiveness. This 
further supports the inclusion of these variables. This table shows the mean, standard deviation 
and the bivariate correlations between all variables including the control variables. For a visual 
representation, Figures 24 and 25 illustrate the country-level relationship between managerial 
discretion and GCI across all years and per year.
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Table 10: Bivariate correlations: Managerial Discretion and National Competitiveness 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Managerial Discretion1 4.88 0.77 -                 
Global Competitiveness Index2 5.11 0.47 .658** -                
Control Variables                    
GDP Per Capita2 4.49 0.35 .526* .742** -               
Economic Freedom Index2 72.03 7.91 .697** .771** .529* -              
Ownership Dispersion3 0.28 0.22 .661** .525* .278 .554* -             
Legal Origin3 0.28 0.46 .614** .341 .150 .719** .636** -            
Employment Law Index3 0.48 0.20 -.176 -.179 .108 -.451 -.656** -.649** -           
Entrepreneurship Behaviour3 4.80 1.32 .187 .146 .093 .405 .329 .413 -.429 -          
Institutional Collectivism3 4.51 0.17 -.786** -.340 -.186 -.412 -.730** -.532* .306 -.165 -         
In Group Collectivism3 4.70 0.72 -.640** -.594** -.476* -.393 -.461 -.212 -.054 -.100 .518* -        
Uncertainty Avoidance3 4.34 0.19 -.493* -.232 -.381 -.194 -.427 -.114 .090 -.427 .433 .410 -       
Power Distance3 3.89 0.18 -.423 -.394 -.328 -.441 -.017 -.066 -.146 -.370 .092 .590** .513* -      
Future Orientation3 4.75 0.19 .161 .385 .042 .553* .089 .350 -.439 .333 .061 .089 -.018 -.336 -     
Humane Orientation3 4.74 0.17 -.128 -.048 -.171 .020 .231 .227 -.513* .521* .025 -.204 -.211 -.133 .057 -    
Performance Orientation3 5.07 0.20 .602** .444 .132 .621** .429 .539* -.300 .201 -.611** -.253 .022 -.165 .212 -.098 -   
Gender Egalitarianism3 3.95 0.43 .853** .641** .590* .574* .389 .446 .078 -.053 -.555* -.779** -.287 -.508* .115 -.115 .376 -  
Assertiveness3 3.96 0.32 .362 .287 .247 .387 .539* .401 -.560* .117 -.295 .136 -.303 .153 .328 .004 .083 .131 - 
Cultural Looseness3 -7.24 2.07 .643** .138 .290 .241 .341 .252 .128 .219 -.533* -.525* -.574* -.509* -.231 -.092 .359 .543* .133 
n1= 792; n2 = 180; n3= 18; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001  
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Figure 24: Relationship between managerial discretion and GCI across all years 
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Figure 25: Relationship between managerial discretion and GCI per year 
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4.6.2. Hypotheses Testing  
To test the proposed relationships the author has used several econometrics models based on 
extant research and suitability in terms of the variables being tested. For hypothesis 1 to 10, 
the author used fixed-effect regression analysis, for hypothesis 11, the author employed a 
hierarchical linear model, often referred to as multilevel mode, and finally for hypothesis 12, 
the author used multilevel mediation analysis. Details and further explanation on each model 
and the reason being using it is provided in the below sub-sections. 
4.6.2.1. Fixed-Effect Regression Analysis 
Due to the changes in the external conditions affecting discretion over time, it is worth stating 
that the sample period examined in this analysis is 2005-2014 inclusive (10 years); such a time 
frame is in line with several works in the discretion literature (e.g. Crossland and Hambrick, 
2007, 2011). The author identified this time frame to correspond with the sample frame used 
in this and the following chapters, particularly the last one. To test the proposed hypotheses (1-
9), the researcher has performed fixed-effect regression analysis in which country level 
discretion scores generated from the consultant panel were the dependent variables (792 
diverse ratings), and the country national culture (cultural practices) scores the independent 
variables. The use of such analysis technique is due to variation between individual ratings. In 
other words, each consultant is distinct from the other in terms of the number of countries 
he/she rates and the tendency of his/her ratings. Not all the panellists provided scores for all 
the country discretion levels, and each one gave a distinct score (either low, moderate, or high). 
Thus, fixed-effect regression in this context considers the inter-rater (consultant) differences 
and treats each consultant as a fixed-effect. As opposed to ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression analysis, the fixed-effect addresses the heterogeneity between raters along with 
controlling for the distinctive panellists’ rating pattern (Hsiao, 2003). This enables more 
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accurate analysis that illustrates each consultant’s exclusive intercept and control for 
unobserved heterogeneity between raters (Kennedy, 2008: 282-283; Crossland and Hambrick, 
2011). Additionally, it provides more variability, informative data, less collinearity between 
variables, greater efficiency and degrees of freedom (Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2008). 
The analysis was conducted using the statistical software Stata 14 in which panels were 
assigned the ID value of each respondent, which was then absorbed in the analysis equation to 
take into consideration the uniqueness of each panellist. First, discretion scores were 
constructed according to each consultant rating per country. Then, cultural practices mean 
scores aggregated to the country level were included in the fixed-effect equation as 
predictor/independent variables. 
It is important to note that the function or stata command used in this analysis is the 
areg function instead of the xtreg, because discretion was considered as constant during the 
whole period and was not measured on an annual basis. The areg command takes into 
consideration the changes in ratings across each panellist and considers that the number of 
groups (consultants) remains the same throughout the sample size, which is indeed the case 
here. This is opposed to xtreg, which handles cases in which the actual number of groups 
increases with the sample size and accounts for the changes over time. Additionally, in the areg 
function, the model absorbs or controls the fixed-effect (which is in this case the panellists) 
and considers it as a nuisance parameter in order not to affect the  coefficients (McCaffrey et 
al., 2012). This is particularly important as it allows for computational efficiency (Lovell, 
2008). 
Furthermore, the author has run a series of preliminary analyses to empirically justify 
the use of the fixed-effect instead of the random or any other regression model. Starting with 
the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, which is helpful to determine whether the 
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consideration of the ordinary lease square regression is warranted. The Breusch-Pagan test 
results (χ2(2) = 699.81, p<0.001) indicate that the variance across entities is not zero and that 
there exist significant differences across units, which is in this case the scores of discretions 
provided by the expert panel. As such, the use of OLS regression is not appropriate because it 
is unable to address the heterogeneity between raters. Next, Hausman test was performed to 
determine whether random effects would be a possible option to test the hypothesised 
relationships. It is important to clarify here that the author did not use the normal Hausman test 
due to its serious shortcomings, particularly related to the consideration of the random 
estimator as being efficient (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). Instead, Cameron and Trivedi (2010) 
proposed an enhanced version of the Hausman test labelled as robust Hausman analysis. After 
running the robust version of the Hausman test, the results (χ2(2) =399.93, p<0.001) indicated 
that the current data fits better in a fixed-effect regression model as opposed to a random effect 
one. This further supported the use of the fixed-effect regression technique. 
Like the statistical technique implemented to test hypotheses 1 to 9 concerning the 
effect of cultural practices on managerial discretion, and consistent with Crossland and 
Hambrick (2011), the author used fixed-effect regression analysis in which the panellists’ 
ratings of national-level managerial discretion were the dependent variable and the intra-
cultural variation measured by the overall standard deviation of the society across all cultural 
dimension was the independent variable. As stated earlier, the reasoning behind the use of the 
fixed-effect model is mainly due to the distinctiveness and heterogeneity in the panellists’ 
ratings. Although OLS may be helpful as a statistical procedure to test the proposed 
relationship, its drawback is the inability to control for panellists’ heterogeneity and the 
uniqueness of each panellist rating (Kennedy, 2008). Furthermore, to empirically justify the 
use of fixed-effects regression, the author runs several statistical tests as preliminary analysis. 
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First, the author runs the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test to decide whether the 
consideration of the simple OLS regression is warranted. The test results (χ2(2) = 668.93, 
p<0.001) indicate that the variance across entities is not zero and that there exists significant 
difference across units, thus the use of simple OLS regression is not appropriate. Later, to 
decide whether random or fixed effects should be used, the author run a robust Hausman test 
instead of the normal Hausman test, which has a serious shortcoming by considering the 
random estimator to be efficient (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010: 267). The results (χ2(2) =240.82, 
p<0.001) designate that the current data fits better in a fixed-effects model as opposed to the 
random-effect method. 
4.6.2.2. Hierarchical Linear Modelling  
To capture the estimates of the explanatory variables at the year and country levels, and thereby 
predict individual national-level performance per year (Hypothesis 10), the author specified a 
multilevel regression model, often referred to as a hierarchical linear model (HLM) (Bliese and 
Hanges, 2004). The use of multilevel analysis is consistent with the broader management 
literature (e.g. Hammer et al., 2009; Aguinis et al., 2013; Quinn and Bunderson, 2016) and 
particularly the strategic leadership literature (e.g. Crossland and Hambrick, 2011; Crossland 
and Chen, 2013; Lam et al., 2015). Due to the within-subject nature of the current data 
(discretion and competitiveness levels within country), multilevel analysis was used to capture 
the nesting of the measures within each subject (Bliese, 2000; Song et al., 2002). The multilevel 
approach is suitable for the current data structure because it accounts for the interdependencies 
among repeated observations per country (e.g. multiple years by the same country), whereas 
standard regression techniques do not and instead assume that each yearly observation is 
independent of the others. Whereas the use of the ordinary least square analysis (OLS) would 
be inappropriate because it does not account for the non-independence of nested data and 
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increases the likelihood of Type I (when analysing group-level effect) and Type II (when 
analysing individual-level effect) errors (Bliese and Hanges, 2004). The current data contained 
multiple yearly observations (10 per country) nested within any given country, and the 
multilevel model or HLM modelling appropriately controls for the possibility that national 
competitiveness performance from the same country would be more like one another than to 
performances from another country. It also supports the simultaneous testing and explanatory 
variables at yearly (e.g. economic performance, economic freedom index) and country levels 
(e.g. level of managerial discretion). 
Before estimating the hypothesised relationship, the author sought to determine 
whether there was any significance between group-variation in the dependent variable (GCI) – 
a prerequisite for conducting multilevel analysis (Quinn and Bunderson, 2016). The author first 
estimated a baseline ordinal regression model (intercept only) that included only the dependent 
variable (GCI), then he conducted a baseline multilevel regression (intercept only) that 
included GCI as the dependent variable and a random effect for the country as a grouping 
variable. A likelihood ratio test indicated that the multilevel ordinal regression model provided 
a significantly better fit than the non-nested ordinal regression model (χ2(2) =44.07, p<0.001), 
indicating the appropriateness of the multilevel modelling technique for testing the proposed 
hypothesis. Even with the inclusion of the control variables, the likelihood ratio test also 
indicated that the multilevel model provided a significantly better fit than the non-nested 
ordinal regression model (χ2(2) =26.20, p<0.001). 
Furthermore, to determine the extent to which the variation in GCI was due to the 
grouping variables (countries), the author calculated the intra-class correlation (ICC) statistic 
for multilevel ordinal regression model (Algesheimer and Herrmann, 2005), which reveals a 
ratio of between-group variance to total variance. The ICC value of 0.92 indicated that 
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differences between countries accounted for a large percentage of the total variance in the 
yearly GCI. Also, the author chose to grand-centre the variables prior to running the multilevel 
models as this is an important and helpful procedure before estimating an HLM model because 
it reduces the correlations among main-effect, random-effect and interactive terms (Bliese, 
2005). Accordingly, the author specified the multilevel regression model to estimate the effect 
of the antecedent year- and country-level managerial discretion on GCI. The author relied on 
Stata 14 to estimate the model. 
4.6.2.3. Hierarchical Mediation Analysis 
Mediation analysis was carried out to determine whether discretion mediates the relationship 
between cultural practices and national competitiveness (Hypothesis 11). The concept of the 
mediation analysis is that the effect of the independent variable is transmitted to the dependent 
variable through the mediator variable. In such an analysis, there exists three main statistical 
equations: first the effect of the dependent on the independent variable; second the effect of the 
mediator on the independent variable; and third the effect of the dependent variable on the 
mediator and the independent variable. The latter is the indirect effect, which relates to the 
proportion of the effect of the independent variable that passes to the mediator variable. 
Due to the multilevel nature of the current data (nested within countries), the author 
conducted a multilevel mediation analysis instead of the normal mediation analysis 
(sgmediation) using the ‘ml_mediation’ command in stata. This is because sgmediation would 
not be able to capture the endogenous nature of variables and will provide inconsistent 
estimates (Antonakis et al., 2014). Additionally, multilevel mediation provides a much better 
fit after an xtmixed command, which was used to test Hypothesis 10. Finally, such analysis 
would only provide confirmation if a mediation exists or not, but to report standard errors and 
confidence intervals, the author uses Preacher and Hayes’ (2004) bootstrapping approach. This 
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also helps to avoid the normality distribution assumption of the confidence intervals and 
circumvents the power problem associated with non-normality and the asymmetries of the 
sampling distribution (Shrout and Bolger, 2002). Furthermore, it has been acknowledged that 
bootstrapping is the most accurate and accepted approach nowadays (Zhao et al., 2010). 
4.7. Summary 
This chapter has identified the methodological approach which has been implemented in this 
research to provide answers the proposed research questions along with accomplishing the 
research aim of investigating the impact of inter- and intra-cultural variations on managerial 
discretion and the implications for national competitiveness. Additionally, this chapter has also 
showed the different econometric analysis employed to test the relationship between the 
variables and to show the mediating relationship that discretion plays between culture 
(antecedent) and national competitiveness (consequence).   Several research philosophies or 
philosophical approaches were discussed and outlined to support to positivist choice of the 
researcher. The following chapter, reports the findings of the hypotheses testing.
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5. Research Findings 
5.1. Inter-Cultural Variations Findings 
Despite these initial indications reported in the correlation analysis section, when running the 
actual regression models along with the control variables, the relationship may well vary. 
Another interesting observation is the inter-correlations among several cultural practices, 
where some exhibit high (above 0.6) and significant coefficients, which have also existed in 
other studies (e.g. Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). This indicates that cultural practices are not 
fully distinctive from each other and that they cohere in a way that suppresses the statistical 
effects of individual cultural practice. For that reason, each cultural practice was regressed 
against discretion ratings simultaneously. By doing that, the researcher is trying to avoid the 
multi-collinearity among variables and illustrate the individual effects on discretion. 
After running nine separate fixed-effect models, the results are presented in Table 11 
below.
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Table 11: Fixed-effect regression: The effect of inter-cultural variation (each cultural dimension) on managerial discretion 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 
Constant 4.903*** 4.907*** 4.902*** 4.910*** 4.901*** 4.913*** 6.196*** 4.910*** 4.912*** 
Institutional Collectivism -0.474***         
 (0.095)         
Uncertainty Avoidance  -0.215**        
  (0.072)        
Power Distance   -0.133**       
   (0.044)       
Future Orientation    0.220**      
    (0.071)      
Humane Orientation     -0.129*     
     (0.057)     
Performance Orientation      0.193***    
      (0.053)    
Gender Egalitarianism       0.172**   
       (0.055)   
Assertiveness        0.190***  
        (0.048)  
Cultural Looseness         0.232*** 
         (0.052) 
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Control Variables 
Institutional Collectivism-values -0.599***         
 (0.104)         
Uncertainty Avoidance- values  -0.438***        
  (0.076)        
Power Distance- values   -0.316***       
   (0.051)       
Future Orientation- values    -0.008      
    (0.070)      
Humane Orientation- values     -2.140***     
     (0.524)     
Performance Orientation- values      0.069    
      (0.054)    
Gender Egalitarianism- values       -1.658***   
       (0.288)   
Assertiveness- values        0.092  
        (0.058)  
Ownership Dispersion 0.176* 0.265*** 0.415*** 0.466*** 0.420*** 0.409*** 0.321*** 0.400*** 0.298*** 
 (0.075) (0.067) (0.060) (0.075) (0.060) (0.063) (0.063) (0.061) (0.066) 
Employer Flexibility 0.406*** 0.328*** 0.335*** 0.520*** 0.347*** 0.469*** 0.288*** 0.445*** 0.282*** 
 (0.073) (0.065) (0.065) (0.076) (0.074) (0.077) (0.069) (0.072) (0.073) 
Legal Origin 0.385*** 0.439*** 0.451*** 0.414*** 0.325*** 0.407*** 0.382*** 0.433*** 0.394*** 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.059) (0.061) (0.065) (0.068) (0.071) (0.062) (0.062) 
F 44.02*** 45.49*** 45.91*** 41.02*** 43.89*** 39.10*** 45.16*** 39.62*** 50.67*** 
R²  0.47 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46 
n= 792; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001         
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The author argued in Hypothesis 1 that the more that a society’s practices encourage 
collectivistic behaviour, the lower the discretion available to CEOs of firms headquartered in 
that society will be. Model (1) shows a strong negative and significant relationship between 
institutional collectivism and managerial discretion (= -0.47; p<0.001), thus supporting 
Hypothesis 1. Model (2), which illustrates the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and 
managerial discretion, indicates a significant negative relationship (= -0.21; p<0.01), thus 
Hypothesis 2, which argued that the more a society promotes uncertainty avoidance behaviour, 
the less the discretion available to CEOs of firms headquartered in that society will be, was 
supported. Hypothesis 3 suggested that higher power distance practices have a positive 
relationship with CEO discretion; Model (3) did not exhibit the same hypothesised direction 
and oppositely showed a negative relationship (= -0.13; p<0.01); Hypothesis (3) was therefore 
not supported.  
Hypothesis 4, which argued that the more a society endorses future-oriented behaviour, 
the higher the CEO discretion would be, was supported, as per Model (4) (= 0.22; p<0.01). 
Model (5) proves that the prediction concerning the impact of humane orientation practices on 
discretion was in the same hypothesised direction (negative relationship). This provides 
support for Hypothesis 5 (= -0.12; p<0.05), which contended that in societies where humane 
orientation behaviour is valued and promoted, CEOs would have lower leeway over their firms’ 
faith and form. Hypothesis 6 debated that the higher the performance orientation practices in a 
society are, the greater the CEO discretion would be. Model (6) proves this proposition 
(=0.19; p<0.001).  
Model (7) exhibited a strong and positive relationship between gender egalitarianism 
and managerial discretion. Hypothesis 7, which argues that the more a society encourages 
equality among genders, the greater the discretion available to CEOs of firms headquartered in 
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that society will be, was also supported (=0.17; p<0.01). Hypothesis 8, which argued that the 
more a society values assertive behaviour, the higher the discretion available to CEOs 
headquartered in that society will be, was positive and supported, as per Model (8), (=0.19; 
p<0.001). Lastly, Model (9) illustrates a significant positive relationship between cultural 
looseness and managerial discretion. Thus, Hypothesis 9, which argued that in loose societies 
CEOs of firms headquartered in that society possess higher latitude of actions as opposed to 
their counterparts who operate in tight societies, was supported as well (=0.23; p<0.001). 
Accordingly, all the cultural practices, as measured by House et al., (2004), showed a strong 
relationship with managerial discretion. However, not all the relationships followed the 
proposed direction. All the hypothesised directions were supported except for power distance, 
which showed an inverse relationship. Further explanation and implications of these results 
will follow in the discussion chapter (6). 
5.2. Intra-Cultural Variations Findings 
Table 12 reports the fixed-effect regression results for the main Hypothesis 10, which is related 
to the intra-cultural variation within a country across all cultural dimensions. 
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Table 12: Fixed-effect regression: The effect of intra-cultural variation on managerial 
discretion 
  
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
  
Constant 4.8953*** 4.939*** 4.946*** 4.975*** 4.946*** 
      
Intra-cultural variation -0.3105***     
  (0.0547)     
Control Variables      
Cultural Tightness-Looseness  0.1869***    
   (0.0525)    
Ownership Dispersion   0.2087**   
    (0.0674)   
Employer Flexibility    0.1881*  
     (0.0741)  
Legal Origin     0.3132*** 
      (0.0626) 
      
F 48.70*** 96.41*** 87.55*** 11.69*** 102.06*** 
R²  0.48 0.39 0.38 0.32 0.39 
n= 792; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
Table 13, on the other hand, reports the fixed-effect regression results for the intra-cultural 
variation within a country on each cultural dimension.
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Table 13: Fixed-effect regression: The effect of intra-cultural variation (each cultural dimension) on managerial discretion 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
Constant 4.906*** 4.9071*** 4.9036*** 4.8983*** 4.8996*** 4.8967*** 4.8877*** 4.9077*** 
Institutional Collectivism -0.1850***        
  (0.0546)        
Uncertainty Avoidance  -0.1482**       
   (0.0522)       
Power Distance   -0.1807***      
    (0.0501)      
Future Orientation    -0.3065***     
     (0.0643)     
Humane Orientation     -0.2596***    
      (0.0516)    
Performance Orientation      -0.2947***   
       (0.0521)   
Gender Egalitarianism       -0.3468***  
        (0.0537)  
Assertiveness        -0.2137*** 
         (0.0546) 
Control Variables         
Cultural Tightness-Looseness 0.1469* 0.2302*** 0.2251*** 0.1832*** 0.1986*** 0.2270*** 0.1656** 0.2400*** 
  (0.0583) (0.0527) (0.0526) (0.0532) (0.0526) (0.0519) (0.0526) (0.0525) 
Ownership Dispersion 0.2997*** 0.2051** 0.2785*** 0.2989*** 0.2856*** 0.2265*** 0.1728* 0.1668* 
  (0.0665) (0.0742) (0.0666) (0.0660) (0.0659) (0.0668) (0.0680) (0.0743) 
Employer Flexibility 0.3029*** 0.2686*** 0.2160** 0.2147** 0.2062** 0.2182** 0.1682* 0.1753* 
  (0.0735) (0.0735) (0.0754) (0.0740) (0.0741) (0.0731) (0.0739) (0.0779) 
Legal Origin 0.3635*** 0.4417*** 0.3218*** 0.1764* 0.2798*** 0.2964*** 0.4259*** 0.3859*** 
  (0.0625) (0.0642) (0.0649) (0.0765) (0.0653) (0.0634) (0.0608) (0.0617) 
F 43.42*** 42.54*** 43.81*** 46.28*** 46.95*** 48.67*** 51.13*** 44.40*** 
R²  0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.47 
n= 792; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001      
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These individual results provide further support for the theoretical reasoning that 
derived Hypothesis 10. Greater heterogeneity of behaviour on all and each cultural practice/s 
within an environment significantly reduce the degree of managerial discretion available to 
CEOs headquartered in that country. 
Hypothesis 10 argues that greater heterogeneity within a given country would be 
negatively associated with managerial discretion. Model 1 shows that the relationship between 
intra-cultural variation and managerial discretion is indeed negative (= -0.31; p<0.001), thus 
supporting Hypothesis 10. The remaining results show that the variation on each of the cultural 
practices negatively affects the degree of managerial discretion available to CEOs. Institutional 
collectivism (= -0.18, p<0.001); uncertainty avoidance (= -0.14; p<0.01); power distance 
(= -0.18; p<0.001); future orientation (= -0.30; p<0.001); humane orientation (= -0.25; 
p<0,001); performance orientation (= -0.29; p<0.001); gender egalitarianism (= -0.34; 
p<0.001) and assertiveness (= -0.21; p<0.001) are all significant and negatively related to 
managerial discretion. This provides additional support for the idea that greater heterogeneity 
within a given country increases the institutional constraints on CEOs actions, as they need to 
adapt and take into consideration a broader set of stakeholder needs. 
5.3. National Competitiveness Findings 
Table 14 contains the results for the HLM. As per the model below, managerial discretion has 
a positive and significant effect on national-level competitiveness measured by GCI (βdiscretion 
=2.505, p<0.001), thus providing support for Hypothesis 10. Clearly, countries that allow for 
greater latitude in executive decision making perform better overall.
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Table 14: HLM: The effect of managerial discretion on national-level competitiveness 
  Model 1 
  Global Competitiveness Index 
Constant 0.244*** 
 (0.058) 
Managerial Discretion 2.505*** 
 (0.477) 
GDP Per Capita 2.627*** 
 (0.541) 
Economic Freedom Index 0.012* 
 (0.006) 
Ownership Dispersion 2.755*** 
 (0.362) 
Legal Origin -0.871*** 
 (0.179) 
Employment Law Index 3.825*** 
 (0.577) 
Entrepreneurial Behaviour -0.603*** 
 (0.127) 
Institutional Collectivism -5.932*** 
 (1.360) 
In Group Collectivism 1.136*** 
 (0.312) 
Uncertainty Avoidance 7.708*** 
 (1.537) 
Power Distance -2.191*** 
 (0.543) 
Future Orientation 6.042*** 
 (1.163) 
Humane Orientation 6.686*** 
 (1.239) 
Performance Orientation -4.370*** 
 (1.084) 
Gender Egalitarianism -5.029*** 
 (1.079) 
Assertiveness -1.215** 
 (0.379) 
Cultural Looseness 0.352*** 
 (0.101) 
Year -0.000 
 (0.007) 
lns1_1_1 -3.600*** 
 (0.217) 
lns1_1_2 -2.996*** 
 (0.604) 
lnsig_e -2.293*** 
 (0.061) 
Wald Statistic 525.28*** 
LR Statistic 26.20*** 
Log Likelihood 122.80 
n= 180; number of groups 18; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Again, the empirical results indicate that the inclusion of the various control variables 
was warranted. Concerning the impact of national culture, the findings show that all cultural 
practices exhibit a strong relationship with national competitiveness. Particularly, institutional 
collectivism (p<0.001), power distance (p<0.001), performance orientation (p<0.001), gender 
egalitarianism (p<0.001) and assertiveness (p<0.01) have a strong negative relationship with 
national competitiveness. In contrast, in-group collectivism (p<0.001), uncertainty avoidance 
(p<0.001), future orientation (p<0.001), humane orientation (p<0.001) and cultural looseness 
(p<0.001) showed a strong positive relationship with country competitiveness. In relation to 
GDP per capita, it is obvious that the greater the economic productivity and performance of a 
country, the greater its competitiveness (p<0.001), which is also reflected in the relationship 
between economic freedom index and GCI (p<0.001). Consistent with the literature (e.g. La 
Porta et al., 1999), the ownership dispersion (p<0.001) and legal origin (p<0.001) of countries 
exhibited strong positive and negative relationships consecutively. The greater the flexibility 
of ownership structure and legal origin (e.g. protection of property rights in common laws), the 
greater is a country’s ability to compete on an international level. Also, the employment law 
index (p<0.001) showed a significant positive relationship with country competitiveness. 
Although entrepreneurial behaviour seemed to drive economic performance and 
growth, which in turn contributes to countries’ competitiveness, it has exhibited a negative 
relationship. There is no direct explanation for such findings, but a possible argument may be 
related to culture and other formal institutions factors. It has been argued that entrepreneurial 
orientation or activity within a given country is subject to and constrained/enabled by its culture 
(Autio et al., 2013), which may well not show any positive relationship while not controlling 
for the cultural aspect. Also, according to Berger (1991), the entrepreneurial activity continues 
to be relatively constrained in many countries despite their considerable economic 
Chapter 5 – Research Findings 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
255 
development. Thus, to have a positive relationship, there is a need to include a different set of 
variables to control for variables that are directly related to entrepreneurial behaviour. Due to 
the small variation across countries in terms of entrepreneurial behaviour, such an association 
should be interpreted with caution. 
Lastly, the variable year did not show any relationship with national competitiveness. 
It may be that the actual construction of the GCI measure considers the yearly changes and 
impact of external events (e.g. financial crisis). For that reason, financial crisis did not show 
any impact in this sample. Also, another explanation may relate to the nature of the variables 
in use in the multilevel modelling, as most them were constructed in a static manner that does 
not change over time. 
5.4. Mediation Analysis Findings 
The results for Hypothesis 11, which argues that managerial discretion mediates the 
relationship between cultural dimensions and national competitiveness, has been supported as 
per Table 15. The author finds strong evidence that managerial discretion mediates the 
relationship between: institutional collectivism (coefficient= -2.30, z= -30.52, p<0.001), 
uncertainty avoidance (coefficient=-0.87, z=-24.76, p<0.001), power distance (coefficient= -
0.65, z= -19.91, p<0.001), future orientation (coefficient=0.23, z=21.74, p<0.001), humane 
orientation (coefficient= -0.23, z=-17.90, p<0.001), performance orientation (coefficient=0.85, 
z=21.92, p<0.001), gender egalitarianism (coefficient=0.37, z=7.99, p<0.001), assertiveness 
(coefficient=0.34, z=21.63, p<0.001), cultural looseness (coefficient= 0.14, z=33.63, p<0.001) 
and GCI. 
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Table 15: Results for the mediation test 
Variables 
Mediation Effect 
P-values Std Error 
Institutional Collectivism -2.3033*** (0.0755) 
Uncertainty Avoidance -0.8780*** (0.0355) 
Power Distance -0.6560*** (0.0329) 
Future Orientation 0.2385*** (0.0110) 
Humane Orientation -0.2353*** (0.0131) 
Performance Orientation 0.8548*** (0.0390) 
Gender Egalitarianism 0.3776*** (0.0472) 
Assertiveness 0.3486*** (0.0161) 
Cultural Looseness 0.1417*** (0.0042) 
n= 180; +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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6. Discussion and Conclusions 
For almost four decades, since the influential work of Lieberson and O’Connor (1972), 
academics have argued the core examination of whether executives matter or, in other words, 
have much leeway over their organisations’ fate and form. Are proponents of population 
ecology, neoinstitutionalism and other similar theoretical reasoning right in their assumption 
that executives are much constrained in their actions by inertial and environmental forces that 
limit their abilities to take strategic initiatives (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983)? Or, are strategic management and upper echelon scholars, who studied and 
empirically looked at executive effects (e.g. Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Wiersema and Bantel, 
1992; Sanders, 2001), more in the right direction, if executives can take idiosyncratic actions 
that significantly influence their firms’ outcomes? Bridging these two schools of thought using 
the theory of managerial discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) has shifted the debate 
from whether firms’ executives matter to a more contextually related situation, which 
investigates when and under which circumstances they do matter. These contextual situations 
depend on various external and internal conditions. Sometimes these conditions might boost 
executives’ discretion to take idiosyncratic actions where they would be able to have a 
significant impact on their organisations’ outcomes. However, in other situations, contextual 
settings confer little latitude of action and, in this vein, executives would not be able to affect 
firms’ outcomes. Such contextual conditions have been studied for nearly three decades 
focusing mainly on the industry (e.g. Abrahamson and Hambrick, 1997; Finkelstein, 2009; 
Hambrick and Quigley, 2014), organisational (e.g. Boyd and Salamin, 2001; Kim, 2013) and 
individual (e.g. Carpenter and Golden, 1997; McClelland et al., 2010) contexts. Recently, 
Crossland and Hambrick (2007, 2011) broadened the milieu in which executives matter by 
arguing that discretion also emanates from the institutional environment. Building on this logic, 
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the author has extended the institutional framework of managerial discretion by discovering 
new national-level antecedents – inter-cultural variation (cultural practices) and intra-cultural 
variation – and consequences (its implication on national competitiveness). 
This thesis aimed to answer several research questions. The first question was related 
to the national-level predictors of managerial discretion. To provide a response to this question, 
the author studied other important cultural aspects and practices, and identified several 
important dimensions. A total of eight cultural practices along with an additional cultural 
dimension (cultural looseness/tightness) exhibited high bivariate associations with managerial 
discretion. In an examination of 18 countries from six regional clusters, including under-
researched countries (e.g. Egypt, Kuwait and Qatar), the researcher found that an encompassing 
array of societal practices illustrating the informal institutions of these eighteen societies were 
significantly associated with the degree of discretion available to CEOs of public firms 
headquartered in these nation-states. As rated by a panel of senior management consultants, 
the Anglo country cluster, e.g. the US, the UK and Australia, were amongst the countries that 
provide CEOs with the greatest discretion. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the Middle 
Eastern country cluster e.g. Egypt, Kuwait and Qatar, were amongst the countries that provide 
CEOs with the least discretion. In the middle were countries from different regional clusters 
like Singapore, France and Sweden. This shows how managerial discretion varies from one 
country to another and, more importantly, from one cultural cluster to another. Also, there were 
some variations within the same cultural cluster; for instance, Japan and Korea provided a 
much lower level of discretion compared to Singapore, despite all of them belonging to the 
Confucian cluster. Likewise, the Germanic Europe cluster was not consistent, with Switzerland 
providing CEOs with greater discretion than Germany and Austria. 
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The results showed that in countries where institutional collectivism is high (e.g. Qatar, 
Japan), the discretion available to CEOs of public firms headquartered in these societies was 
low. This is supported by theoretical reasoning, which argues that executives are restricted to 
take decisions only based on consensus from other important stakeholders (Smith et al., 1996). 
In such contextual conditions, CEOs are constrained to take unilateral and idiosyncratic action 
(Crossland and Hambrick, 2007) without having a collective agreement. For instance, 
reorganisation, laying-off employees, aggressive mergers and acquisitions, huge investments, 
along with other strategic actions cannot be taken solely by the CEO as such initiatives might 
harm the collective. In countries where institutional collectivism is low and society promotes 
individualistic behaviour (e.g. the US and the UK), CEOs are rewarded with a wider array of 
acceptable behaviours, which boosts their level of discretion. Consistent with previous 
empirical investigations (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011), this assumption was strongly 
significant ((p<0.001) and F (1, 792) = 44.02***), and robust by explaining a high proportion 
of the changes in managerial discretion, with an R-square of 0.47. Thus, the 
individualism/collectivism cultural dimension has a strong positive/negative relationship with 
discretion across all the countries and regional clusters studied. 
Uncertainty avoidance showed a strong negative relationship with managerial 
discretion (p<0.01; F (1, 792) = 45.49***; R-squared= 0.47). Such a relationship is in line with 
what was hypothesised earlier and complements the previous findings of Crossland and 
Hambrick (2011). The logic is that societies with little uncertainty avoidance (tolerate more 
uncertainty) are relatively more accepting of means-end ambiguity and can tolerate 
unpredictability (Schwartz, 1994). Due to such societal characteristics, it is expected that a 
broader array of actions would be available to CEOs in those cultures, which has been shown 
in the empirical analysis. However, a counter argument may arise from the theoretical 
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conceptualisation of the uncertainty avoidance construct. Venaik and Brewer (2010) argue that 
the uncertainty avoidance practice of House et al., (2004) is more related to the rule-orientation 
and importance of structure and orderliness in such societies. This construct showed a 
significant and positive relationship with the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, 
namely: government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, political stability and non-
violence, control of corruption and voice and accountability (Venaik and Brewer, 2010). As 
such, if the explanation of Venaik and Brewer (2010) that uncertainty avoidance practices is 
more related to the rule orientation and the structure of societies holds true, then one could 
envisage a positive relationship with managerial discretion. The argument is that if societies 
are characterised by institutional environments that promote good governance and include rule 
of law, then economic policies and rules will be easily predictable and will not change 
overnight, which provides more confidence for business leaders and investors (Dervis, 2006). 
Also, this long-term rule-bounded orientation encourage higher economic dynamics and 
growth (Freytag and Renaud, 2007). Therefore, CEOs of firms headquartered in high 
uncertainty-avoidance countries, which have a good governance structure, would be able to 
take more innovative actions without worrying about external legal changes; as such, the 
means-end ambiguity still holds but only for the implications of the executive actions. This is 
like the legal origin argument presented in Crossland and Hambrick (2011). Societies with 
common law legal origin protect private property rights as opposed to the civil law legal origin 
which solidifies the power of the state. CEOs in common law countries, which have a greater 
structure of law (Mahoney, 2001), oversee pursuing a predefined end but with considerable 
leeway in the means to pursue that end (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). Therefore, even with 
the greater governance system, this should not prevent CEOs from having more latitude of 
actions. 
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In line with Crossland and Hambrick (2011), the author found that that power distance 
has a negative effect on managerial discretion. Power distance, another cultural dimension 
examined, exhibited a negative and significant relationship (p<0.01) as opposed to what has 
been hypothesised. An increase in the power distance practices in a society will lead to a 
decrease in the degree of managerial discretion provided to CEOs of public firms 
headquartered in such countries (R-squared=0.48; F (1, 762) = 45.91***). As such, the 
explanation provided by Crossland and Hambrick (2011), that in societies high on power 
distance leaders’ status is elevated due to the recognition that these individuals are figureheads 
rather than bold strategists, is valid. Another explanation might emerge from the endorsed 
implicit leadership theory (House et al., 2014). In societies high on power distance, leaders 
tend more to be self-protective, protecting their positions by following rules and policies to 
avoid risk, and team-oriented. They care for the welfare of other team members and try to 
create cohesive working groups (House et al., 2004). Therefore, despite deeming leaders as 
figureheads, these societies expect executives to behave in a certain manner by avoiding risk 
and following procedures, and as such they constraint their latitude of actions. 
A fourth cultural practice that was examined in this thesis is future orientation, which 
relates to appreciating time by planning for the future and delaying current gratifications 
(House et al., 1999). Future orientation has a tight link with time, which differs across cultures. 
Some societies do not emphasise time or future orientation practices; in these situations, 
societies tend to enjoy current moments and avoid future anxiety (Keough et al., 1999). People 
in such cultural environments rely heavily on their past and try to maintain the status quo 
(House et al., 2004). Committing to the status quo has exhibited a strong negative association 
with managerial discretion (e.g. Hambrick et al., 1993), thus executives operating in such 
environments will experience a lower degree of discretion. The findings indicate that CEOs 
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headquartered in societies that promote future oriented behaviour, or in other words encourage 
future planning to depart from being committed to the status quo, will have higher discretion 
(p<0.01; F (1, 762) = 41.02***; R-squared= 0.46). 
Humane orientation, a fifth cultural dimension examined, exhibited a negative 
relationship with managerial discretion (p<0.05; F (1, 762) = 43.89***; R-squared= 0.47). This 
cultural practice refers to the level at which societies value caring, kindness, unselfishness and 
fairness behaviours (House et al., 1999). In such societies, benevolence is a crucial value that 
determines the acceptable behaviour of individuals (James et al., 1996). By following this 
behaviour, people in positions of power or in higher hierarchical levels tend to act as parents 
to their subordinates, where they often help, support and care about the problems of others 
(House et al., 2004). Executives in such societies will not be able to take any strategic or bold 
actions that might harm their employees, therefore the array of acceptable behaviours of 
executives is limited. Gebert and Steinkamp (1991) showed that in Nigeria, a highly humane-
oriented country, organisational leaders tend to recruit new staff without any qualifications just 
to help them out. Societies promoting such cultural practices tend to be more collectivistic 
(House et al., 2004), which in turn will reduce the latitude of executives’ actions. Thus, 
executives – particularly CEOs – operating in high humane-oriented countries will experience 
a lower degree of discretion as opposed to their counterparts who operate in societies that do 
not encourage humane orientation behaviour. 
Moreover, the cultural dimension of performance orientation, which denotes focusing 
on innovative, rewarding, performance-improvement behaviour and the need for higher 
achievements, has been neglected in cross-cultural literature. The author has showed the 
importance of such cultural practices in relation to executives’ latitude of actions. The tight 
link between performance orientation and achievement has made the evaluation and judgment 
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of people’s performance an important aspect. Societies with high performance orientation tend 
to judge and evaluate individuals according to their individual results or accomplishments. 
Similarly, executives are dismissed based on poor company performance (Crossland and Chen, 
2013). CEOs operating in low-discretion contexts cannot be judged on their companies’ 
performance simply because they do not possess enough discretion. Therefore, performance-
oriented countries provide fertile ground for greater CEO latitude of actions, and as a result 
judge them according to their performance. Another important argument that links the 
performance orientation cultural norm to managerial discretion is that people in high 
performance-oriented societies believe that they have control over the events happening in their 
lives (House et al., 2004). In other words, these individuals possess an internal locus of control 
(Rotter, 1966). Internal locus of control has been empirically tested and showed positive 
association with managerial discretion (e.g. Carpenter and Golden, 1997). Empirically, 
performance orientation has exhibited a positive and significant relationship with discretion 
(p<0.001; F (1, 762) = 39.10***; R-squared= 0.46). Accordingly, the author found support for 
the argument that CEOs of firms headquartered in countries that encourage 
performance/achievement-oriented behaviour enjoy more discretion compared to their rivals 
who lead firms in less performance-oriented societies. 
The cultural dimension related to gender egalitarianism was also supported and 
indicated a positive relationship with managerial discretion. Empirical results are strong, 
particularly in terms of the significance of that relationship (p<0.01; F (1, 762) = 45.16***; R-
squared= 0.47). As such, societies that promote greater equality between genders and assign 
more roles to women provide executives with a wider array of acceptable actions, which in 
turns increases their latitude of actions. Despite being related to gender equality, societies that 
encourage and try to lower the gap between men and women increases the acceptance of having 
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more women in higher positions and would also accept seeing women in business leadership 
positions. Earlier work in management literature showed the importance of gender in the 
advancements towards the upper echelons of firms (Cook and Glass, 2014). This is because 
women leaders are seen to lack the traits of successful leadership in certain countries (Eagly et 
al., 1992). However, not all societies follow this orientation. In societies where there is greater 
acceptance of women, they assign more roles to women and place less of a taboo on their 
behaviour. Hofstede (1998) argued that societies differ in gender equality because of the taboo 
they place on gender differences, particularly regarding women. In such environments, women 
are minorities and have few roles in society. Also, the norms placed on them are strict and tend 
to follow a predefined manner. However, if such taboos are lifted, which is the case of countries 
high on gender egalitarianism (House et al., 2004), societies become more acceptable for 
actions derived from this minority group and the overall zone of acceptance would be larger. 
Therefore, executives operating in these countries would be provided with more managerial 
discretion. 
The last societal practice examined in this thesis from the GLOBE cultural dimensions 
is assertiveness. Assertiveness is the extent to which individuals in a certain culture tend to be 
dominant, tough and aggressive in their relationship with others (House et al., 1999). This 
cultural norm has been linked to individuals’ qualities that enable them to occupy leading 
positions (e.g. Watson and Clark, 1997; Judge et al., 1999). Put simply, individuals with 
assertive behaviour tend to reach higher hierarchical positions. Besides, assertiveness shows 
people’s ability to be self-confident, in control and forceful (Fagenson, 1990), which means 
that assertive people are in control (have internal locus of control) of events happening in their 
environment. Additionally, assertiveness has been linked to people appreciating competition 
and valuing results over relationships (House et al., 2004), hence assertive societies tend to 
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have a free market structure/economy and support firms’ rivalry. In free-market economies, 
executives are allowed greater latitude of actions to quickly respond to market changes 
(Makhija and Stewart, 2002). Hence, in societies that urge assertive behaviour, CEOs who 
occupy elevated hierarchical positions can foresee bold and idiosyncratic actions without 
taking into consideration stakeholder relationships, which enhances their discretion. Therefore, 
and as hypothesised, the author found a significant positive relationship between assertiveness 
and managerial discretion (p<0.001; F (1, 762) =39.62***; R-squared= 0.46). 
 Lastly, the author investigated the relationship between cultural tightness-looseness 
and managerial discretion. Cultural looseness, which relates to societies’ acceptance of deviant 
behaviour (Gelfand et al., 2006), demonstrated a positive association with discretion (p<0.001; 
F (1, 762) = 50.67***; R-squared= 0.46). Countries that tolerate variety and deviant behaviours 
allow a greater array of strategic actions to be pursued by firms’ executives. CEOs operating 
in these societies can foresee deviant and bold strategies, conversely to CEOs operating in tight 
cultures that are not able to take any strategic initiatives that do not fall within the zone of 
acceptance of the overall society norms and behaviours, and are faced with higher isomorphic 
pressures. Such findings have corroborated the extant research (Crossland and Hambrick, 
2011). 
Staying in the realm of answering the first research question, the author moved to study 
intra-cultural variation as another important national-level predictor of managerial discretion. 
Prior studies (e.g. Crossland and Hambrick, 2007; 2011) examining the association between 
the institutional environment and managerial discretion concluded that national culture 
particularly values matter. As discussed earlier, in the first empirical chapter, the author 
concluded through an empirical investigation that not only cultural values matter but also 
practices which determine the degree of managerial discretion in each country. The 
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examination of intra-cultural variation takes a step forward and indicates a strong link with 
managerial discretion. Based on several calls from the cross-cultural literature (e.g. Beugelsdijk 
et al., 2014), and by using the institutional, stakeholder and upper echelon theories, the author 
found that greater heterogeneity within countries negatively affects the degree of managerial 
discretion. This cultural dimension is crucial for our understanding of national culture and 
particularly useful when assessing managerial discretion, as it may lead to several important 
implications.  
Recent works (e.g. Crossland and Hambrick, 2011; Crossland and Chen, 2013) have 
suggested that cultural values, as central tendencies, are directly related to managerial 
discretion. However, despite opening a new horizon in the discretion literature and adding an 
important antecedent, this research stream often uniformly ignores the 
heterogeneity/homogeneity that exists in each culture. As such, the author contributes to the 
discretion literature by showing that intra-cultural variation is an important construct that helps 
to deepen our understanding of the national-level antecedent of managerial discretion. Also, 
the researcher shows that intra-cultural variation is an additional national-level antecedent of 
managerial discretion. Furthermore, from its inception and for several decades, stakeholder 
theory has mainly rested on the side of the voluntaristic perspective (Freeman, 1984). 
Managerial decisions and behaviour is the key variable that shapes the relationship between 
firms and stakeholders (Phillips et al., 2010). Such a perspective implicitly assumes that 
managers have enough latitude of actions to attend to stakeholders’ needs. However, this is not 
always the case as the degree of managerial discretion is a function of the internal and external 
constraints facing managers. The author argued that while managerial discretion is a vital 
intervening variable it also has a powerful role in explaining stakeholder-firm relationships. 
Therefore, such findings fill in the gap that is currently present in stakeholder theory by 
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including the concept of managerial discretion as an important construct to take into 
consideration when talking about stakeholder management. 
Furthermore, the second research question, which focuses on the national implications 
of managerial discretion, is also an important addition to the discretion literature. As mentioned 
earlier, the managerial discretion literature failed to answer a fundamental question – is 
discretion desirable? The majority of the work in this field of research has examined the various 
consequences of managerial discretion at the individual (e.g. CEO risk-taking behaviour 
(Miller et al., 1982)), compensation (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992)), organisation (e.g. 
strategic change (Quigley and Hambrick, 2012)), industry (e.g. attentional homogeneity 
(Abrahamson and Hambrick, 1997)) or even national levels (e.g. CEO effect on firm 
performance (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011) as well as regarding CEO accountability 
(Crossland and Chen, 2013)). However, none have examined if discretion is a desirable 
construct for better performance. Crossland and Hambrick (2011: 815) mentioned that 
“discretion is not, per se, necessarily good or bad, but simply refers to the latitude of action 
available to executives”. Additionally, they didn’t envision a relationship between discretion 
and country performance, particularly national competitiveness. The author challenged this 
proposition and empirically demonstrated that managerial discretion is beneficial for country 
performance. The findings indicated that managerial discretion has a positive effect on national 
competitiveness. Countries that provide a greater latitude of actions for CEOs are more 
competitive than their counterparts who provide less discretion. This is due to the positive 
impact of managerial discretion on fostering a competitive environment among firms that 
operate in a country, and by aggregating this to the national level the environment between 
countries becomes more competitive. 
Chapter 6 – Discussion and Conclusions 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
268 
Finally, the third question, which enquired about the role that managerial discretion 
plays between national-level antecedents and consequences, has also provided interesting 
findings. Cross-cultural studies postulate evidence that a country’s cultural characteristics 
represent important drivers for its competitiveness (e.g. House et al., 2004; Javidan et al., 
2006). The author showed that discretion is driven by a country’s cultural practices and in turn 
it affects national competitiveness. While other mediators may also play a role in enhancing 
country competitiveness, the findings strongly exhibit that discretion is a prominent conceptual 
fulcrum that mediates the relationship between cultural practices and national competitiveness. 
By uncovering this relationship, the author could identify an important mechanism by which 
cultural practices impact country performance. 
6.1. Research Implications and Contributions 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis contributes to the strategic management field, particularly 
strategic leadership and managerial discretion, by moving beyond the narrow focus of the 
institutional environment and discovering important national-level antecedents by 
incorporating other cultural aspects and new consequences. As such, the findings of this study 
have several important implications.  
If countries allow more managerial discretion, how then would executives, firms and 
even industries in these countries differ from their low-discretion counterparts? One of the most 
notable domains in which the national level of managerial discretion differences will be echoed 
is in executives’ attributions. Logically, executives – and particularly CEOs – of firms 
headquartered in high-discretion countries, would be accorded more importance than others, 
simply because they are having a greater effect on firms’ outcomes (Quigley and Hambrick, 
2015). As such, an important implication of the national level of discretion would be the CEOs’ 
visibility in the media and their role in society. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) found that 
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CEOs’ high visibility in internal firm communications (e.g. annual report) may reflect his/her 
individual level of narcissism. Because of their importance, the concept of CEO celebrity (e.g. 
Wade et al., 2006) may be applicable in high-discretion countries. On the other hand, CEOs in 
low discretion countries may not be prominent in the media and may not be considered 
celebrities due to the attribution (discretion level) assigned to them. This is evident in how 
often we hear about and see Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg and many other American 
CEOs in the media as opposed to Nobuyuki Hirano, the CEO of the biggest Bank in Japan, 
which is a low-discretion country. 
Cross-cultural differences in managerial discretion could also have implications at the 
firm level. The concept of competitive dynamism (e.g. Smith et al., 2001) may be better 
explained by managerial discretion. Competitive dynamics refers to the speed at which firms 
can make strategic responses (e.g. Hambrick et al., 1996). These firms would act strategically 
fast and in a way that is predominantly associated with more radical innovation (Adner, 2002). 
As such, executives of firms headquartered in high-discretion countries are more likely to have 
fast strategic responses due to the continuously changing nature of the external environment 
and the availability of a wider array of actions, which results in hypercompetitive behaviour 
(D’Aveni, 1994). In contrast, in low-discretion countries, companies may be more likely to 
follow other competitors and have a stable strategy due to increased institutional isomorphic 
pressures. For instance, there is increased homogeneity amongst firms in Japan compared to 
other countries (e.g. the US) (Porter et al., 2000). Furthermore, national-level managerial 
discretion could be related to the strategic orientations of firms. Managerial discretion could 
explain the variance in Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic typology across countries. As 
discretion provides more leeway for executives’ actions, executives in high-discretion 
countries may be more innovative and consistently upgrading and looking for new 
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opportunities, which falls within the ‘Prospector’ type of strategic orientation. On the other 
hand, firms in low-discretion contexts would have an inward alignment where they focus on 
the efficiency of their operations and ignore external growth opportunities, which falls within 
the ‘Defender’ type of strategic orientation. 
Other important implications appear to have emerged following the discovery of the 
relationship between intra-cultural variation and managerial discretion. These findings could 
shed light on the stakeholder orientation of firms. Stakeholder orientation refers to managers’ 
behaviour towards stakeholders (Berman et al., 1999), which considers the totality of firms’ 
approach to managing stakeholders. Phillips et al. (2010, 2011) conceptualised stakeholder 
management into two types: narrow and broad orientation. At one extreme, managers could 
hold a narrow orientation by constantly honouring and focusing on the interests of a given 
stakeholder group (i.e. a few shareholders) over the interests of other stakeholder groups. At 
the other extreme, managers could exhibit broad orientations in which they focus on a wide 
range of stakeholder groups. If, as found in this thesis, greater heterogeneity within a given 
culture (having a wider range of stakeholder groups) reduces executives’ latitude of actions, 
then we may expect that this would result in executives following a broader stakeholder 
orientation. When a CEO is faced with greater constraints from several stakeholder groups, 
he/she will not be able to take actions that favour one group over the other and should focus on 
attending to the needs of these groups to limit or reduce those constraints. In this case, the CEO 
is expected to put more effort into serving a wider set of stakeholders (e.g. community service, 
well-being of employees, community, customers) and not take any initiatives that do not 
benefit all stakeholders. On the other hand, having a smaller number of stakeholder groups 
would accord the executive more discretion and in turn he/she would be able to categorise those 
stakeholders and attend to the most important and influential group (i.e. shareholders) at the 
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expense of others, thus having a narrow stakeholder orientation. In such situations, the CEO 
can maximise the benefits and well-being of an individual stakeholder group and could take 
more action at the expense of other groups. 
Scholars in the stakeholder research stream have admitted that how managers perceive 
their environment can have an important implication on how they prioritise and address 
stakeholder needs (Mitchell et al., 1997). Also, scholars in the discretion literature are aware 
that how executives perceive their environment may well affect the level of discretion they 
believe they have and in turn their behaviour (Carpenter and Golden, 1997). Executives may 
over or under-estimate the discretion accorded to them and as such may underperform. In 
heterogeneous cultures, executives may find themselves constrained by the claims from an 
increased number of stakeholder groups and therefore, by controlling for executives’ 
individualities (i.e. locus of control), would believe that they are more constrained by the 
external environment and perceive less discretion. In contrast, executives in homogenous 
cultures may find themselves more capable of attending to the needs of a smaller number of 
stakeholder groups and thus perceive themselves to have greater discretion. The mechanism in 
which intra-cultural variation affects the degree of managerial discretion may well be related 
to how individual CEOs perceive themselves to have discretion. 
Another implication could be related to the attribution of CEO effect on firm 
performance. In countries with more managerial discretion, CEOs have a greater effect on their 
firms’ outcomes (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). However, this direct relationship ignores 
the construct of intra-cultural variation and the fact that in any given country, CEOs may 
experience different degrees of managerial discretion subject to the number of stakeholder 
groups they are exposed to. CEOs that are exposed to fewer stakeholder groups are thought to 
have greater discretion, thus their effect on firm outcomes should be higher than those who are 
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exposed and attend to the needs of a wider set of stakeholder groups. Future research should 
consider the interplay between intra-cultural variation, managerial discretion and CEO effect 
on firm performance. Staying in the vein of firm performance, an important avenue of research 
could be related to stakeholder trust. Stakeholder and strategic organisation literature both 
emphasise the importance of firm-stakeholder relationships in developing high levels of trust. 
Trust is a crucial firm resource associated with competitive advantage (Harrison et al., 2010). 
When an executive encounters a greater number of stakeholder groups, he/she will only be able 
to attend to the needs of a small number of these stakeholders and as such may be at risk of 
losing the trust of others. Therefore, this could lead to deteriorating firm performance. 
Additional implications are echoed in the domain of leadership effectiveness. Recent 
additions to the leadership literature have made interesting advancements in its theoretical 
conceptualisation by illuminating what can be considered as emic (culture specific) or etic 
(universal) in terms of leadership attributes and effectiveness (Aktas and Sargut, 2011; House 
et al., 2014). This research stream has shown that leadership is culturally dependent and that 
the perception of effective leadership not only depends on the central tendencies of a given 
society but also on its tightness-looseness dimension (Aktas et al., 2016). Similarly, one may 
expect intra-cultural variation along with managerial discretion to be associated with the 
perception of effective leadership. For instance, in heterogeneous (high intra-cultural variation) 
societies, executives are faced with a greater number of stakeholder groups and are accorded 
lower discretion; as such, they try to attend to the needs of all or most these groups and are 
constrained in the number of actions they can take. In such situations, it is expected that 
participative leaders would be perceived as having the most effective leadership style because 
it reflects the degree to which executives take into consideration the needs of others (Jago, 
1982) and involve stakeholders in their decision-making processes (House et al., 2004). By 
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doing so, executives would be able to lower the extent of the constraints exerted on their 
actions. On the other hand, in homogenous cultures in which executives enjoy more managerial 
discretion, the autonomous leadership style would be more appropriate, because such leaders 
tend to work without collaboration or feedback from others and independently, and tend to be 
more assertive (House et al., 2014). This all seems to be acceptable in a society where leaders 
are faced with fewer constraints arising from fewer stakeholder groups.  
Moreover, the extant research examining the association between national culture 
(including intra-cultural variation) and innovation has concluded that culture does indeed 
matter (Puia and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013). Other works in the discretion literature (e.g. 
Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992; Sahaym et al., 2012) also suggest a strong link between 
the latitude of actions and innovation. Therefore, one may expect a role, particularly a 
mediating role, of managerial discretion in driving national innovativeness. Future research is 
encouraged to empirically assess such a proposition. 
The results presented in this thesis have additional important management implications 
as well. With business becoming increasingly globalised and internationalised, the profile of 
countries becomes of great importance and can become a tool for strategic corporate choices. 
National differences have shown a strong influence on market-entry strategies (Hennart and 
Larimo, 1998) and discretion has also demonstrated varied levels across countries (Crossland 
and Hambrick, 2011); managerial discretion could therefore shed light on entry modes of 
foreign direct investment and in locating target markets. CEOs operating in high-discretion 
countries may wish to internationalise via entry modes that involve more control and risk (e.g. 
greenfield investment). These strategies offer more latitude of actions and considerable options 
that the executive can choose from. Executives who are used to less discretionary environments 
may choose to carry out international expansion using less risky strategies such as joint 
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ventures. Also, the location of the target market may be related to the levels of discretion of 
that country. Executives operating in countries that provide considerable leeway to their actions 
may logically internationalise to similar countries rather than countries that impose more 
constraints on their actions. 
Moreover, managerial discretion could have an important implication on the CEO 
appointment process. Despite relying on the national pool (DiNardo et al., 1996), the CEO 
labour market in our current globalised world could be affected by cross-national differences 
in managerial discretion. For instance, transferring a CEO from a low-discretion country to a 
high-discretion environment might lead to substantial negative effects on performance. CEOs 
in high-discretion countries are used to taking bold strategic actions that do not necessarily 
comply with the overall cultural norms. When such a CEO moves to a low-discretion setting, 
implementing idiosyncratic actions is objectionable, thus any decisions that deviate from the 
cultural boundaries of that environment will lead to negative results on performance. 
According to Howard and Wellins (2008), CEOs have identified working across 
cultures and team mobilisation as the top two crucial leadership competencies in their 
enterprises. National differences have resulted in numerous failures in cross-cultural business 
phenomena such as market penetration and mergers and acquisitions (Stahl and Javidan, 2009). 
The national level of managerial discretion could also help in interpreting and understanding 
these cultural differences and their strategic implications. Cross-border merger and acquisitions 
are complex business phenomena (Collins et al., 2009) that involve higher levels of uncertainty 
(Shimizu et al., 2004). Also, such large strategic actions are dependent on the cultural profiles 
of the countries of the firms involved in these transactions (Basuil and Datta, 2015). Managerial 
discretion provides a clearer framework for executives to interpret cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions and could predict the success and failure of such deals. For instance, Daimler-
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Benz has been widely cited by analysts as a failure (The Economist, 2000), stating that culture 
has been one of the important triggers of this failure. The differences in the managerial 
discretion levels between Germany (country of origin of Benz, low-discretion) and the US 
(country of origin of Daimler, high discretion) could better explain the failure of this deal. 
Executives operating in high-discretion countries are used to taking bold strategic actions due 
to the greater zone of acceptance they enjoy, whereas executives in low-discretion countries 
tend to focus more on implementing symbolic actions based on market signalling. Therefore, 
initiating M&A transactions between countries that differ in their discretion levels (high and 
low) could lead to unsuccessful outcomes. 
Despite its critical importance in driving country competitiveness, managerial 
discretion could also have financial implications. It is worth noting that the idea of 
competitiveness is not only related to economic performance but also related to the ability of 
countries to compete on an international level. Managerial discretion has shown a significant 
correlation with country economic performance, measured by GDP per capita (Pearson 
coefficient= 0.526, p<0.05). As such, and from this simple statistical relationship, it is expected 
that discretion also plays a role in driving the economic productivity of a country. This 
investigation could open an interesting research stream later and have a significant impact on 
policy makers. Also, it will be interesting for future research to consider the mechanisms 
through which discretion could drive countries’ economic performance. The logic behind such 
a stipulation would be like the one employed in this thesis. Discretion allows executives to take 
actions from a broader array of choices; it drives their attentional heterogeneity (Abrahamson 
and Hambrick, 1997) and enables them to move from their status quo to foresee strategic 
change, which has a positive impact on firm performance (Quigley and Hambrick, 2012). 
Taking these characteristics into consideration, the competition scale would increase in a 
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country allowing firms to become more productive and seek more efficient actions, which all 
fall under the umbrella of boosting a country’s economic status. 
Finally, the positive influence of managerial discretion on country competitiveness may 
provide an interesting framework to examine the influence of firms over public policymaking, 
for instance in the establishment of rules and regulations. This interesting question may be 
important for non-market strategy research. Public policymaking literature often emphasise the 
impact of firm size, industry competition, country-level institutional determinants and the 
interaction between these as proxies for firm influence over public policymaking (Macher and 
Mayo, 2015). However, discretion may present a better theoretical fit for explaining public 
policymaking. Policy-makers are generally interested in achieving greater national 
performance and always seek to put their country on the global competitive map. The results 
show the positive impact of managerial discretion in accomplishing these goals. As such, 
policy makers should provide flexible institutional environments, particularly formal 
institutions, which allow for greater latitude of actions. By incorporating managerial discretion 
in non-market strategy research, answers for the relative success or failure of firms’ efforts to 
influence public policymaking may be provided. 
6.2. Research Limitations 
Like any other academic research, this thesis has several limitations that should be noted. First, 
the author focused primarily on the discretion available to CEOs without taking into 
consideration other top management members, for instance the CFO, and the interaction 
between TMT members. It is in line with the original conceptualisation and arguments of 
managerial discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987), and consistent with the focus of the 
mainstream work in managerial discretion literature (e.g. Crossland and Hambrick, 2011, 
Quigley and Hambrick, 2015). However, other board members are worth taking into 
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consideration. This thesis did not address the discretion of other executives, if the level of 
leadership centrality – the extent to which CEOs are the most influential actor within the TMT 
– is high. Future research, could investigate the extent to which leadership centrality is static 
across countries and if the discretion levels of other TMTs and the interaction with CEO 
discretion could lead to distinct outcomes. 
Second, although this PhD has a wide geographical spread including six different 
regional clusters, other important countries exist with a growing global presence and with firms 
competing on an international scale. The sampling in this thesis has resulted in the omission of 
significant countries such as Russia, Brazil, India, China, etc. which are becoming increasingly 
influential in today’s global economy. The theoretical reasoning presented in this thesis would 
support the idea that the association between cultural practices and managerial discretion could 
be applicable to other institutional contexts. However, there is a need to determine whether 
such findings in terms of the antecedents and consequences of discretion are also generalisable 
to other countries. As such, researchers are also encouraged to broaden the discretion context 
even further by including sample of other countries. 
Third, the empirical examination focused on publicly listed firms and the discretion of 
CEOs leading such organisations. The author did not address whether CEOs leading large 
private firms, family firms or even government-owned enterprises would also be provided with 
similar levels of discretion. There may well be other firm-specific factors that could affect the 
applicability of the country ratings, but it is interesting to see how the findings of this thesis 
would apply to CEOs of other types of firms. The reasoning would be very like the one 
employed in this research, as even CEOs of private firms are constrained by the institutional 
environment, which could be an interesting avenue for future research. 
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Moreover, consistent with the mainstream literature of managerial discretion 
(Wangrow et al., 2015), this thesis examined discretion as a static concept. Because of its link 
to national culture, which changes very little over time, the examination did not take into 
consideration the interplay between discretion and time. It is true that some changes in the 
external environment, particularly the industry context, such as the deregulation of a given 
sector, would significantly alter the discretion levels provided to CEOs in that environment, 
but how this may also apply to the national level. Despite the somehow static nature of culture, 
at least in the short term, there exists other national changes, for instance changes in rules and 
regulations or even in the political system. Thus, future research might consider how such 
changes in formal institutions affect managerial discretion over time. 
Lastly, one might argue that the research has some potential limitations in terms of 
measurement of managerial discretion, including population and respondents. As extensively 
discussed in section 4.4.2.2 of the methodology, this research follows the main stream literature 
and studies that were published in four star journals and have been inspired by the work of 
prominent scholars in the field such as: Donald Hambrick and Craig Crossland. The author 
wanted to establish a measurement technique that directly measures the construct of managerial 
discretion instead of relaying of secondary measures. Also, gathering secondary measures 
would not be appropriate as the examination refers to the impact of culture on managerial 
discretion, thus any measures indicating the degree of discretion in a country would relate to 
cultural dimension, which is the core examination of the these. Second, the direct measurement 
involved in this research is an extension of the seminal work of Crossland and Hambrick 
(2011), Abrahamson and Hambrick (1995) and Crossland and Chen (2013); these authors have 
developed such direct approach to assess discretion, using either industry analysts or 
international fund managers. The remarkable step involved in this thesis was the selection of 
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management consultants as the appropriate panel to rate discretion scores across countries. 
These panellists possess extensive knowledge of various factors (from individual to country-
level) that would either hinder or enable the freedom of decision making for chief executives. 
Also, statistical analysis showed the reliability and validity of their answers, as such it is 
considered as an appropriate panel. Furthermore, the population of respondents is very well 
positioned as opposed to earlier studies, Crossland and Hambrick’s (2011) population of 
respondents were eight, and the population of Crossland (2008) was 26, therefore the 57 
respondents constituting the overall population of this thesis is acceptable and way above 
earlier studies. Finally, one might argue that the respondents didn’t measure the construct of 
managerial discretion instead, they measured perceived discretion. Such argument holds to be 
incorrect. It is well documented that individuals in a specific environment are observers of their 
society if they possess enough knowledge (Javidan et al., 2006). These consultants possess at 
least 15 years of experience in consultancy and at least 10 years of experience handling projects 
in specific environments within the sample of this study, therefore they are very well informed 
and knowledgeable. At the end, we are all better observers of others than ourselves (Hofstede, 
2001), indicating appropriateness of the consultant panel. 
6.3. Conclusion 
This doctoral thesis contributes to the strategic management and particularly managerial 
discretion literature by examining the inter- and intra-cultural antecedents and the national-
level implications of managerial discretion across countries. The author provided a deeper 
understanding of the factors that yield managerial discretion and how discretion contributes to 
national performance. Also, the author showed the important mediating role that discretion 
plays between those antecedents and consequences.  
Chapter 6 – Discussion and Conclusions 
 
© Moustafa Haj Youssef - 2017 
 
280 
Understanding how discretion functions at the national level remains an under-
researched topic in the literature. Though this thesis represents an attempt to address this gap, 
there are several avenues for future research to consider. A greater understanding of the 
antecedents, consequences and the role managerial discretion that plays at the national-level, 
sheds fresh lights on the cross-cultural differences in managerial practices and the 
transferability/generalizability of these practices.
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